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Abstract 
 
A chemical supply chain (CSC) presents a network that integrates suppliers, manufacturers, 
distributors, retailers and customers into one system. The hazards arising from the internal system and 
the surrounding environment may cause disturbances to material, information and financial flows. 
Therefore, supply chain members have to implement a variety of methods to prepare for, respond to 
and recover from potential damages caused by different kinds of hazards. A large number of studies 
have been devoted to extending the current knowledge and enhancing the implementation of chemical 
supply chain risk management (CSCRM), to improve both safety and reliability of the CSCRM 
systems. However, the majority of existing risk management methods fail to address the complex 
interactions and dynamic feedback effects in the systems, which could significantly affect the risk 
management outcomes. In order to bridge the gaps, a new CSCRM method based on System 
Dynamics (SD) is proposed to accommodate the need to describe the connections between risks and 
their associated changes of system behaviour. The novelty of this method lies not only on providing a 
valid description of a real system, but also on addressing the interactions of the hazardous events and 
managerial activities in the systems. In doing so, the risk effects are quantified and assessed in 
different supply chain levels. Based upon the flexibility of SD modelling processes, the model 
developer can modify the developed model throughout the model life cycle. Instead of directly 
assessing different risks and providing arbitrary decisions, the obtained numerical results can offer 
supportive information for assessing potential risk reduction measures and continuously improving 
the CSC system performance. To demonstrate the applicability of the newly proposed method, a 
reputed specialty chemical transportation service provider in China is used and analysed through 
modelling and simulating the chemical supply chain transportation (CSCT) operations in various 
scenarios. It offers policy makers and operators insights into the risk-affected CSC operations and 
CSCRM decision-making processes, thus helping them develop rational risk reduction decisions in a 
dynamic environment. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
Summary 
This chapter gives a brief introduction to research background that helps to understand the research 
necessity from the academic and practical viewpoint. The thesis outline is provided to explain the 
different stages in chemical supply chain risk management (CSCRM), followed with the hazard 
identification, risk analysis and risk reduction. It is particularly innovative that the qualitative method 
is applied to capture and conceptualise the chemical supply chain (CSC) risks and a quantitative 
method is used to model and simulate the risk effects in the supply chain level. Meanwhile, the 
challenges in the research have been specified to demonstrate the deliverables to the knowledge and to 
indicate the achievements against the defined objectives. 
 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
The Chemical industry (CI) is playing a key role in modern world economy, which comprises more 
than 70,000 product lines and a number of geographic markets. The CSCs are the networks of the CI 
that integrates suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers and customers in one system (Tsiakis 
and Papageorgiou, 2008). Due to the geographic dispersion of the supply chain members, huge 
volumes of chemical materials often need to be purchased, and transported across the national 
boundaries by air, road, railway, pipeline or ship. Meanwhile, multiple manufacturing recipes can be 
applied for converting raw materials to finished products in batch, continuous or semi-continuous 
operation modes. These distinct features require highly coordinated material, information and finance 
flows to perform as per expectations.  
 
However, the CSC appears to be complex and volatile (Pasman and Rogers, 2012; Kirschstein, 2015; 
Li et al., 2015). The complexity may reduce the efficiency, while the volatility brings uncertainties to 
CSC operations. These are regarded as the sources of risks, which should be managed during the 
operations (Simangunsong, Hendry and Stevenson, 2011). A risk is defined as the potential for an 
incident or accident, which can interrupt the operational process and have a negative impact on the 
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system performance (Waters, 2011). In the CSC, the risks are the threats in terms of some unpleasant 
things, such as financial instability, global sourcing, and unstable regional situations, arising from the 
uncertainties and disruptions among the internal system, and the surrounding environment that 
damage the system performance and cause unexpected losses (Mckinnon and Braithwaite, 2005). 
Apart from the general risks addressed in the supply chain, each CSC has its distinct risk features. The 
hazardous characteristics of chemical substances, such as being flammable, toxic and explosive, could 
result in the significant risk consequence on the CSC systems. As well, it threatens the surrounding 
environment and endangers human health (Bonvicini, Leonelli and Spadoni, 1998; Papageorgiou, 
2009). In response, governments and authorities have introduced a substantial body of legislation, 
regulatory guidance and recommendations to ensure the safety of CSC operations (Furuhama et al., 
2011; Fisk, 2014; Scruggs et al., 2014). It is essential for the CSCs to provide low pollution and 
energy-efficient services and products for the framework of today‟s society in terms of the 
responsibility for environmental protection (Verboven, 2011). Meanwhile, the majority of fossil fuels 
are sourced from dangerous and unstable areas of the world. It leads to CSCs experiencing a higher 
probability of terrorist attack (Mullai, 2009). The academics and practitioners are highly concerned 
about the environment issue, especially after the hurricane Katrina, Indonesia tsunami and the Tohoku 
earthquake. When major disruptions occur, many CSCs tend to break down and take a long time to 
recover (Rao and Goldsby, 2009; Ehlen et al., 2014). To deal with these undesired risks, it is essential 
to broadly outline the sources of risks across the supply chain network following the structured 
method.  
 
CSCs are becoming more and more vulnerable, it is therefore important to effectively predict and 
control the risks through a coordinated approach under the challenges of uncertainty, complexity and 
regulatory oversight across the global economy (Christopher and Lee, 2004; Thun and Hoenig, 2011). 
Both academia and CSC operators appreciate the need to improve the safety and reliability of the CSC 
not only at the operational level but also at the strategy level, to identify the hazards, analyse their 
associated risks and manage the unacceptable ones (Mckinnon and Braithwaite, 2005). However, it 
still remains to be further investigated as to how hazard identification can be conducted, how the 
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causal relations and feedback effects can influence the risk effects in a CSC, how the risk modelling 
method plays a role in CSCRM and how the advantageous risk reduction decisions can be made.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The research questions are generated to ensure that the research objectives are met and the 
methodological points are specified, which are shown as: 
 What are the risks in the CSC? 
In theory, a risk is defined as a potential for an incident or accident, which brings undesired effects 
(Waters, 2011). In the CSC, the risks arise from the uncertainties and disruptions among the internal 
system, and the surrounding environment that interrupt the operational process and cause unexpected 
losses in terms of financial, service level and reputation aspects. It is therefore significant to ensure 
that all the risks have been recognised across the supply chain network.  
 
 What is a CSCRM framework that can be implemented to deal with the CSC risks? 
The framework describes the overall plan and reveals the priorities of the research. Managing CSC 
risks should first understand the sources of risks, and then facilitate risk management in a proper way. 
The knowledge gathered by means of the literature review will contribute to developing a framework, 
which facilitates the risk management approaches and suggests the structured steps to achieve the 
research objectives.  
 
 What are the hazards or sources of risks associated with a CSC and how to identify these 
hazards? 
An unforeseen hazard is a threat that can interrupt the CSC operations and has negative impact on the 
CSC performance, it is therefore essential to identify hazards in the CSC. To extend the understanding 
of the risks from an industrial perspective, a rigorous approach is required to strengthen the 
knowledge base in hazard identification and provide a comprehensive CSC risk portfolio. 
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 What are the appropriate methods for analysing and evaluating the risks associated with the 
identified hazards within the changeable system and how to implement the proposed methods? 
Although the proposed analytical approaches seem more promising, the formulation of a risk analysis 
technique is a rather difficult task within the changeable system. A novel method is required to 
accommodate the need to describe the causal relations between the hazardous events and their 
associated changes of CSC behaviour. The risks should be analysed that take into consideration the 
complex interactions and dynamic feedback effects among the system.  
 
 What is the appropriate method for reducing the unacceptable risks on system thinking and 
how can it be used to manage the CSC risks? 
Risk reduction measures aim at reducing occurrence likelihood of undesirable events and/or mitigating 
possible consequence severity. Before practically applying it, the reduction outcomes should be 
estimated to ensure that the provided approach does indeed address the research objectives. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES  
The primary purpose of this research is to propose an integrated method by using both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques to identify hazards, analyse and reduce the risks associated with the identified 
hazards in the supply chain level. Due to the insufficient hazard identification studies specific to CSCs, 
this research combines the distinct CSC risk features with sources of general supply chain risks to the 
established CSC risk taxonomic diagram.  
 
In the previous studies, various methods and different techniques are applied to accommodate the 
need to analyse and evaluate the risks. However, little has been done to address the dynamic 
interactive relations among the variables influencing the system operations, which could significantly 
affect the risk management results. It is imperative to develop a methodology that can obtain and 
represent the complex relationships using multiple sources of data to address the dynamic risk impacts 
in CSC systems.  
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In order to achieve the research aims, the objectives are addressed as follows: 
 To understand the technical challenges in carrying out hazard identification, risk assessment and 
risk reduction through conducting a literature review; 
 To propose a novel framework to capture, conceptualise, analyse and reduce the risks in the CSC 
and hence to strengthen the knowledge base in CSCRM; 
 To develop conceptual models to support the proposed framework; 
 To conduct simulations to investigate the significant risks and explore the risk reduction outcomes 
in CSC systems;  
 To conduct case studies to test the proposed methods. A real CSCT case is provided to examine 
the developed CSCRM method for hazard identification, risk assessment and risk management. 
 
1.4 THE CHALLENGES OF CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH (THE STATEMENT 
OF PROBLEM) 
In recent years, “global”, “complex”, “uncertain” and “hazardous” are the words frequently used to 
describe the CSC system. These characteristics contribute to the risks in both internal systems and the 
external environment and lead to the uncertainties and disruptions to the CSC operations. Instead of 
offering a holistic CSCRM framework, the majority of the studies were carried out to analyse several 
specific kinds of risks. It is important to credit the publications that had developed conceptual or 
analytical models to investigate the risks in the CSC. Ferrio and Wassick (2007), You, Wassick, and 
Grossmann (2009), Tong, Feng and Rong (2011), Oliveira et al. (2013) and Cai (2014) applied 
stochastic programming methods to investigate schedule and reschedule problems under demand 
uncertainty, so as to enhance the service level and reduce the waste in CSCs. Laínez, Puigjaner and 
Reklaitis (2009), Carneiro, Ribas, and Hamacher (2010), Oliveira and Hamacher (2012), and Ruiz-
Femenia et al. (2013) provided retrofit actions to deal with the investment optimisation problems in 
the CSC. Recently, an alternate viewpoint on the CSC operations reaches a consensus that 
environmental standards should be improved to minimise the hazardousness to the environment. Mont, 
Singhal and Fadeeva (2006), Bruinen de Bruin et al. (2007), Furuhama et al. (2011), Zhu, Cordeiro 
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and Sarkis (2013), Fisk (2014) and Scruggs et al. (2014) offered alternative viewpoints to manage 
policy related risks effectively and efficiently toward the increasing challenges in CSCRM. However, 
there is a need to provide a generally applicable method for analysing and managing multiple types of 
risks in the supply chain level. 
 
In practical terms, it is difficult to have a clear understanding of the complex CSC structure, operating 
procedures, and other aspects with available quantitative data. To provide risk information, past 
experience and expert judgement are frequently employed to describe the risk consequences and the 
behaviours of the CSC operations (Tse, 2012). However, the majority of existing methods are 
restricted by using the combination of qualitative and quantitative data in risk management research 
(Kaggwa, 2008). A novel method is required to conduct risk analysis and risk reduction using 
multiple sources of data in the research.  
 
Besides, the developed risk management systems are presented as static models and the simple 
algebraic equations are frequently adapted to represent the relationship between the system 
components (Leveson, 2004). It ignores the feedback effects among the logical loops emerging from 
the causal relations, which govern the system behaviour change over time and lead to the dynamic of 
system behaviours over time (Fernandes, Barbosa-Póvoa and Relvas, 2011). Meanwhile, the 
addressed relationships between each functional node are not simply proportional. The nonlinear 
relationships exist as the norm rather than the exception. It is imperative to develop a methodology 
that can obtain and represent both the linear and nonlinear relationships, so as to address the dynamic 
CSC operations.  
 
The identified research gaps indicate the valuable points of the additional work. It is challenging to 
provide a novel CSCRM method employing both qualitative and quantitative data/information to 
manage changeable CSC risks taking into consideration the complex interactions between the 
hazardous events and their associated changes of system behaviour. 
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1.5 ACHIEVEMENT OF THE RESEARCH  
A CSC is usually an extremely complex system in which multiple interdependent variables lead to the 
dynamic system behaviour. Uncertainties, disruptions, and hazardous characteristics of chemical 
substances pose significant challenges to the CSC operations. It is difficult to address the dynamic 
risk effects caused by the inherent relations and the complex feedback effects using the majority of 
the existing risk analysis methods. In this research, a system dynamics (SC) based CSCRM method is 
provided that encapsulates the hazards addressed in the literature, assesses their associated risks and 
suggests the beneficial risk reduction approaches. The applied SD modelling technique takes into 
account the complex interactions between a CSC and hazardous events, dynamic feedback loops in 
the developed system, and the uncertain nature of the risks, which is capable of demonstrating the 
CSC system operations and predicting dynamic behaviours as the system changes under different risk 
circumstances. It combines the theory, the method and the risk reduction analysis to investigate the 
dynamic risk effects in a complex system and provide useful insights not only in engineering but also 
in broad fields, such as policy making, planning, and management.  
 
In the hazard identification stage, the achievement of the research is the identification of the hazards 
in the whole CSC network. To broadly outline the sources of CSC risks, a risk diagram is developed 
in a hierarchical structure that classifies the identified hazards into nine risk categorises: supply risks, 
operational risks, demand risks, security risks, political risks, policy risks, macroeconomic risks, and 
natural environment risks. It provides a risk portfolio for further hazard identification research in a 
certain CSC. 
 
In the risk analysis stage, a noteworthy study is to introduce a systematic methodology for the 
quantitative analysis of the risks instead of assessing the risks based on the expert knowledge or 
limited historical data. The provided SD-based risk analysis is a scenario-based analytical method 
within a complex system. It quantifies the system behaviours with an interactive procedure that 
integrates risk scenarios. Revealing the gap between the expectation and the real-time performance in 
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different risk scenarios quantitatively assesses the risk effects in the developed CSC system and 
suggests the further risk reduction activities.  
 
To fit in with the risk reduction measures, the developed SD model can be modified through 
appropriately amending the inputs, re-defining the cause and effect relationships, and modifying the 
model structure. Developed risk reduction measures aiming at reducing occurrence likelihood of 
undesirable events and/or mitigating possible consequences are forecasted to suggest the rational risk 
reduction decisions.  
 
1.6 SCOPES AND OUTLINE OF THE THESIS  
The research scopes are set up to surround the core of the thesis, which offer an integrated method to 
identify the CSC hazards, analyse the observed risk factors and provide an advantageous risk 
reduction method in the CSC. The proposed method considers the dynamic feedback loops in the 
developed system and the uncertain nature of the risks. It is particularly innovative, when being used 
to support risk management in a dynamic environment, compared to the traditional static risk analysis 
methods largely based on the experts‟ knowledge or the limited historical data. The research gives a 
perspective to policy makers and operators, an insight into the dynamic CSC and suggests 
advantageous CSCRM packages on the system thinking. A graphical flowchart is presented in Figure 
1.1 for outlining the structure of the thesis followed with the identification of research gap, 
development of research, model validation, case study and conclusion. The thesis layout is 
highlighted and explained as follow. 
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Chapter 5:
SD Modelling of conceptual CSCRM
Chapter 6:
SD based CSC risk analysis and mitigation
Chapter 4:
Hazard Identification
Chapter 7:
Case study of CSCRM 
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Chapter 1:
Introduction
Chapter 2:
Literature review
Chapter 3:
Research Methodology and Framework
SD model validation
SD modelling and validation
Chapter 8:
Conclusion
 
Hazards taxonomic diagram 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The structure of the thesis 
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This thesis is compiled in eight chapters. Following the discussion of the research process as 
presented in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 offers a first attempt at broadly understanding the risk perspectives 
in CSCs, and discussing the state-of-the-art CSCRM research. Thematic analysis is conducted to 
gather the fragmental information, so as to provide a systematic description of the research. A 
classification tree for the CSCRM literature review is developed to thematically describe the sub-
divided risk classifications, research methodologies, risk management procedures, and CSCRM 
strategies. It finds that practically conducting CSCRM is a fertile area emerging from growing 
challenges. The distinctive gaps existing in current literature provide a future research agenda.  
 
In Chapter 3, the research methodology, research strategies and research methods are presented and 
discussed. It lays down the foundation for the study through indicating the main philosophical views 
behind the research methodologies. A CSCRM diagram is provided to reveal the overall plan and the 
priorities of the research. Furthermore, the chapter describes the methodologies of questionnaire 
survey and a SD modelling method, which are employed to capture, conceptualise, analyse and reduce 
the CSC risks. 
 
To strengthen the knowledge base in hazard identification in the CSC, Chapter 4 aims to broadly 
outline and decompose the unstructured hazards from the CSC perspective. Following the rigorous 
approaches, the questionnaire survey and online survey are developed to make inferences about the 
attitudes and opinions from the experts. The hazards are addressed and the importance of these 
identified hazards to the CSC system is obtained providing a portfolio of CSC risks.  
 
The SD method is employed to model and simulate the CSC risks on system thinking. Chapter 5 
discusses the conceptual development of the CSC model and its associated risk model. Interactions 
between the CSC and the hazardous events are formalised that combine the risk theory and risk 
generation mechanism. The major interdependences and feedback mechanisms are addressed that 
demonstrate the changes of system behaviours arising from the hazardous events within the system 
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boundaries. To establish sufficient confidence in the built model, a validation is carried out to test and 
verify the correspondence of the model structure and the robustness of the model‟s behaviours. 
 
SD is a scenario based modelling and simulation method to predict the system behaviours under 
certain conditions. Chapter 6 develops risk scenarios to assess diverse risks and explore possible risk 
reduction measures using the proposed method. The design of CSC conceptual models (shown in 
Chapter 5) is adapted to fit in with the established scenarios. It is capable of addressing the system 
performance as the developed model changes under different risk circumstances. The expert 
intervention is applied to generate risk scenarios and corresponding risk reduction scenarios in the 
methodology. Through benchmarking the system behaviour in different scenarios, the risk generation 
mechanism is simulated and the risk effects are addressed. 
 
Chapter 7 demonstrates the application of the provided SD-based CSCRM method. A case study is 
conducted to understand and improve the developed SD models and proposed CSCRM approach. The 
developed CSCT sub-model is adapted to simulate CSCT operations, as well predict the dynamic 
behaviours as the model changes under different risk scenarios. Establishing upon the flexibility of the 
SD modelling, the developers can use the different input values and amend the developed model 
structure throughout the life cycle specifically in design and operations phases. The obtained 
numerical results offer policy makers and operators insights into the risk-affected CSC operations and 
CSCRM decision-making processes, thus helping them develop rational risk reduction decision in a 
dynamic environment. 
 
Chapter 8 summarises the research findings on the hazard identification, risk analysis and risk 
reduction in all previous chapters. The research findings have been disseminated through academic 
publications in research journals and at international conferences making contributions to academic 
and industrial areas for the further research on CSCRM. The limitations of the proposed research are 
outlined and the opportunities arising from the proposed methods are suggested for future 
improvements and applications. 
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CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Summary:  
This chapter presents the process of carrying out a rigorous and structured literature review. The 
fragments of isolated investigations are gathered within the research domain to provide critical 
insights into addressed hazards, proposed risk management methods and implemented risk reduction 
strategies in CSCRM. The identified research gaps indicate the valuable points of additional work, 
which are used to clarify the research problem in the proposed study. 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND CHEMICAL SUPPLY 
CHAIN 
The CI is playing a key role in modern world economy, which produces a wide variety of chemical 
products to help maintain life at a productive and comfortable level (Massey et al., 2012). To satisfy 
the various customer needs, the CSC connects suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers and 
customers together to provide sourcing, manufacturing, logistics, storage and other services. However, 
the majority of chemical substances have hazardous characteristics, which threaten the surrounding 
environment and endanger human health (Papageorgiou, 2009). The disruptions and uncertainties 
arising from globalisation, complexity and vulnerability interrupt the operations and damage the CSC 
performance. These kinds of undesired events, which are regarded as the origin of risks, are 
determined by the hazardous characteristics of chemical products. To overcome the challenges of 
uncertainty and complexity in the CI and the CSC, it is necessary to make great efforts to reduce risks 
and improve the service through a coordinated approach. 
 
2.1.1 Current chemical industry (CI) 
The CI converts raw materials, such as oil, natural gas, and water, into different products including 
basic chemicals, commodity chemicals, polymers and speciality chemicals. The produced chemicals 
are widely used in automotive industry, construction industry, communications industry, energy 
industry, food industry, medical industry and other essential industries, which help maintain life at a 
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productive and comfortable level. It is hard to find an industry or any single economic sector that can 
work effectively without chemicals (Massey et al., 2012).  
 
In the financial aspect, the CI is regarded as one of the major contributors to national and global 
economies. The European Chemical Industry Council (2012) announces that “The European chemical 
industry plays a key role in ensuring that by 2050 over 9 billion people live well, within the resources 
of the planet”. In last fifty years, the CI has shown rapid and dramatic growth around the world. The 
value of global chemicals produced and shipped around was $4.12 trillion while it was US$171 
billion in 1970 (Massey, et al. 2012). The performances of chemical companies are different because 
there are wide gaps between the top and bottom companies. Meanwhile, the economic development 
level determines the global chemical production map. The newly emerging economies are likely to 
produce commodity chemical products. In contrast, the developed economies are enjoying the 
comparative advantage of speciality chemicals (Burgess et al., 2002).  
 
Generally, the chemical products can be categorised into 5 groups: polymers, petrochemicals, 
consumer chemicals, basic inorganics and specialities. Figure 2.1 shows European Union Chemical 
Industry (EUCI) sales by sectorial breakdown in 2010 and 2011. Specifically, polymer is a kind of 
large molecule chemical, which ranges from synthetic plastic to natural biopolymer. Petrochemical 
derives from petroleum and other fossil fuels, which is defined as the essential part of the CI. Large 
volumes of polymers and petrochemicals are produced, which account for the majority of EU 
chemicals sales. Consumer chemicals, such as soaps, detergents, perfumes, cosmetics and pesticide, 
are produced by polymers or petrochemicals that represent 12.8% and 12.3% of total EU chemical 
substance sales in 2010 and 2011. Basic inorganic products are synthesised from inorganic and 
organometallic compounds and applied in in every aspects of the CI, including catalysis, materials 
science, pigments, surfactants, coatings, medicine, fuel, and agriculture. In EU, the sales of basic 
inorganic chemicals take up around 13.5% of the sales in the CI. The specialities are particular 
chemical substances, which can be used as the auxiliaries for the other industries. Therefore, 
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speciality chemicals are the largest market in terms of sales, which accounts for more than 25% of 
sales. 
 
Figure 2.1. EU chemicals industry sales by sectorial breakdown in 2010 and 2011 
 
During the operations, the CI achieves more profit in sales by improving product design and 
flexibility but it is still facing many challenges in terms of cost reduction and environmental 
friendliness (Iles and Martin, 2013). The public criticises the pollution and waste produced by the CI, 
especially in China. Not only the public but also the governments have drawn attention to the 
environmental issue. In response, more rigorous policies and legislation are introduced to reduce the 
environmental damage and improve the industrial ecology. The chemical organisations have to 
reposition so as to fully meet the market requirements. As well, novel technologies and competitive 
strategies are implemented to provide desired products and services with low cost and high profit 
(Bartels, Augat and Budde, 2006). Risk management is recognised as the one of the core elements of 
value creation in such a challenging environment, which offers a method to deal with the unexpected 
challenges. 
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2.1.2 The global and vulnerable CSCs 
In practice, CSCs have multiple interdependent entities and numerous nonlinear interactions that are 
complex and dynamic (Tsiakkouri, 2010). A traditional CSC is a push system, which continuously 
produces low margin and high throughput products based on the schedule and plan, while special 
types of CSC are driven by customer orders to manufacture high value and low throughput chemical 
substances. To provide a graphic illustration, a conceptual CSC network is shown in Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2. A conceptual CSC network 
 
The CSC operations involve sourcing, conversion, logistics, and storage activities to provide required 
products and services to the customers. The CSC engages in developing effective strategies to sustain 
competitive advantages in the vulnerable environment (Liu and Nagurney, 2011). The geographic 
dispersion of supply chain members determines that huge volumes of materials often need to be 
purchased and transported from remote areas and unstable regions by multiple transportation modes. 
For instance, the United States imports crude oil from the gulf region by ships; China purchases tons 
of natural gas and oil from Russia every year through pipelines; Japan imports fossil fuels from the 
Middle East due to the limited domestic energy resources. To reduce the risk and achieve the desired 
performance, different sourcing strategies are applied to purchase the required products from 
upstream members. However, European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC, 2012a) indicated that 
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unexpected events, such as financial instability, policy change and unstable regional situations, can 
interrupt the operational process and bring negative impacts on the CSC systems. A majority of fossil 
fuels are sourced from unstable areas of the world, so that the flows of the CSC are likely to be 
affected by natural catastrophes, war, economic downturns and political upheaval. For instance, the 
earthquake and tsunami which happened in Japan resulted in the shortages of necessary chemicals all 
over the world (Park, Hong and Roh, 2013). In 2012, super storm Sandy interrupted the CSC 
operations because of the shut-down of ship terminals, flooded warehouses and labour shortage. 
These hazardous events caused tremendous losses in terms of cost, service level, and reputation 
aspects. During the manufacturing, different chemical products are formulated though blending, 
reaction and other activities according to the recipes. Multiple materials are added following the 
specific procedures at a particular time. The complex and vulnerable operational process destroys the 
efficiency of the CSC operations and brings the risks to the CSC system (Applequist, Pekny and 
Reklaitis, 2000; Pasman and Rogers, 2012). In addition to the risks existing in the operational 
processes, the requirements of environment protection restrain the development of the CI. The public 
is sensitive towards every chemical company in terms of the environmentally friendly movements 
(Verboven, 2011). To take environmental responsibility, it is essential for the CSCs to produce low-
pollution and energy-efficient products and services. 
 
In spite of the risk-related challenges, CSCs have to deliver a competitive business performance so as 
to survive in such an emulous industry (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a). It is estimated that a reduction of 
the CSC operations cost by 10% can create three times the profit improvement (Garcia-Flores and 
Wang, 2002). Therefore, both academics and CSC operators appreciate the efforts to improve the 
safety and reliability of the CSC.  
 
2.1.3 The unique characteristics of CSCs 
Compared with the automotive supply chain, general retail supply chain and other supply chains, the 
unique characteristics of the CSCs are associated with the strategic planning and operational activities, 
including extensive trading, highly security required, sensitivity to energy prices, restriction of 
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environment regulations and high capital investment (Adhitya and Srinivasan, 2010). These 
distinctive characteristics enable the CSCs to exhibit complex structures and particular ways of 
operating. In order to offer a structured description, the features of the CSCs are presented according 
to the stage of CSC operations: 
 Opportunistic raw material purchasing 
In the CSC, the exchanges of chemical raw materials are extensive and the trades take place in all 
parts of the world on a 24×7 basis. Therefore, the opportunistic buying is necessary because of the 
price fluctuation (Gebreslassie, Yao and You, 2012). To obtain more profits, chemical companies take 
advantage of every cost saving opportunity to make a good purchasing decision. However, there is an 
option arguing that highly discounted raw materials may lead to finished products at low prices when 
the customer demand remains at a certain level. The effective purchase decisions should be made 
through evaluating the difference between market requirements and sourcing cost so as to maximise 
the profit of investment (Koji and Macgregor, 2008). 
 
 Complex manufacturing process 
The chemical products are formulated by different kinds of feedstock and reaction equipment based 
on the recipe (Mele, 2011). The manufacturing is a complex network in terms of numbers of 
restrictions in chemical manufacturing operations, such as the amount of reaction materials, reaction 
time, and sequence of material adding. A slight change of manufacturing activity could lead to a huge 
difference of final products so the complexity results in the difficulties of finding out the root cause 
for quality issues. To guarantee the effective and efficient production, the production planning and 
management are required to reduce the waste and prevent the disruption during the manufacturing 
process. 
 
 High inventory level 
In order to catch the brisk demand, most chemical manufacturers implement make-to-stock strategies 
(Sharda and Akiya, 2012). It compels the companies to maintain a relatively high level of inventory. 
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Meanwhile, the products are manufactured in batch, continuous or semi-continuous operation mode. 
This kind of manufacturing feature leads the inventory level to increase in a specific period of time. It 
is a big challenge for the CSCs to manage the complex inventory system to optimise the inventory 
level in the whole system.  
 
 Complex container management 
In the inventory system, the containers and tanks are set up within each operation unit used to store 
the raw materials, work-in-process (WIP), by-products and finished products. The immiscibility of 
chemicals determines that the substances with different identities cannot be mixed during storage 
(Karimi, Sharafali and Mahalingam, 2005). Meanwhile, the movement of inventory is accomplished 
through one of five modes: pipeline, bulk tankers, parcel tankers, tank containers, or drums. To 
transport large quantities of a single product, pipeline and bulk tankers are widely applied, especially 
in the petrochemical industry. Parcel tankers are designed to carry an assortment of liquids with up to 
42 tank compartments, so that multiple chemical substances can be simultaneously transported. Tank 
containers, also referred to as ISO tanks, intermodal tanks, or IMO portable tanks, differ from other 
modes, which can be used for intermodal transportation by road, rail, and ship (Karimi, Sharafali and 
Mahalingam, 2005). To address the beneficial container modes and ensure the operations of the 
container chain, container management is required to improve the service level. However, empty 
repositioning is a challenging point given imbalanced global trade flows. Since CSCs provides global 
service, material flows are not balanced geographically. Decision-makers and operators have to 
correct geographic and temporal imbalances in the container chain to improve the utilisation and 
efficiency through a coordinated approach (Erera, Morales and Savelsbergh, 2005; Manuj and 
Mentzer, 2008b). 
 
 Vulnerable transportation operations 
Obviously, safety, efficiency and sustainability have become the critical principles to the CSC 
transport management (Reiskin, White and Johnson, 1999). Due to the geographic dispersion of the 
supply chain members, multiple transportation modes are used to support the transfer in various 
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materials and high technical, expensive and sophisticated transportation equipment is employed 
during the whole transportation processes. However, unforeseen and potentially disruptive events 
pose significant challenges to the operations in terms of difficulty prediction and risk control 
(Srinivasan and Karimi, 2002). Hazardous characteristics of chemical substances, uncertainties and 
disruptions pose significant challenges to CSC shipment as well as the surrounding environment, 
which potentially threaten ecological balance and endanger human health (Bonvicini, Leonelli and 
Spadoni, 1998; Papageorgiou, 2009). 
 
 The alternative customer orders 
In CSCs, the chemical composition are not specified by a certain value but described by a range of 
values with the words such as „at least‟, „no more than‟ or „less than‟. Therefore, it is significant for 
CSC members to understand the rules of products substitution. The disparate orders can be classified 
and combined by properly selecting the product attributes, so as to benefit from large-scale production 
(Bartels, Augat and Budde, 2006).  
 
2.2 REVIEW METHODOLOGY 
In order to construct a thorough understanding of current research, reviewing literature is a vital part 
of the research because it serves as a foundation and guidance to build the proposed study. On a 
positive note, the proper review of papers will help to identify the gaps and to find out what further 
efforts should be taken to bridge the gaps. Before undertaking any research, it is essential to collect, 
select and analyse „what is already known‟ through conducting a scientific literature review to find 
out a new research topic.  
 
To illustrate the existing studies systematically and structurally, the taxonomic diagrams provide an 
elaborate guideline of CSCRM. The review methodology is shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Literature review sources
 
Science-citation databases 
(Science Direct, Scopus and Science Citation Index)
Key words
 
Chemical industry, chemical supply chain, supply chain management, risk management
 (Meanwhile, the expanded set of these keywords is also given attention)
Analysis and taxonomy
 
  -- Identified hazard 
  -- Implemented risk analysis techniques and their characteristics
  -- Risk management strategy
Critical review
 
The research will further narrow down by key focus on the aspects 
of identified paper’s research propose , methodology, key finding, 
and practical implications. 
Implications and gaps
 
  -- Specify the practical implementation of this research
  -- Propositions and identification of gaps for future research
 
Figure 2.3. Methodology of literature review 
 
An overview of the literature context provides the current status of CSCRM research holistically. The 
specific papers are selected which are highly relevant to the proposed study in terms of the research 
scope, methodology, and methods. Then, the literature search narrows down and focus on the research 
purpose, methodology, key findings, practical implications and gaps in identified papers. From an in-
depth review, the taxonomic diagrams of identified hazards, risk analysis methods and risk reduction 
strategies are developed to graphically describe the findings of the literature review.  
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2.3 OVERVIEW OF CSCRM LITERATURE 
Although it is a fact that the concept of SCRM has attracted researchers‟ attention for the last fifteen 
years, very limited literature actually addressed the risk management issue from the CSC perspective 
(Khan and Burnes, 2007). There were 993 papers involving SCRM published by the end of 2005 
compared with 9,687 papers by the end of 2015. Especially in 2015, there are 2,425 papers published 
dealing with SCRM problems. However, insufficient studies employed existing methods or proposed 
novel methods to manage the risk from industrial practice. There were only 502 articles in 49 journals 
found analysing CSCRM problems by the end of 2015. Figure 2.4 presents the year-wise distribution 
of identified papers.  
 
Figure 2.4. Year-wise distribution of identified papers 
 
In the past fifteen years, the researchers have sought to not only manage the risks to improve the 
reliability of local company, but also provide a coordinated approach to manage the risk in 
national/international SC. It is observed that the CSC risk has been given attention by the researchers 
since 2001. Because of 9/11 attacks, the CSC operations were seriously damaged and experienced 
tremendous losses in service level, financial, and reputation aspects. After that, more and more 
academics and practitioners have realised the importance of CSCRM. There are a number of studies 
provided every year contributing to the knowledge of CSCRM, so that the total number of published 
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papers increased to 204 in the year of 2011.  In addition to terrorist risks, environment issues are other 
important factors in CSCRM. Since 2012, the scientific papers have grown exponentially when the 
environment issue attracts the attention from the governments and public. In this period, many studies 
have focused on the CSC planning, optimisation under uncertainty and hazardous material 
substitution analyses. 
 
In an attempt to classifying the papers based on the journals, the top 10 high quality journals are 
selected, as shown in Figure 2.5. The bar chart illustrates the number of published articles of each 
journal, while the red line is used to represent the impact factor of each journal. The top 4 journals are 
“Computers and Chemical Engineering”, “European Journal of Operational Research”, “Journal of 
Industrial and Engineering Chemistry Research” and “International Journal of Production 
Economics”, which encompassed 22, 11, 11 and 11 papers respectively.  
 
Figure 2.5. Published articles categorised by journals in top 12 
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To define the concept of SCRM, three structural steps are identifying the hazards, analysing the risk 
effects and reducing the unacceptable risks (Rao and Goldsby, 2009; Colicchia and Strozzi, 2012). In 
this research, the identified papers are categorised by the research scope of each paper by structural 
steps mentioned above. To do so, the papers concerning hazard identification, risk analysis and risk 
reduction process were reviewed along with the other papers. Figure 2.6 describes the number of 
papers categorised by the associated research area. 
 
Figure 2.6. The number of papers categorised by the associated research areas 
 
Note that there is some overlap between addressed the number of papers categorised by the associated 
research areas. There are 31 papers deal with more than one structural step in the CSCRM research. In 
particular, there is limited attention on literature review while only 4 review papers could be found. In 
these 4 papers, the studies concentrated on the specific types of issues instead of comprehensively 
reviewing the CSCRM concept. For instance, An, Wilhelm and Searcy (2011) observed the 
significance of incorporating SCRM through conducting a literature review in biofuel and petroleum-
based fuel supply chain. Nikolopoulou and Ierapetritou (2012) provided a review paper about optimal 
design of sustainable CSC. Tsai (2013) reviewed the studies associated with environmental 
distributions and risk management of phenols pertaining to the endocrine disrupting chemicals in 
Taiwan. Compared with other sequential steps, the majority of the recent studies focused on the stage 
of risk analysis. In CSCRM research, it is difficult to have a clear understanding of the complex 
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system structure, operating procedures, and aspects associated with available quantitative data. Hence, 
past experience is employed to judge the risk consequence and descriptive words are used to illustrate 
the behaviours of the CSC operations (Tse, 2012). The reviewing result shows that the qualitative, 
quantitative and hybrid risk analysis techniques were implemented to conduct CSCRM supported by 
multiple kinds of data. However, it is also observed that many studies in CSCRM are carried out to 
analyse a specific type of risk rather than assessing CSC risks as a whole. A further analysis of the 
proposed risk analyse techniques is required under a broader context for a more exhaustive variety of 
disruptive events in the CSC. In order to achieve the objectives of the research, risk reduction should 
be carried out to minimise the unacceptable risks. Though there are a number of reported studies 
involving the risk reduction measures, few papers actually address this issue by a practical method. 
Furthermore, the identified papers were refined by setting exclusion criteria that selected in the field 
of CSCRM. There were 152 quality papers selected which implemented the SCRM method in CSCs 
dealing with the different kinds of risks, of which the 30 most citied papers were shown in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1. 25 most cited papers categorised by associated research area in risk management 
Paper Citation Hazard 
Identification 
Risk Analysis Risk 
Reduction 
Applequist, pekny and Reklaitis (2000)  X  
Lohse et al. (2003)   X 
Frier (2003)   X 
Lasschuit and Thijssen (2004)   X 
Van Wyk and Baerwaldt (2005) X X X 
Kleindorfer and Saad (2005) X X X 
Mont, Singhal and Fadeeva (2006) X   
Bruinen de Bruin et al. (2007)   X 
Adhitya, Srinivasan and Karimi (2007) X X X 
You, Wassick and Grossmann (2009)  X  
Adhitya, Srinivasan and Karimi (2009) X   
Laínez, Puigjaner and Reklaitis (2009)   X 
Foerstl et al. (2010)  X X 
Carneiro, Ribas and Hamacher (2010)  X  
Bassett and Gardner (2010)  X  
Liu et al. (2011)  X  
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Liu, Liu and Chang (2011)   X 
Tong, Feng, and Rong (2011)  X  
Gebreslassie, Yao and You (2012)  X X 
Oliveira and Hamacher (2012)  X  
Asamoah, Annan and Nyarko (2012)  X  
Ruiz-Femenia et al. (2013)  X  
Oliveira et al. (2013)  X  
Leppelt et al. (2013)  X  
Ehlen et al. (2014)  X X 
 
Hazard identification, risk analysis and risk reduction are three main steps in SCRM. As shown in 
Table 2.1, there are three papers found dealing with the whole risk management procedure, while 
other studies focus on a specific research area. The reported studies are most likely to discuss the risk 
analysis research that involved 17 of 25 papers. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are adapted 
to address the risk consequence not only in operational level but also in strategic level. As well, 
various risk reduction strategies and associated methods are suggested to enhance the studying of 
CSCRM when 11 of 25 papers offer theoretical or practical methods to evaluate risk management 
decisions that might improve CSC system performance. 
 
To provide a meaningful analysis, the study is narrowed down by focusing on each paper‟s research 
purpose, methodology, key findings, practical implications and gaps therein. Table 2.2 provides a 
summary of 25 key papers in terms of the title, authors, publication year, focus, method type and key 
findings.  
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Table 2.2. A quick summary of 25 key research papers 
No Paper Citation Focus Method type Key finding 
1 Risk and uncertainty in managing chemical 
manufacturing supply chains (Applequist, pekny 
and Reklaitis, 2000) 
Evaluating uncertainties in 
planning and design phase 
Quantitative Evaluating risk premium to find out financial trade-off between 
risk and investment in a CSC during design and planning 
procedures. 
 
2 Never Change a Running Process? Substitution of 
Hazardous Chemicals in Products and Processes: 
Definition, Key Drivers and Barriers (Lohse et al., 
2003) 
Investigating the main 
driving factors and barriers 
of hazardous substitution 
Qualitative Suggesting that legislation, quality benefit, environmental and 
health concerns are the key drivers of chemical substitution 
and encouraging conducting co-operation, information sharing 
and regulatory pushing to enforce hazardous substitution. 
 
3 Hazard and exposure considerations related to 
chemical risk assessment (Frier, 2003) 
Discussing the analytical 
aspects of hazard analysis, 
exposure assessment and 
data requirements  
Qualitative Pointing out reliable information and systematic methods are 
still required to conduct hazard analysis and exposure 
assessment under introduced legislation.  
4 Supporting supply chain planning and scheduling 
decisions in the oil and chemical industry 
(Lasschuit and Thijssen, 2004) 
Introducing the optimised 
decision making toolset 
known as GMOS/NetSim 
 
Qualitative Suggesting an optimisation process is a one of the significant 
parts in CSCRM. GMOS/NetSim is a good method to conduct 
strategic planning in global supply chain, which has been used 
in oil, chemical and gas business. 
 
5 External risks and the global supply chain in the 
chemicals industry (Van Wyk and Baerwaldt, 
2005) 
Managing external risks in 
strategic level under global 
environment  
Qualitative Developing an integrated risk management framework to 
manage the external risks in CSCs and suggesting five 
managerial policies to strengthen risk management. 
 
6 Managing disruption risks in supply chain 
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005) 
Managing disruption risks 
in CSC 
Qualitative Building a conceptual framework, which integrated the risk 
assessment and risk reduction to manage the CSC risks, and 
conducting case study based on the collected data. 
 
7 Chemical management services in Sweden and 
Europe (Mont, Singhal and Fadeeva, 2006) 
Providing an overview of 
the chemical management 
services strategy in Europe 
Qualitative Analysing advantages and disadvantages of chemical 
management service in Europe and suggesting that joint 
efforts are needed to seek for economic and environment 
benefits. 
8 Risk management measures for chemicals in 
consumer products: documentation, assessment, 
and communication across the supply chain 
(Bruinen de Bruin et al., 2007) 
Analysing risk 
management measures 
method  
Qualitative Conducting conceptual analysis in risk management measures 
used in chemicals risk assessment under the requirements of 
REACH and developing a standard for establishing risk 
management measures categorisation. 
 
(Continued) 
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No Paper Citation Focus Method type Key finding 
9 Heuristic rescheduling of crude oil operations 
to manage abnormal supply chain events (Adhitya, 
Srinivasan and Karimi, 2007) 
Managing disruptive risks 
in a refinery supply chain 
through employing optimal 
rescheduling method 
 
Quantitative Proposing a heuristic rescheduling method to manage the 
disruptions and pointing out the factors affecting schedule 
resilience. 
10 Supply chain risk identification using a HAZOP-
based approach (Adhitya, Srinivasan and Karimi, 
2009) 
Using HAZOP-based 
approach to identify risks 
Qualitative Providing HAZOP-based hazard identification approach to 
identify the risks in a refinery supply chain and suggesting the 
possible cause, consequences, safeguards and reduction 
actions of captured risks. 
11 Risk management for a global supply chain 
planning under uncertainty models and algorithms 
(You, Wassick and Grossmann, 2009) 
Managing planning risk 
under demand and freight 
rate uncertainty in tactical 
level 
Quantitative  Developing a stochastic programming approach for the mid-
term planning of global CSC, which considered the 
production, inventory, time, transportation and service level.  
12 Financial and financial engineering considerations 
in supply chain and product development pipeline 
management (Laínez, Puigjaner and Reklaitis, 
2009) 
Discussing financial 
considerations in 
enterprise-wide decision 
problems 
 
Hybrid Indicating that the enterprise-wide decision problems must be 
formulated with realistic detail not just in the technical aspects 
but also in the financial components.  
13 Managing supplier sustainability risks in a 
dynamically changing environment sustainable 
supplier management in the chemical industry 
(Foerstl et al., 2010) 
 
Analysing and mitigating 
supplier sustainability risks 
in CI  
Qualitative Exploring sustainability risk assessment and risk reduction 
methods and conducting case study to demonstrating proposed 
method.  
14 Risk management in the oil supply chain: A CVaR 
approach (Carneiro, Ribas and Hamacher, 2010) 
Proposing an integrated 
risk management method  
for strategic planning 
 
Quantitative Developing a strategic method to evaluate and optimise 
investment planning in oil supply chain.  
 
15 Optimizing the design of global supply chains at 
Dow AgroSciences (Bassett and Gardner, 2010) 
Optimising the network 
design in global CSC 
Quantitative Presenting a novel method to optimise network design of global 
CSC. Both strategic and tactical improvements are highlighted 
to support decision making. 
16 Transportation risk assessment of chemical industry 
supply chain based on a dual model (Liu et al., 
2011) 
Assessing transportation 
risk in CSC 
Quantitative Analysing the features of chemical products and using dual 
model to analyse both the internal and external CSC 
transportation risks.   
 
17 A study on a framework of chemical industry 
supply chain risk management based on 3S and the 
internet of things (Liu, Liu and Chang, 2011) 
Integrating internet 
technology with risk 
management 
Qualitative Using internet technology to conduct CSCRM and briefly 
stating the implementation procedures. 
 
(Continued) 
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No Paper Citation Focus Method type Key finding 
18 Planning under demand and yield uncertainties in 
an oil supply chain (Tong, Feng and Rong, 2011) 
Optimising planning 
problem under 
uncertainties 
Quantitative Describing a novel mathematic method to optimise planning 
under demand uncertainty and product yield fluctuation which 
takes into account the reduction of the total cost, risk of 
customer dissatisfaction and inventory violation.  
19 Design under uncertainty of hydrocarbon bio-
refinery supply chains: Multi-objective stochastic 
programming models, decomposition algorithm, 
and a comparison between CVaR and downside 
risk (Gebreslassie, Yao and You, 2012) 
Optimising the design of 
bio-refinery supply chain 
under uncertainty  
Hybrid Identifying the hazards in bio-refinery supply chain and 
presenting a novel modelling and algorithm approach to 
support decision-making activities through analysing the 
value-at-risk in the supply chain. 
 
 
20 Optimization of the Petroleum Product Supply 
Chain under uncertainty: A case study in Northern 
Brazil (Oliveira and Hamacher, 2012) 
Optimising the investment 
under uncertainty 
 
Quantitative Proposing a two-stage stochastic model to simulate the 
investment planning in the petroleum product supply chain 
and applying proposed method in real case study. 
 
21 AHP approach for supplier evaluation and selection 
in a pharmaceutical manufacturing firm in Ghana 
(Asamoah, Annan and Nyarko, 2012) 
 
Evaluating supplier 
selection  
Hybrid Indicating that the evaluation and selection of suppliers should 
be integrated into a company‟s core strategic decisions. 
22 Multi-objective optimization of environmentally 
conscious chemical supply chains under demand 
uncertainty (Ruiz-Femenia et al., 2013) 
Evaluating demand 
uncertain risk in terms of 
economic and environment 
performance 
 
Quantitative Developing a stochastic multi-scenario mixed-integer linear 
program (MILP) to manage demand uncertainty which 
maximises the expected profits and minimises the 
environmental impacts. 
23 A Lagrangean decomposition approach for oil 
supply chain investment planning under uncertainty 
with risk considerations (Oliveira et al., 2013) 
Evaluating investment 
planning problem under 
demand uncertainty 
Quantitative Presenting a quantitative risk analysis approach to deal with oil 
supply chain investment planning problem under demand 
uncertainty and indicating that expected shortfall could be an 
efficient method to reduce the possibility of high cost. 
 
24 Sustainability management beyond organizational 
boundaries-sustainable supplier relationship 
management in the chemical industry (Leppelt et 
al., 2013) 
Managing sustainable 
supplier relationship in the 
CSC 
Qualitative Reviewing sustainable supplier relationship management 
introduced by sustainability leaders and examining the 
neglected impacts through conducting case studies. 
25 Chemical supply chain modelling for analysis of 
homeland security events (Ehlen et al., 2014) 
 
Investigating how a supply 
chain can adapt to and 
recover from risks 
Quantitative Applying SD method to capture the dynamic, disaggregates, 
and decentralised nature of large chemical supply chains and 
investigate how developed model can adapt to and recover 
from risks. 
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2.4 THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
Thematic analysis is a kind of qualitative research technique, which is commonly used in a literature 
review to emphasise, analyse and illustrate a specific research question. Indeed, there is substantial 
amount of effort on extending current knowledge in terms of managing the potential risks in the CSC. 
However, most of the research spread out across multiple disciplines and concentrate on various risk 
issues. Thematic analysis seeks to gather the fragmental information to provide a comprehensive and 
systematic description in the proposed research. A classification tree for the CSCRM literature review 
is developed to thematically illustrate the sub-divided risk classification, research methodology, risk 
management procedure, and risk management strategy, shown in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7. Classification tree for CSCRM literature review 
 
Risks appear in a huge variety of forms and impact on diverse points in CSCs. To structured identify 
the captured hazards, a risk classification method is provided to categorise the risks into operational, 
market, strategic and external environment aspects in Section 2.4.1. After identifying all the hazards, 
CSC managers adopt risk analysis methods to assess the risks and screen out the unacceptable ones. 
There are different tools and techniques for CSCRM that can be used in this regard. As described in 
Section 2.4.2, the applied methods have been classified into three groups, which are qualitative, 
quantitative and hybrid. Based on the determined risk management strategy, risk reduction procedure 
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is carried out to preventively or responsively deal with the unexpected hazardous events on system 
thinking. 
 
2.4.1 Hazard identification of CSCRM 
Hazard identification is an essential and significant step in SCRM. A list of risks is produced to 
indicate the risks that affect the CSC operations (Jereb, Ivanuša and Rosi, 2013). Common listing, 
taxonomy, scenario based process mapping and objective based process mapping are commonly used 
for identifying and classifying hazards. Brainstorming is employed to define the possible risks 
according to the knowledge of experts, while risk mapping techniques are used to systematically 
identify hazards in the system or surrounding environment. 
 
Even though there is a substantial amount of literature dealing with CSCRM, the attention on 
systematic hazard identification and classification from an industrious perspective is fairly limited. An 
overview of the CSCRM studies is discussed in the previous section but it is necessary to provide a 
clear and distinct analysis to capture the risks within the CSC. To provide a structured description of 
identified hazards, a risk classification method is adapted from Singhal, Agarwal and Mittal (2011). It 
categorises the risks into operational, market, strategic and external environment aspects. Each aspect 
and its attributes are explained in detail below. Meanwhile, a taxonomic diagram is established to 
structurally present the identified sources of risks in the examined literature. 
 
 Operational risks 
Operational risks appear and reside in operational characteristics, which refer to the possibility of an 
event occurring in internal SC that may cause product damage, service delay or reputation damage 
(Marley, Ward and Hill, 2014). In the literature, the risks associated with operational process have 
been analysed, which include supply process disruptions, inventory stock-out/unnecessary, improper 
container management, demand uncertainties, improper planning, lack of/ failure of information 
system, lead-time concern, and security risks. A schematic view of operational risks is graphically 
illustrated in Figure 2.8. 
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Figure 2.8. A schematic view of operational risks 
. 
Specifically, the occurrence of supply process disruption accompanies the movement of materials 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004). In the CSC, tremendous volumes of chemical substances need to be 
sourced and transported along the network. The unexpected event interrupts the supply activities and 
results in negative effects. García-Flores and Wang (2002) considered the supply uncertainty in their 
developed agent-based models to support the CSC management.  
 
Inventory risks belong to the risks arising from the requirement of reducing inventory cost and 
improving service level (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a; Laínez, Puigjaner and Reklaitis, 2009). In the 
CSC, Business-to-Business (B2B) sales are mostly conducted between the supply chain members, so 
that the feature of high inventory dominates the operational process. In the operations, the chemicals 
are commonly stored in tanks or other containers. It is difficult to monitor and manage the containers 
to ensure that they meet the industry standards (Van Wyk and Baerwaldt, 2005). The quality a largely 
amount of containers exacerbates the vulnerabilities of the CSC because it is difficult to be measured 
and monitored during the operations.  
 
According to the literature review results, demand uncertainty, planning problem and reschedule 
management are frequently analysed together (Adhitya, Srinivasan and Karimi, 2007). The majority 
of CSCs involve strongly diversified sources, multiple products and a long list of markets. It puts a 
huge pressure to satisfy dynamic customer requirements within narrower time-windows because the 
demands are uncertain. Therefore, planning management is another interesting research topic that 
aims for scheduling and controlling system operations. Planning risk arises from improper planning 
that leads to unexpected losses. To deal with planning risks, the risk management tool is regarded as a 
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helpful method to reduce the possibility of high cost in various viewpoints, such as physical, financial 
and information aspects (Oliveira, et al., 2013). Applequist, Pekny and Reklaitis (2000) offered a new 
technique to evaluate the risks in supply chain design and plan stage. It applied the risk premium 
construct for estimating an equilibrium point between investment and benefit. You, Wassick and 
Grossmann (2009) developed a stochastic programming model incorporating the production process, 
inventory level, transportation models, lead-time, customer demand fill-rate and risk measures in one 
system. Using the same method, Carneiro, Ribas and Hamacher (2010), Tong, Feng and Rong (2011) 
analysed the planning problem under demand uncertainty in the oil supply chain.  
 
Security risks refer to third parties who intend to steal proprietary data, knowledge or interrupt the 
supply chain operations. Manuj and Mentzer (2008a) indicated that the security risks include 
infrastructure damage and information leakage due to spying, system crash, public and private utility 
services disruptions and criminal activities. In the global environment, the CSCs can be easily 
attacked by terrorists. Therefore, security risk is of high concern to the CSC operators, especially after 
9/11 terrorist attack (Adhitya and Srinivasan, 2010). In order to estimate the potential impacts of man-
made and natural disasters on chemical plants, Ehlen et al. (2014) developed an agent-based model to 
analyse the security events. 
 
Furthermore, a hazardous event could not only disrupt the physical flow, but also affect the 
information exchanging in the supply chain system. Information technology is provided to support to 
avoid defaults and to generate the trust between the members (Liu, Liu and Chang, 2011; 
Wakolbinger and Cruz, 2011).  
 
 Strategic risks  
The strategic risks represent the risks related to supply chain strategic characteristics that influence the 
whole supply chain context (Barbosa-PÓvoa, 2012). Preliminary studies suggested that the focus of 
CSCRM shifted from operational risks towards more tactical and strategic risks due to globalisation 
and complexity. Generally, the proposed studies are following a structured approach to assess the 
  
33 
 
strategic risks of improper network design, lack of information sharing, lack of relationship 
management, and unsuitable location of facilities (Carsano, Vecchietti and Montagna, 2011; Awudu 
and Zhang, 2012). Figure 2.9 describes a schematic view of strategic risks, which were analysed in 
the literature. 
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Figure 2.9. A schematic view of strategic risks 
 
Compared with other industries‟ supply chain, a CSC can be enormously long and complex. The 
various intermediate links in the CSC systems are exposed to various risks, which have a tremendous 
impact on supply chain performance (Craighead et al., 2007). The design of the CSC structure is 
required to be optimised to provide a more robust and reliable network in the changeable environment. 
Bassett and Gardner (2010) give the credit of network optimisation studies that offer different optimal 
platforms for CSCM and CSCRM. Mathematic programming has been frequently employed to deal 
with the problems in this subject. Corsano, Vecchietti and Montagna (2011) demonstrated a proposed 
mathematic programming model in Dow AgroSciences for sustainable design while considering the 
recycling process. It suggested that the application of network optimisation could improve CSC 
performance in terms of cost, time and reputation, which can be regarded as a great help to business 
(Naraharisetti, Karimi and Srinivasan, 2011). 
 
Additionally, Laínez, Puigjaner and Reklaitis (2009) suggested a computational framework to explore 
how relationships will affect the supply chain operations. In order to support this viewpoint, 
conceptual or analytical models are built to investigate the problem in supplier and customer 
relationships. Foerstl et al. (2010) integrated the supplier sustainability risk assessment and 
corresponding response process in one system to manage the supplier relationship in the CSC. 
Similarly, Leppelt et al. (2013) empirically analysed the sustainable supplier relationship management 
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theory, which is introduced by sustainability leaders in the CI all over the world. It investigated both 
advantages and neglected impacts of making sustainable supplier relationship development and 
provides a scientific supplier relationship management framework to enhance the operational 
performance of the CSC.  
 
 Market risks  
Market risks fall into a broad category of the market fluctuations that affect the supply chain 
behaviours across the industry (Christopher and Lee, 2004). Although the CI is a mature industry, its 
market environment is still full of uncertainties (Bartels, Augat, and Budde, 2006). Within the 
CSCRM context, the identified risk components of market risks cover price fluctuation, exchange rate 
arbitrage, various customer requirements and requirement of hazard products substitution. A 
schematic view of market risks is presented in Figure 2.10. 
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Figure 2.10. A schematic view of market risks 
 
Price fluctuation risk is known as economic risk which refers to an economic fluctuation accompanied 
by the economic activity changes (Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1987; Rao and Goldsby, 2009).  Inflation 
or changes in the prices will result in the price fluctuation, so the CSC has to take price variation into 
consideration when making operational decisions. This is beneficial for allowing the CSC to exploit 
cost benefits from the price fluctuation and exchange rate arbitrages in the global market 
(Gebreslassie, Yao and You, 2012).  
 
Competitive risk derives from the uncertainties interrelated with dynamic customer demands and 
expresses in comparison between the existing products and services and potential entrants (Miller, 
1991). The actions are taken by firms to satisfy various requirements and to maintain the market share. 
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However, the environmental awareness challenges the CSC operations and profitability in these years. 
CSCs have to change its traditional conception in operations to adapt to the new requirement of 
incorporating environmental concern along with the economic criteria (Sarkis, Zhu and Lai, 2011). 
The requirements of hazardous chemicals substitution indeed contribute to the competition that forces 
the CSCs to provide alternative produce and services to the market (Acar and Gardner Jr, 2012).  
 
 External environment risks 
Globalisation and complexity pose significant challenges for CSC operations because they can be the 
sources of risks which arise from the internal system or the surrounding environment. Compared with 
internal risks, the external environment risks, such as terrorism, natural disaster and political issues, 
are much more likely to disrupt the CSCs (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). Special attention in the CSC 
design stage should be given to systematically identify, assess and control the environment risk 
factors at the beginning. In CSCRM literature, external environment risks refer to a broad term of 
undesired events surrounding the external environment (Daniel, et al., 2004). The studies focus on 
minimizing the risk of political instability, policy changes, environment protection problems, frequent 
natural disasters, and social challenges. Figure 2.11 describes a schematic view of external 
environmental risks. 
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Figure 2.11. A schematic view of external environmental risks 
 
A political risk is described as the uncertainty and instability when a major change happens in a 
political regime (Barry, 2004). In the global CSC, huge volumes of fossil fuel are exploited from 
unstable regions of the world due to the geographically uneven dispersion. The wars in Afghanistan 
(2001), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011) sent the feedstock prices soaring. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
terrorism is of the highest concern and the CSC has had to incur higher operating cost in response to 
  
36 
 
the terrorist threat (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). These kinds of disturbances affect the supply 
activities and result in tremendous loss. Therefore, the CSC managers adopt various risk analysis 
methods to evaluate the political risk in the respective regions before making a business decision.  
 
Manuj and Mentzer (2008b) pointed out that both political risk and policy risk are frequently 
experienced during the operations. It is significant to fully understand policy risks, such as tax policy, 
laws, regulations and the available policy material before getting down to business (Ting, 1988; 
Schildhouse, 2006). Recently, the governments and public have been concerned about the 
environmental problems of CSC operations. There are more and more legislation, industrial best 
practices, regulatory guidance, recommendations, etc., introduced to protect against the pollution and 
other environmental concerns, introduced to protect human health and the environment from 
significant risks and making contributions to a diverse, sustainable and economic environment. 
Therefore, the CSC has to adapt its products and services toward a more sustainable environmental 
risk assessment (Zhu, Cordeiro and Sarkis, 2013; Ruiz-Femenia et al., 2013). Coinciding with the 
requirements of the European policy of REACH (Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of 
CHemicals), Bruinen de Bruin et al. (2007) developed a table of criteria which incorporates the 
environment issues and risk factors to support CSCRM.  
 
Meanwhile, the natural disasters and the climate changes are frequently experienced in real life and 
mostly analysed in the literature. The natural environment uncertainty brings catastrophic 
consequences that not only affect the CSC operations, but also damages the world economy (Peng, 
Peng, Chen, 2014). Therefore, it is imperative to develop a method that can be used to simulate the 
CSC operations under the disruption and address the dynamic risk effects in the supply chain level. 
 
The literatures in CSCRM develop a generic understanding that initiates risk components in different 
sectors. A detailed synthesis of the literature in these disciplines provides empirical evidences of 
hazard identification in the CSC, which enables the authors to develop a typological diagram to 
illustrate the under-investigated risk components. Figure 2.12 incorporates the preceding discussion 
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of identified hazards and structurally illustrates the supply chain risk classification framework 
proposed by Singhal, Agarwal and Mittal (2011). This taxonomic diagram can serve as a fundamental 
guide for future CSCRM research.  
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Figure 2.12. A typological diagram of CSC risks 
 
2.4.2 Implemented risk analysis techniques and their characteristics 
In CSCRM research, a large number of studies have been devoted to extending current knowledge 
and enhancing the implementation of CSCRM. The various methods are provided to conduct risk 
analysis and risk reduction using multiple sources of data, such as numerical data, expert judgement, 
and interviews (Kaggwa, 2008; Sodhi, and Tang, 2012). To provide a structural analysis, an overview 
is discussed that categorises the implemented methods into qualitative, quantitative and hybrid aspects: 
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 Qualitative research methods 
Generally, qualitative methods investigate the risk issues from theoretic and empirical perspectives 
that the studies are carried out to enhance the CSCRM theory (Wagner and Bode, 2006). In the 
CSCRM research, qualitative methods can be classified into three kinds of approaches, which are 
literature review, conceptual analysis and empirical study. A schematic view of qualitative research 
methods addressed in the literature is illustrated in Figure 2.13.  
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Figure 2.13. A schematic view of qualitative research methods addressed in the literature 
 
Literature review provides a whole picture of associated issues in the past works, which serves as a 
base and guide to proposed study. The proper review of research papers will help to identify what has 
been done and what further efforts should be taken to improve the CSCRM. Cohen and Kunreuther 
(2007) emphasised the contribution of Paul Kleindorfer in CSCRM discipline and provided a novel 
framework to manage the disruption risks in the CSC. You, Wassick and Grossmann (2009) reviewed 
scientific articles for tactical planning of a global multi-product chain under uncertainty. 
 
Conceptual technique refers to the method used to describe and enhance the fundamental concepts, it 
also provides a theoretical framework to future research. It is important to credit the previous 
publications that have developed conceptual models to investigate various kinds of risks in the CSC. 
Lohse et al. (2003) conceptualised the basic risk issues in hazardous chemicals substitution. Van Wyk 
and Baerwaldt (2005) conducted a conceptual analysis to manage the various disruption risks in the 
CSC. Facing the challenges of introduced policy, a conceptual framework is provided to investigate 
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policy risk in the supply chain level (Bruinen de Bruin, et al., 2007). Adhitya, Srinivasan and Karimi 
(2009) provided a qualitative method to identify the hazards in a refinery supply chain.  
 
The empirical approach is an integral method that gains the knowledge through analysing the direct 
and indirect information from case study, accident data, industrial survey and interview. In a detailed 
synthesis of the literature, it is found that a case study has been undertaken to investigate various 
topics in the proposed subject, such as optimising investment planning in Northern Brazil (Oliveira 
and Hamacher, 2012), sustainable supplier relationship management in the CI (Leppelt et al., 2013), 
and a case study of CSC risk analysis based on Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Fuzzy 
Comprehensive Assessment (FCA) mode (Lu, 2015). Industrial survey is another method of empirical 
analysis (Meric et al, 2002). Sodhi, Son and Tang (2012) investigated the researchers‟ perspectives on 
SCRM and indicated the gaps needed to be closed with the help of questionnaire survey. 
 
 Quantitative research methods 
The attention paid to and the research conducted on the risk quantification is increasingly growing as 
time goes on. Therefore, a variety of concepts and methods have been developed to quantitatively 
analyse CSC risks and support risk management decision making (Marhavilas, Koulouriotis and 
Gemeni, 2011; Laínez and Puigjaner, 2012). The proposed approaches can be broadly categorised into 
mathematical modelling, computational simulation, and statistics and probability analysis groups, as 
described in Figure 2.14. 
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Figure 2.14. A schematic view of quantitative research methods addressed in the literature 
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Mathematic modelling methods are most discussed in the literature, which consist of multi-objective 
programming, linear and nonlinear programming, and other quantitative mathematical programming 
methods. The studies have been devoted to quantitatively analyse the CSC risks in terms of time, 
financial, quality and reputation aspects (Pai et al., 2003; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011). In 
particular, Oliveira et al. (2013) applied the multi-objective mathematic modelling method to weight 
the risk reduction investments and benefits on the finance side, so as to find the optimised decision 
making under demand uncertainty. To measure the planning risk under demand uncertainties, the 
stochastic programming models are developed to represent both linear and nonlinear relationships in 
the CSC system (Guillén-Gosálbeza and Grossmann, 2010; Tong, Feng and Rong, 2011; Gebreslassie, 
Yao and You, 2012). In contrast, mixed-integer programming models are frequently used to optimise 
network design of the global CSC. Bassett and Gardner (2010) highlighted the advantages of strategic 
and tactical improvements for network optimisation. 
 
Simulation modelling approach is a systematic technique for understanding the interactive impacts of 
the risks under different scenarios. Principally, agent-based simulation, discrete event simulation and 
SD simulation are widely used to investigate the causal relations between supply chain system and 
hazardous events for various risk settings. Gao, Shang and Kokossis (2009) developed agent-based 
models to simulate the dynamic behaviours of a CSC, so as to quantitatively estimate the 
compromised risk management decisions. Ge et al. (2004), Janamanchi and Burns (2007) and 
Campuzano, Mula and Peidro (2011) conducted discrete event simulation to analyse the dynamic risk 
effects. However, agent based simulation and discrete event simulation present the developed supply 
chain models as static (Leveson, 2004). It ignores that the information feedback governs the change of 
system behaviours which could significantly affect the risk management outcomes. On the contrary, a 
SD method represents the system operations and assesses the risks under the concept of dynamics. It 
is employed to address the feedback effects among the logical loops emerging from the interactive 
relationships (Tako and Robinson, 2014).  
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Furthermore, some research about the CSCRM has been conducted based on statistical and 
probability analysis. It is a quantitative method used in hypothesis testing (Hung and Ryu, 2008). 
Foerstl et al. (2010) investigated several hypotheses of managing the supply risks in the CSC to 
enhance the operational performance. Ghadge (2013) indicated the benefits of utilising statistics and 
probability analysis method to assess operational and tactical risks. 
 
 Hybrid research methods 
Tang and Musa (2011) indicate that there is a huge potential for developing a hybrid technique to 
capture the complex and dynamic behaviours of risks. It is an integrated method, whereby both 
qualitative and quantitative techniques are applied to deal with the risk analysis and risk reduction. 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012) conducted a questionnaire survey to comprehensively identify and 
empirically evaluate the risks contained in the cargo flows between the Gulf of Finland and Finnish 
mainland. Then, a simulation model has been constructed to simulate the possibility, consequence and 
the subjective value of risks.  
 
Even though hybrid methods are the techniques of interest in the SCRM research, very limited study 
actually provides a hybrid method incorporating the risk issues from industrial practice (Ritchie and 
Brindley, 2007). Aqlan and Ali (2014) suggested that the hybrid risk management methods, such as 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Failure Model and Effects Analysis (FMEA), 
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), have huge potential to be implemented in 
CSCRM. Specifically, FTA provides a method for cause analysis in depth based on a particular 
accident, which is often used in system-level risk assessment. The inherent logical relationships can 
be qualitatively or quantitatively analysed. The ETA method logically develops a decision tree model 
to explore the possible outcome following an initiating event where the risks are presented based on 
probable subsequent events and final result events. FEMA is a kind of technique for failure analysis, 
which has been widely used in SCRM, while FMECA is an extension of FMEA used to analyse the 
possibility of failure modes and the severity of their consequence (Tuncel and Alpan, 2010; Lavastre, 
Gunasekaran and Spalanzani, 2012). AHP provides a comprehensive and rational framework for 
  
42 
 
structuring a hazards hierarchy and quantifying hazards weight, for overall CSC risk, which helps 
decision-makers to expand their understanding of the hazards through risk ranking (Asamoah, Annan 
and Nyarko, 2012). Furthermore, many techniques are integrated in described methods to fill the gap 
in criticality analysis requirement and to enhance the risk management performance, such as fuzzy 
logic (Yang, Bonsall and Wang, 2008; Wulan and Petrovic, 2012), grey theory (Yang and Chen, 
2006), Monte Carlo simulation (Hekimoğlu and Barlas, 2010; Olson and Wu, 2011), Bayesian nets 
(Yang, Bonsall and Wang, 2008), Markov models (Bilsel and Ravindran, 2012), neural networks (Wu 
and Olson, 2013) and Evidential Reasoning (Yang and Xu, 2002; Yang, Bonsall, and Wang, 2010). 
The following are descriptions of the hybrid approaches addressed, shown in Figure 2.15.  
 
Hybrid research 
methods
 
 
Fault tree analysis 
(FTA)
 
 
Event tree analysis 
(ETA) 
 
Analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) 
 
 
Failure Model and 
Effects Analysis 
(FMEA)
 
 
...
 
 
Empirical study/
Simulation 
modelling 
 
 
Figure 2.15. A schematic view of hybrid methods addressed in the literature 
 
As shown in Figure 2.16, the taxonomic diagram of implemented CSCRM methods is developed 
which represents the whole picture of the research methods used in the literature. Although the 
proposed approaches seem more promising, the formulation of a comprehensive and systematic 
CSCRM technique is a rather difficult task. Researchers have a difficult experience to accurately infer 
the behaviours of complex systems and address the dynamic risk effects in the supply chain level. The 
identified research gaps indicate the valuable points of additional work that provides a novel risk 
management method employing limited qualitative and quantitative data/information to manage a 
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more exhaustive variety of CSC risks. It should address the complex interactions and dynamic 
feedback effects among the developed system and hazardous events, which could significantly affect 
the outcomes of CSCRM. 
 
Hybrid research 
methods
 
Quantitative research 
methods
 
Simulation 
modelling 
 
Statistics and 
probability 
analysis
 
Mathematical 
modelling
 
Linear 
programming 
modelling
 
Stochastic 
modelling
 
Qualitative research 
methods
 
Literature 
review 
 
Conceptual 
approach
 
Empirical 
approach
 
Case study
 
Survey based 
statistical design
 
Research methods
 
 
Empirical study 
& Simulation 
modelling
 
 
Figure 2.16. A schematic view of sources of CSCRM methods addressed in the literature 
 
2.4.3 Risk management Strategy 
Risk management techniques represent the methods proposed by researchers to address the primary 
research objectives in CSCRM, whereby actions are taken from the view of the outcomes of risk 
assessment (Lynch, 2012). Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009) indicate that agility, flexibility and 
preparedness are the main principles in the CSCRM. Efforts have, therefore, intended to provide a 
structural method to reduce the risks. The risk management mechanisms are based upon the applied 
strategies that can be preventive or responsive. The goal of the proactive strategy is to build a robust 
supply chain to ensure that the hazardous event occurrence likelihood can be reduced (Knemeyer, 
Zinn and Eroglu, 2009). The occurrence of hazardous events, however, cannot be eliminated no 
matter how much effort and investment is spent. The adaption of a reactive procedure is suggested to 
reduce the risk when it indeed affects the supply chain operations due to the unmanageable risks 
which have frequently occurred. Figure 2.17 presents the risk management strategies and their 
associated approaches addressed in the literature. 
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Figure 2.17. CSCRM strategies and their associated approaches addressed in the literature 
 
Specifically, an avoidance approach is the extreme case that is employed to significantly reduce the 
likelihood of end unbearable threat. Meanwhile, a collaborative relationship among the members is 
formed to construct the risk tolerance in advance. In the CSCRM research, there are a number of 
preventive approaches suggested, such as sustainable supplier relationship management combining 
the SCRM framework with information technologies (Liu, Liu and Chang, 2011), and coordinating of 
information sharing (Lohse et al., 2003). In contrast, reactive risk management approaches are applied 
to minimise the risk effects, such as developing an emergency response plan (Kleindorfer and Saad, 
2005), reducing the risk through improved confidence (Christopher and Lee, 2004), and improving 
resilience of network (Christopher and Peck, 2004).  
 
A novel risk management method is required to explore the potential effects of risk reduction methods 
and to analyse the risk criteria against the risk management incentive, so as to suggest the beneficial 
CSCRM decision making in further research (Woodruff, 2005; Thun, Drüke, and Hoenig, 2011; 
Bandaly et al., 2012; Micheli, Mogre and Perego, 2014). 
 
2.5 STATE-OF-ART OF PROPOSING SYSTEM DYNAMICS (SD) METHOD TO 
SUPPORT SUPPLY CHAIN RISK ANALYSIS 
Forrester (1961) first proposed a SD methodology for the adoption of qualitative as well as 
quantitative methods to solve multidimensional problems. Qualitative methods are used in 
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conceptualizing the system model and quantitative methods contribute to SD modelling and 
simulation. An SD model emerging from the initial description of the real system is developed by two 
pairs of basic concepts: resources-information and levels-rate. It combines the theory, methods and 
philosophy in control engineering and non-linear dynamic system discipline that has been widely 
applied to investigate economic, management, engineering patterns and other issues distinct from the 
general system control method (Lyneis and Ford, 2007).  
 
In terms of risk management discipline, SD has been firstly applied to manage risks in project 
management. There are many SD models developed to evaluate the interaction between project 
performance and various aspects of decision-making processes in project management (Ford and 
Bhargav, 2006). Recently, SD modelling technology has been used to deal with a variety of issues in 
SCM and SCRM disciplines. To provide a structural and distinct analysis to capture the investigated 
SCM issues by the SD method, this research adopts the classification method provided by Tako and 
Robinson (2012) to separate the SCM issues in the strategic level and the operational level. In the 
strategic level, SCM seeks to deal with company-wide problems involving long term activities. The 
studies mainly focus on network optimisation, relationship management and information sharing. 
Tactical management will produce cost benefits for the supply chain, such as bullwhip effect analysis, 
reverse logistics management, and cost management. Operational measures are provided to handle the 
problems related to daily activities based on the given strategic and tactical decision. A list of SCM 
issues is shown in Figure 2.18, which divides the supply chain management issues into Structure 
optimisation (SO), Processes redesign (PR), Supplier selection (SS), Capacity planning (CPL), 
Relationship management (RM), Information sharing (ISH), Bullwhip effect (BE), Reverse logistics 
(RL), Replenishment control policies (RCP), Optimising supply chain operations (OSCO), Cost 
management (CM), System information (SI), Inventory planning/management (IPM), Planning and 
demand forecasting (PDF), Production planning (PP), and Distribution planning (DP). 
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Figure 2.18. Ordering of SCM issues from strategic to operational level 
 
Following the described literature review method, 162 papers are identified which use the SD method 
to deal with SCM problems by the end of 2015. The selected papers are categorized based on 
involved SCM issues. Figure 2.19 shows the extent to which SCM issues are addressed by the SD 
approach. 
 
Figure 2.19. The extent to which SCM issues are addressed by SD approach 
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According to the statistical result, the applications of the SD method are spread out to investigate all 
kinds of SCM issues, especially in inventory management, bullwhip effect, strategy and policy 
assessment and information delays (Ge et al. 2004; Janamanchi and Burns, 2007; Kumar and 
Yamaoka, 2007; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008b; Campuzano, Mula and 
Peidro, 2010). The built SD models not only take account of the logical interactions in the supply 
chain system, but also predict dynamic behaviours when time is factored into the sequence 
(Angerhofer and Angelides, 2000). The visualisation of supply chain operations may lead the 
modeller to greater understanding of the real system. Moreover, changes can be adapted in developed 
SD models to explore the dynamic performance in different scenarios, so that the analytical method is 
provided to support SCM decision making. 
 
It is important to credit the previous publications that have developed conceptual or analytical models 
to investigate various kinds of risks in the supply chain, as these have provided the dynamic effects 
that underpin this proposed model and simulated the system structure and behaviours. Choi, 
Narasimhan and Kim (2012) developed an SD model that integrates multiple considerations germane 
to global supply chains to analyse the risk of postponement strategy. Kenne, Dejax and Gharbi, (2012) 
discussed the production panning within a closed-loop supply chain. To manage the risks, an SD-
based optimisation method reduces the costs of manufacturing and remanufacturing products. Based 
on the traditional mathematical model, Lee and Chung (2012) applied SD thinking to develop an 
inventory model for the supply chain of deteriorating items. Through comparing the supply chain 
simulation results with statistical calculation results, the developed SD model is validated. It gains the 
confidence of SD analysis in inventory management. In the supply chain, the awareness of product 
recycling is increasing not only due to the obligation imposed by legislation but also the financial 
consideration. Das and Dutta (2013) examined two different methods to reduce the order variation and 
bullwhip effect in a closed-loop chain. To deal with the carbon emission policy risk, Bai and Mu 
(2014) proposed a two-echelon supply chain model to explore the system performance under different 
risk scenarios. Peng, Peng, Chen (2014) analysed the effects of supply disruptions in the post-seismic 
supply chain using the SD modelling and simulation method. It suggests developing a coordinated 
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system to integrate information in order to recover from the supply failure in risk affected condition. 
Li et al. (2015) offered an integrated SCRM framework to address the dynamic risk effect on system 
thinking. Guertler and Spinler (2015) and Mehrjoo and Pasek (2016) quantified the risks through 
exploring the supply chain behaviours using the SD method. The proposed method can be used to 
help decision makers to predict the outcomes of risk management decisions that might improve 
supply chain performance. To understand the risk generation mechanism in a food supply chain, Stave 
and Kopainsky (2015) applied the SD method to conceptualise and represent how a supply chain can 
be affected by disturbances, so as to assess the risks considering feedback effects in the system. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH GAP 
It can be argued that the scholar needs to understand the current research status and find out the gaps 
in existing knowledge to enhance their understanding (Boote and Beile, 2005). The literature review 
offers a first attempt at broadly understanding the risk perspectives in the CSC, investigating the 
current status of CSCRM and exploring the risk management methods implemented. Although the 
awareness of the vulnerability of the CSC has been given attention by academics and practitioners, the 
research of CSCRM is a fertile area emerging from growing challenges and the fact that a very limited 
amount of research actually specifies this issue in literature, as well as in practice. The identified 
research gaps indicate the valuable points of additional work that are presented below: 
 
 Holistic framework of CSCRM 
The literature shows that the majority of research papers concentrate on specific risk management 
steps instead of providing a comprehensive CSCRM framework in terms of hazard identification, risk 
analysis and risk reduction. Rao and Goldsby (2009) argue that any myopic research focusing on a 
specific part of risk management may be suboptimal due to the complex and dynamic characteristics 
of supply chain system. Therefore, there is a need for a broader view that would facilitate proper risk 
management from industrial practice (Tang and Musa, 2010). An integrated approach is needed to 
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identify hazards, assess and control the associated risk by following sequential steps in the supply 
chain level. 
 
 Comprehensive and systematic hazard identification 
Hazardous characteristics of chemical substances, uncertainties and disruptions pose significant 
challenges to CSC operations as well as the surrounding environment, which potentially threaten 
ecological balance and endanger human health (Bonvicini, Leonelli and Spadoni, 1998). To manage 
these risks, hazard identification is an essential step to produce a list of risks (Waters, 2011). Even 
though a substantial amount of literatures can be found dealing with CSCRM problems, the attention 
that is given to systematic hazard identification is fairly limited. Meanwhile, most of the provided 
studies are conducted with diversified objectives and concentrated on various risk issues. A further 
analysis of hazard identification is required to capture a more exhaustive variety of risks under a 
broader context. 
 
 Novel risk management method 
In the previous studies, various methods and different techniques are applied to accommodate the 
need to analyse and evaluate the risks. Plenty of static models have been developed to assess the cause, 
probability and consequence of the risks for screening out insignificant hazards (Leveson, 2004). 
However, little has been done to address the dynamic interactive relations among the variables 
influencing the system operations (Fernandes, Barbosa-Póvoa and Relvas, 2011). Indeed, the 
feedback effects emerging from the ignored causal relations govern the system behaviour that can 
change over time, and hence could significantly affect the risk management results (Leveson, 2004; 
Bouloiz et al., 2013). It is imperative to develop a methodology that can obtain and represent both 
linear and nonlinear relationships using multiple sources of data to address the dynamic risk impacts 
in the complex CSC system.  
 
To fill the gap, this research uses the SD modelling approach to analyse and manage the CSC risks. It 
is particularly noteworthy that SD offers a methodological approach that describes the major 
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interdependencies and feedback mechanisms between the investigated system and its associated 
hazardous events in a pre-defined condition. Incorporating the capability of the modification both in 
the design and the operational phases, the developed SD model can be re-structured and updated to 
explore the effects of different risks (Yeo, Pak and Yang, 2013). In the developed risk scenarios, the 
generated hazardous events affect the balanced system and causes unexpected changes in system 
behaviour. Through evaluating the variation in the system behaviour, the risk effects can be addressed 
to provide a baseline for comparing the risk effects in different risk scenarios. The using of SD can 
assist the decision-makers to avoid direct assessment of the risks based on arbitrary decisions 
 
 Optimal CSCRM decision 
Ensuring that a particular risk reduction approach does indeed support CSCRM often requires formal 
modelling of forecasting outcomes of a particular risk reduction decision. It is worth analysing the 
trade-off between the investment required for reducing action and the risk loss, so as to make better 
risk management decisions (Schmitt and Singh, 2012). However, the research involved in CSC risk 
reduction is not specified in academic literature, as well as in practice. To confront the challenges and 
to gain the benefits, there is a critical need for incorporating structural risk reduction optimisation 
within the proposed CSCRM framework to manage the risk in a cost-effective way. 
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CHAPTER 3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Summary 
This chapter discusses the research methodologies, which have been implemented to grasp the defined 
aims and objectives. This research intends to provide a novel risk management method for capturing, 
assessing, and managing the risks in a dynamic CSC network. Due to the insufficient industry specific 
data, literature review and questionnaire survey are conducted to strengthen the knowledge base in 
hazard identification and risk data collection. SD offers a methodological approach that describes the 
major interdependencies and feedback mechanisms between the CSC and its associated hazardous 
events. The application of the proposed modelling and simulation method enhances the practice of 
risk modelling, which can be used to address dynamic risk effects and potential risk reduction 
outcomes in the CSC. 
 
3.1 SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT  
Over the past decades, the supply chain has faced various challenges across the worldwide (Ghadge, 
Dani and Kalawsky, 2012). Driving factors such as customisation habit, competition, globalisation, 
outsourcing and new technologies have changed the fact of the supply chain and created new 
requirements to supply chain risk management (SCRM) (Finch, 2004; Ritchie and Brindley, 2007; 
Choon Oh, and Karimi, 2008; Colicchia and Strozzi, 2012). As well, the risks resulting from 
interactions between environment and the supply chain network, such as natural disaster, war and 
political instability, pose significant challenges to supply chain operations, and are difficult to predict 
and control effectively (Yang et al., 2013). Both the academics and practitioners appreciate the efforts 
in the application of SCRM to protect against the risk and keep the operation smoothly and effectively. 
Nevertheless, the incorporation and integration of systematic methodologies and analytical tools for 
improving the resilience and sustainability of the supply chain as a whole, while maintaining its 
competitiveness in terms of cost effectiveness and operational efficiency, is still largely unexplored. 
To bridge the gap in SCRM an integrated framework is provided to facilitate the understanding of the 
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source of risks and the need for reducing the undesired risk effects (Marhavilas, Koulouriotis and 
Gemeni, 2011). Figure 3.1 graphically represents the established SCRM framework. 
Figure 3.1. A general SCRM framework 
 
 Hazard identification 
It is widely recognised that hazard identification is a vital phase for conducting an effective risk 
management (Caridi et al., 2009). A hazard is defined as a physical situation arising from the 
uncertainties or disruptions that potentially damages the supply chain operations (Holton, 2004). The 
invisible demand, unknown competitors, and uncertain supply are frequently experienced in the 
operations that result in undesired losses, while the disruptions arising from operational contingencies, 
 
(Source: Marhavilas, Koulouriotis and Gemeni, 2011) 
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natural disasters, terrorism or political instability pose a threat to a supply chain. To manage these 
unexpected risks, it is essential to broadly outline the sources of risks across the supply chain network 
following the structured method.  
 
 Risk analysis 
In SCRM research, various methods and different techniques are provided to accommodate the need 
to analyse and evaluate the risks using multiple sources of data. The cause, probability and 
consequence of the risks should be assessed for screening out insignificant hazards (Khan and Abbasi, 
2001; Pai et al., 2003; Zsidisin and Ritchie, 2008; Tuncel and Alpan, 2010; Tummala and Schoenherr, 
2011). In theory, the risk is a potential for undesirable consequence, so that the assessments of the 
combination of the probability and consequence are conducted in order to suggest appropriate SCRM 
measures (Mokhtari et al., 2011; Heckmann Comes and Nickel, 2015). In the analysis, the probability 
refers to the occurrence probability of an accident event with undesired effect, while consequence 
indicates the magnitude of possible consequence in terms of negative aspect when the hazardous 
event does occur. To comprehensively estimate the probability and the degree of the possible 
consequences in a hazardous situation, Ren et al. (2009) and Kumar Himes and Kritzer (2014) further 
consider the likelihood of the hazardous event occurring in a certain period of time and the probability 
of suffering the given magnitude of the consequence. The interdependency among the hazardous 
events in different segments of a supply chain is investigated to estimate the risk effects. There are a 
number of qualitative or quantitative risk analysis methods provided, such as Hazard and Operability 
Study (HAZOP), FEMA, FMECA, FTA, ETA and Preliminary Risk Analysis (PRA) (Waters, 2009; 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008).  
 
Based on the pre-defined criteria, which are determined according to the experience, supply chain 
standard, or other regulations, the risk analysis results can be evaluated to screen out significant risks. 
If the risk is not acceptable, it requires additional reduction actions or safeguards aiming at reducing 
occurrence likelihood of undesirable events and/or mitigating possible consequences (Ting, 1988). 
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 Risk reduction 
Risk reduction procedure represents the method proposed by researchers to address the research 
objectives (Zsidisin and Ritchie, 2008). Efforts have, therefore, intended to offer a risk reduction 
method to reduce the undesired risk effects following the principle outlined in Figure 3.2. It will help 
to verify the advantageous risk reduction methods and suggest better-informed SCRM decisions (Li et 
al., 2015).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. The principle of risk reduction 
 
Waring (1996) first proposed the risk reduction principle to instruct the risk reducing actions. Based 
on the risk evaluation results, there are four levels provided to describe risk effects, which are 
unacceptable, tolerable, acceptable and negligible. To deal with the unexpected risks, the associated 
risk reduction principle is suggested: 1) Reducing actions should be carried out to manage the 
unacceptable risks; 2) Tolerance of the risk if risk reduction is impracticable or if cost of reduction 
would exceed the improvement gained; 3) Monitoring the acceptable risks to ensure the risks stays in 
current or lower level; 4) Ignoring the risks with negligible effects. 
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(Source: Zsidisin and Ritchie, 2008) 
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To assess potential risk reduction measures and continuously improve the CSC system performance, it 
requires one to forecast the outcomes of implemented risk reduction methods. To carry out risk 
reduction actions, preventive and responsive risk reduction mechanisms are built to respond to and 
recover from the risk effects (Merrick et al., 2002). In the preventive mechanism, there is a 
collaborative relationship among the members of the CSC to identify hazards and take actions to 
reduce the risks proactively. On the contrary, in reactive mechanism the CSC members deal with the 
risks only after becoming problems. Based on the various mechanisms, the alternatives risk reduction 
approaches are proposed, which can be classified as avoidance, prevention and reduction (Merrick et 
al., 2002). The prevention method is conducted to mitigate the occurrence likelihood of hazardous 
events, and the avoidance approach is an extreme case in prevention approach which is employed to 
significantly reduce the possibility of the occurrence of the threatening event. Reduction approach is 
another kind of solution which is provided to reduce the undesired risk consequence (Ghadge, Dani 
and Kalawsky, 2011). For instance, insurance is provided to reduce the negative impacts on the 
financial aspect, a flexible supply strategy supports the firm to be agile, and emergency response 
procedures are established to support the reduction of the impacts of either a man-made or natural 
disaster.  
 
 Risk monitoring 
The supply chain operation can only proceed when the risk has been reduced to an acceptable level 
(Ho et al., 2015). However, the structure and operational process should be monitored continuously 
due to frequent changes. When the new hazard has been identified, the entire risk assessment and risk 
reduction process are required to be repeated till the risk is acceptable. 
 
3.2 A NOVEL SD BASED CSCRM FRAMEWORK 
The empirical and analytical research methods are applied to describe what the supply chain network 
and individual companies ought to do in regard to SCRM. However, the formulation of risk 
management from the industrial perspective is a rather difficult task, especially in terms of risk 
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quantification and risk reduction decision making (Nikolopoulou and Ierapetritou, 2012). Managing 
CSC risks should first understand the sources of risks, and then facilitate risk management in a proper 
way (Cucchiella and Gastaldi, 2006; Trkman and McCormack, 2009). The framework describes the 
overall plan and reveals the priorities of the research. It encapsulates observed risks within and 
surrounding the CSCs in a hierarchical structure. The impacts on system behaviours associated with 
identified hazards are investigated to capture the critical risks. Figure 3.3 represents an overview of 
CSCRM framework for the purpose of this research upon which the research methodology will be 
directed. 
 
3.2.1 Hazard identification 
Hazard identification is a critical step to recognise the uncertainties and disruptions across the supply 
chain network. There are a number of structured methods provided to identify the hazards. Waters 
(2009) indicated that the historical data collection, interviews and group meetings can be used to 
collect necessary data during the research. Yang (2010) provided an alternative viewpoint in hazard 
identification. The analysis of the corporate financial report and meeting records, constructing 
operational flow charts and continuous facility examinations were suggested to explore the existing 
hazardous events in the system. In this thesis, three distinct constructions are developed to establish a 
conceptual understanding of the CSC risks, which are hazard identification, source of hazards 
classification, and validation. To facilitate proposed method, literature review and qualitative 
questionnaire survey comprise the primary methods of research. Specifically, literature review serves 
as a base and guide to build upon throughout the CSC hazard identification research process. Based 
on the literature review results, a CSC risk taxonomic diagram is developed that combines the specific 
risk perspectives in the CSC with widely explored risk issues in the general supply chain. The 
obtained risks are categorised into nine risk domains: supply risks, operational risks, demand risks, 
strategy risks, security risks, political risks, natural environment risks and policy risks. Before moving 
to the next stage, an empirical analysis is conducted to verify the identified hazards and confirm the 
appropriateness of hazard classification.  
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Figure 3.3. Proposed methodology of CSCRM 
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3.2.2 Risk analysis 
Concerning about the complex interactions and the dynamic feedback effects between CSC behaviours 
and various hazardous events, a SD method is implemented for describing the complex CSC structure 
and simulating CSC operations under multiple scenarios in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. In accordance 
with the SD modelling and simulation procedures, the SD-based risk analysis is carried out following: 
articulation of problem, causal loop diagram development, stock and flow translation, and model 
formulation. Specifically, the interactions in the CSC and its contained risk evolution mechanisms 
drawn from expertise and literature are formalised in the developed causal loop diagram. Then, a stock 
and flow diagram is correspondingly converted with more detailed quantitative information in terms of 
the sequential steps: characterise elements, write equations, assign values to parameters, build model, 
and improve model. The accumulation of the material, information, and cost based on the time step 
will be addressed to represent the dynamic system operations. In the study, five sub-models will be 
developed using Vensim
©
 (Commercial software): supplier sub-model, manufacturer sub-model, 
transporter sub-model, retailer sub-model and customer sub-model. By appropriately connecting the 
sub-models, it offers a multi-echelon CSC model to describe the complex CSC structure and to 
simulate the dynamic CSC operations.  
 
The developed SD models simulate CSC operations under a specified state of the system, so that the 
scenario is established to specify the operational condition. However, the lack of industry-specific risk 
data challenges the application of the proposed method. To explore the extent of CSC risks, a 
questionnaire survey is used to inform a set of corresponding risk attributes. Based on the obtained 
data, the various scenarios are generated with different risk attributes to explore the distinct risk 
effects on system thinking (Rozman et al., 2012; Featherston and Doolan, 2013). The combination of 
participatory SD modelling and scenario analysis facilitates the CSC behaviours, as well as mapping 
the risks through quantifying of the system behaviours. 
 
The quantitative simulation results will be measured in terms of time, cost, and quality aspects, so as 
to screen out unacceptable risks, which should be further reduced. The criteria are designated 
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according to the experience, standard, or other regulations. In particular, a time-based effect refers to a 
delay and disruption in material, information or financial flows, which in turn influences the supply 
chain performance. A cost-based consequence affects the financial flow that may lead to profit 
decrease. In contrast, a quality-based impact contributes to the damage of quality of product, service 
or property.  
 
3.2.3 Risk reduction 
Risk reduction procedure represents the method of dealing with unexpected hazardous events on 
system thinking. In Chapter 6, two risk reduction methods are provide to reduce occurrence likelihood 
of undesirable events and/or mitigating possible consequences. Incorporating the capability of SD 
model modification throughout the modelling life cycle, both in design and operation phases, the risk 
reduction methods are investigated and the outcomes are estimated through adjusting the input values 
and modifying the system structure based on the implemented risk reduction methods. Comparing 
system performance under different scenarios will identify advantageous risk reduction decisions. 
Therefore, the simulation analysis ensures that the implemented approach does indeed address the 
research objectives. 
 
3.3 DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS RELATED TO RESARCH DESIGN 
According to the research philosophical and theoretical foundations, the research methodology, 
research strategy and research methods are adapted in line with the knowledge (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2007). The proper approaches used to carry out research are identified, which meet the aim 
of the study.  
 
3.3.1 Research methodology 
Research methodology is a way used to scientifically deal with the research problem (Kothari, 2004). 
It systematically describes the steps that the researcher can follow to carry out the study, which may 
differ from problem to problem. In particularly, research methodology explains the consideration of 
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the concepts and theories which underlie the methods. As well, it indicates the reason of why a 
particular method fits for the research problem in given study. An explanation of the rationale of 
employed methods is given to answer the research problem in context with identified research gaps 
and gain the disciplined thinking of scientific study.  
 
3.3.2 Research methods 
Research method is regarded as a part of the research methodology, which refers to the technique 
implemented to conduct the research (Yin, 2013). However, a distinction is made between research 
method and research technique. Research method is defined as a well organised approach which can 
be taken towards the selection and construction of the technique, while a research technique refers to a 
particular step-by-step procedure which describes in detail how to do it (Kothari, 2004).  
 
In this study, both qualitative and quantitative methods are applied to identify, analyse and reduce 
CSC risks. To identify the hazards existing in the CSC, the literature review is adapted to categorise 
unstructured risks. The questionnaire is developed to verify the comprehension of hazard 
identification and examine the appropriateness of the risk classification results. The application of the 
SD method in CSCRM is an intermediate platform between widely used mathematical programming 
and empirical study. The causal interdependencies between system behaviours and hazardous events 
are formalised, so as to address the dynamic risk effects in the supply chain level. Due to the 
insufficient risk data, another questionnaire is developed to make inferences about the attitudes and 
opinions from the experts. The obtained risk data are inserted into the developed SD models to 
explore the CSC operations in various conditions. The simulation analysis comprehends the complex 
risks in a dynamic CSC system and provides an advantageous CSCRM decision support tool by 
revealing the gap between the expectation and the real-time performance. Full details about the 
research methods and research techniques will be explained in the following sections. 
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3.3.3 Research strategy 
Research strategy offers a route to validate the research, which can be considered as the basic research 
protocol. It employs explanation, description, classification, and analysis to answer the research 
questions in terms of when, where, how, why, how many and how much. Thus, the selection of an 
appropriate research strategy is critical to ensure the achievement of the aim and objectives.  
 
In this research, two different kinds of research strategies are applied to carry out studies, which are 
exploratory, and explanatory. The exploratory research is a flexible and adaptable strategy to define 
the research hypothesis based on the collected qualitative information. It is widely used in a situation 
where it is difficult to obtain prior information (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1991). In this thesis, the 
exploratory strategy is employed to fill the gap in hazard identification. To investigate the risk 
generation mechanism, the explanatory strategy is implemented to explain what is going on and 
conceptualise the risk propagation mechanism (de Weerd-Nederhof, 2001; Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2007). In particular, the major interdependencies and feedback mechanisms are addressed 
that demonstrate the changes of system behaviours arising from the hazardous events. 
 
3.4 KEY RESEARCH APPROACH: SD 
SD is a scenario-based simulation method to predict the behaviours of dynamic systems and analyse 
the efficacy of decision-making under different scenarios, including the impact of time delays, 
disruptions and uncertainties in a supply chain system. The adaptation of SD theory not only 
formalises the dynamic interactions between the investigated system and hazardous events but also 
considers the feedback effects among the operational processes. Incorporating the capability of the 
model modification both in the design and the operational phases, the developed SD model can be re-
structured and modified to explore the outcomes of potential risk reduction methods.  
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3.4.1 The theory of SD 
Jay Forrester first proposed SD theory to analyse the industrial dynamics by modelling and simulation 
using a computer-based approach at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1958 
(Forrester, 1961). It combines theory, methods and philosophy in control engineering and non-liner 
dynamic system discipline (Garbolino, Chery and Guarnieri, 2009; Oehmen et al., 2010; Garbolino, 
Chery and Guarnieri, 2010; Bouloiz et al., 2013). The developed system seeks to understand the 
interactions between structural components and information feedbacks that show as dynamic 
behaviours in the system perspective (Forrester and Senge, 1980). SD is a broad concept that can be 
divided into two aspects: „System‟ represents the structure of the system and the concept of feedback 
effect, while „dynamics‟ reflects the changes in the behaviours of the various system components over 
time. The assumed interactions between the variables are formalised to build a casual loop diagram, 
which is used to demonstrate the dynamic hypotheses (Lertpattarapong, 2002). An illustrative 
example is shown in Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4. An illustrative example of causal loop diagram 
 
Arrows are used to indicate the direction of a cause and effect relationship where the causative 
variable is represented by the origin of the arrow and the effected variable is on the other side. The “+” 
or “-” sign on the arrow describes the positive or negative effects between two variables. Based on the 
developed causal loop diagram, an increase in births results in more chickens in the future, so that the 
changes of the both sides of the variables toward the same direction. However, more chicks maturing 
leads to the decrease in the number of chicks, thus the behaviour of the affected variable presents the 
reduction effect on the influence of the origin variable. A closed chain of causal relations is defined as 
the feedback loop, which could be positive or negative. In a positive loop, the number of negative 
relationships is even or zero. This kind of loop is unstable and oscillates so triggering the system to 
Births
Chicks
Chicks maturing
Chicken
Death
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grow, evolve and collapse. In contrast, the negative loop has an odd number of negative relationships 
that change the loop towards a stable situation.  
 
Stock flow diagram is converted from the developed Causal loop diagram, which demonstrates the 
causal relationships between the stock, flow and control variables with more specific quantitative 
information. Figure 3.5 describes an illustrative example of Stock flow diagram. 
 
Key:                                   Outside the system interest                                            Rate                         
 Level                                                                              Auxiliary 
                                           Material flow                       Information flow    
Figure 3.5. An illustrative example of stock and flow diagram 
 
In this diagram, the system components are assigned to the level, auxiliary and rate variables. 
Specifically, a level variable is a structural element, which is represented in the rectangle box and 
used to describe an accumulative effect, such as inventory level, amount of labour, and value 
damaged in a certain period of time. Auxiliary is presented in the box without a border, which arises 
when the formulation of a level‟s influence on a rate involves one or more intermediate calculations. 
In response to changes in levels or exogenous influences, the value of auxiliary changes immediately. 
A rate only passes the information that governs the change of level variable.  
 
3.4.2 Steps in SD modelling 
A SD methodology comprises a set of rigorous procedures to describe a supply chain structure and its 
behaviours in terms of differing processes, information, decision-making and organisational limits. 
Yeo, Pak and Yang (2013) suggest that the SD modelling process can be characterised by three phases: 
logical modelling, model quantification and model application. To model and simulate the CSC risks, 
Chicks
Births
Chicken
Chicks maturing Death
1
Variable
11
Variable
Level
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an SD-based CSCRM framework is developed based on well-established guidelines for the SD 
modelling process. The sequential steps are shown in Figure 3.6. 
Problem definitionStep 1
Causal interdependencies 
formulation between the flow of 
CSC operations and risk factors
Step 2
Conceptual design of modelStep 3
Stock and flow diagram creationStep 4
Data collectionStep 5
Model validation Step 6
Model testStep 7
Model applicationStep 8
System Dynamics Modelling Process
(Source: Yeo et al., 2013)
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Step 8
Problem definition 
Model validation model test
Causal loop diagram development
System dynamics model 
development
Risk data collection
Risk scenario simulation
Risk reduction scenario simulation
 System Dynamics based CSCRM 
Modelling Process
(Source: Drawn by Author)
Causal loop diagram creation
Logical 
modelling 
phase
Model 
quantification 
phase
Model 
application 
phase
Logical 
modelling 
phase
Model 
quantification 
phase
Model 
application 
phase
 
Figure 3.6. Framework of SD-based CSCRM modelling process 
 
In the developed framework, problem definition is the first step, which describes the purpose of the 
modelling study and specifies the system boundaries. However, very limited research actually 
provided a formal structure of problem definition in the literature, as well as in practice. 
Lertpattarapong (2002) suggests defining the research problems following the steps of a list of 
variables, conceptual models, and problem statement. Yeo, Pak and Yang (2013) provide a verbal 
statement for defining the goal of system and specifying system boundaries. In this study, the 
guideline suggested by Sterman (2000) is adapted to facilitate the problem definition in SD modelling. 
It sequentially defines the system purpose, determines the system boundaries and provides a list of 
variables. The variables within the system boundaries are identified to clarify research issues. Then, 
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the key variables and their interactions are addressed to represent the interdependencies between the 
flow of CSC operations and hazardous events. In step 3, the assumed causal relations between the key 
variables are formalised to build a causal loop diagram, which is used to demonstrate the cause and 
effect relationships within the system boundaries (Lertpattarapong, 2002). In accordance with 
addressed causal relations, the stock and flow diagram is developed through translating established 
causal loop diagrams using computer-based language (Campuzano and Mula, 2011). The created SD 
model should be verified and tested before model application in Step 5. In Step 6, the risk data is 
collected, which can be inserted as the input value of further risk scenario simulation. Running the SD 
model simulates the system operations in different scenarios. Through benchmarking the comparisons 
of the system performances, the risks are quantitatively assessed to find out the unacceptable risks in 
Step 7. Incorporating the ability of modifying the developed SD model both in design and operations 
phases,  provides a method to measure the effects of potential risk reduction methods and support 
CSCRM decisions in step 8. 
 
3.4.3. The advantages of integrating SD in SCRM 
Supply chain is characterised by extreme complexity and uncertainty, the hazardous events could 
affect the balanced system and cause unexpected changes in system performance. SCRM is 
introduced to manage the undesired risk effects and maintain the system performance (Thun and 
Hoenig, 2009). Instead of assessing the risks based on expert knowledge or historical data, the 
application of the SD method to SCRM provides an analytical method for solving multidimensional 
problems using qualitative as well as quantitative information. It not only simulates the supply chain 
operations, but also predicts dynamic behaviours as the system changes emerging from the interactive 
relationships between the SC system and hazardous events (Angerhofer and Angelides, 2000). The 
logical feedback effects between the hazardous events and system behaviours are obtained to estimate 
risk effects when time is factored into the sequence. There are five main advantages of implementing 
the SD approach in SCRM: 
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 SD is best suited to those problems associated with continuous process where feedback 
significantly affects the system operations by producing dynamic changes in system 
behaviours. 
 SD has ability to integrate material, people, processes and information in one system. 
 SD can use the multiple sources of data.  
 SD is a choice for checking the feasibility of different strategic, tactical and operational 
decisions. 
 Ease of building a simulation model and reduced execution time. 
 
3.5 METHODOLOGY FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
This section gives a detailed explanation of the data collection and analysis methods used in the thesis. 
To capture and understand the risk factors, it is required to apply an approach involving the use of 
qualitative methods to gather and examine the risk data along with justification due to the scarcity 
of the research done in this area. The first sub-section describes the data collection method in the 
hazard identification phase. A questionnaire survey covering the key concepts of the identified CSC 
hazards will be conducted to verify the comprehensiveness of hazard identification and the 
importance of addressed hazards to the CSC. The second sub-section introduces the data collection 
method used in the risk analysis stage. The risk data will be collected as input values of different risk 
scenarios to simulate the dynamic risk effects in the supply chain level. Figure 3.7 describes the 
methodology for data collection and data analysis, which are applied in line with the research 
questions and objectives. 
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Data collection in hazard identification
Data Collection Data Analysis
Qualitative data:
Literature review
Experts’ judgement
Output:
Risk taxonomical 
diagram 
Data collection in risk analysis
Data Collection Data Analysis
Qualitative and 
Quantitative data:
Linguistics variables 
Experts’ judgement
Output:
Input values of 
the various risk 
scenarios 
 
Figure 3.7. The methodology for data collection and data analysis 
 
3.5.1 Data collection method in CSC hazard identification and validation 
In spite of the systematic hazard identification and risk decomposition, the research continues with an 
empirical study covering the key concepts of the sources of CSC risks. Chapter 4 provides a detailed 
explanation of data analysis and taxonomic diagram validation in hazard identification. Following the 
rigorous approaches, the questionnaire is developed in line with research questions, research 
objectives and related literature to collect the opinions from the experts who are most familiar with 
conditions to clarify the ambiguity (McCormack and Hill, 1997). In particular, the number of 
parameters in the construct, the selection of a Likert scale and avoiding negative words are the critical 
issues, which should be given more attention (Hinkin, 1995). The proposed method makes inferences 
about the attitudes and opinions to verify the comprehensiveness of addressed hazards and to 
investigate the importance of captured hazards to a CSC.  
 
In the hazard identification stage, the questionnaire is designed to explore the importance of identified 
hazards and a Seven-point Likert scale is used to investigate the level of agreement with each question 
from the respondents. The questionnaire is developed in English in the early stage and translated from 
English into Chinese since the targeted respondents are academia and experts in the UK and China. 
To verify the appropriation and accuracy of the questionnaire translation, forward and backward 
translation methods are employed to examine developed questions. Two forward translators, native 
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speakers of the Chinese and fluent in English, conduct translations independently. Any disagreements 
are resolved via a reconciliation process, resulting in a single provisional forward translation. Using 
this translation, backward translation is carried out by independent backward translators (fluent in 
Chinese and English, and different from the forward-translators) to ensure adequate representation of 
the forward translation. The forward format is then pilot tested on the target participants before being 
field-tested on a larger sample. Face-to-face discussions are conducted to help the questionnaire 
builder obtain a clearer picture of the meaningful advices. Based on the comments, the questionnaire 
is properly modified to fit in with the requirements (Finalised English and Chinese questionnaires are 
given in Appendix One). Furthermore, it will be converted to an online questionnaire via e-survey 
creator. It is expected that after participants had completed the questionnaire, the researcher could 
sign in onto e-survey creator and view the completed questionnaire.  
 
The questionnaires were sent out to collect the data from risk experts and analysts in May 2014. The 
participants were selected based on their experience to the research topic using the university 
membership directories on SCM in Liverpool John Moores University, the University of Liverpool 
and Wuhan University of Technology in China. As well, recognised CSCM companies in China were 
contacted. The elected participants were approached by emails with a cover letter. A reminder via 
phone call was later followed to establish willingness to participate.  
 
The population, sample and response rate in the survey will be described in later sections. As well, a 
validity test will be conducted to test whether the study measures the necessary items and whether the 
study receives the reliable responses after receiving the completed questionnaires. Based on the 
obtained results, a risk taxonomic diagram is developed to illustrate the CSC risks in a hierarchical 
structure, which provides a comprehensive risk database to CSCRM research.  
 
3.5.2 Data collection method in CSC risk analysis stage 
In the risk analysis phase, expert elicitation is a proven methodology that is used to gather information 
in the CSC domain regarding the lack of accurate industry-specific risk data. The developed CSC 
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system could be affected by hazardous events and bring unexpected consequences during its 
operations. Indeed, there is a substantial amount of effort that has been devoted to presenting the level 
of the possible risks. Mokhtari et al. (2011), Vilko and Hallikas (2012), and Heckmann, Comes and 
Nickel (2015) suggested that a risk could be analysed in two attributes: Occurrence likelihood (LO) 
and Consequence severity (CS). LO refers to the probability that an accident event occurs by causing 
an undesired effect, whereas CS indicates the magnitude of the possible consequence in terms of the 
negative aspects. Meantime, Ren et al. (2009), and Kumar, Himes and Kritzer (2014) argued that 
Consequence probability (CP) should be considered, which indicates the probability of suffering the 
given magnitude of the consequence, when the accident happens. In this research, the CSC hazardous 
events are described by the combination of LO, CS and CP. LO estimates whether a CSC risk will 
materialise. When a hazardous event occurs, the negative effects with a given degree of probability 
are represented by CS and CP to describe the experienced consequence in terms of the system‟s 
inability to satisfy customer demand, recover from time delay and quality damage, causing financial 
and life loss (Upton, Zsidisin, and Panelli, 1999). The set of corresponding data of each hazardous 
event is collected from risk experts and inserted into the developed SD model to explore the risk 
effects from the whole supply chain perspective. Following the questionnaire development procedures 
described in Section 3.5.1, the questionnaire is constructed to elicit expert opinions on the CSC risks in 
terms of hazardous event occurrence likelihood, consequence severity and consequence probability.  
 
 LO 
The occurrence likelihood of a hazardous event describes the frequency of the hazardous event 
occurring in a certain time of period, which interrupts CSC operations (Li et al., 2015). It is often used 
to subjectively estimate whether the risk will materialise. In practice, the accurate numerical value of 
the occurrence likelihood is difficult to be addressed, therefore, six abstractive categories are provided 
to describe the likelihood of occurring: „Rare‟ (Has never or rarely happened), „Very low‟ (Only likely 
to happen within 2-3 years), „Low‟ (May occur within one year), „Medium‟ (Likely to happen at some 
point within a few months), „High‟ (Circumstances frequently encountered on a monthly basis), and 
„Very high‟ (Circumstances frequently encountered almost daily). Following this format, the numbers 
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of 0, 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are used to represent the corresponding abstractive category. Table 3.1 illustrates 
the definition of the occurrence likelihood of a hazardous event. 
 
Table 3.1. Definition of the occurrence likelihood of a hazardous event  
LO Likert scale Definition 
Rare 0 Has never or rarely happened 
Very low 1 Only likely to happen within 2-3 years 
Low 3 May occur within one year 
Medium 5 Likely to happen at some point within a few months 
High 7 Circumstances frequently encountered on a monthly basis 
Very high 9 Circumstances frequently encountered almost daily 
 
 CS 
Consequence severity indicates the magnitude of possible effect when the hazardous event does occur. 
It is regarded as a negative consequence in the inability to satisfy customer demand, bringing time 
delay and quality damage, causing financial loss, or even threating human life (Upton, Zsidisin, and 
Panelli, 1999). In the SCRM discipline, the consequence is frequently measured in three aspects: time, 
cost, and quality (Vilko and Hallikas, 2012). The time-based consequence refers to delay and 
disruption in material or information flows, the cost-based consequence exists in the financial flow that 
may lead to cost increase or profit loss, while the quality-based consequence refers to the damage of 
quality of product, service or property. To describe the level of consequence severity in various 
aspects, the words of „Negligible‟, „Minor‟, „Moderate‟, „Major‟, „Critical‟ or „Catastrophic‟ are 
applied in the proposed research. The definition of consequence severity is shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2. Definition of consequence severity  
CS Likert scale Definition 
Negligible 0 An insignificant effect on this core activity 
Minor 1 Causing some inconvenience with minor impacts 
Moderate 3 Causing some disruption with medium impacts 
Major 5 Causing major disruptions to CSC operations 
Critical 7 Causing failure of CSC operations 
Catastrophic 9 Causing complete and irrecoverable failure of CSC operations 
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 CP 
Consequence probability refers to the probability of the consequence given the hazardous event 
occurred (Li et al., 2015). The level of probability can be described in different words and illustrated 
in various ways. Hallikas et al. (2004) suggested five abstractive categories: very unlikely, 
improbable, moderate, probable, and very probable, while Chang (2013) used rare, unlikely, possible, 
likely, and almost certain to describe the consequence probability. In this thesis, a novel Likert nine-
point scale is provided to represent the probability of the consequence, which are „Impossible‟, „Rare‟, 
„Low‟, „Medium‟, „High‟ and „Definite‟. The definition of each Likert scale is described in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3. Definition of consequence probability 
CP Likert scale Definition 
Impossible 0 Will never occur 
Rare 1 Rarely to occur 
Low 3 Unlikely to occur 
Medium 5 About an even chance of occurring 
High 7 Likely to occur 
Definite 9 Definitely will occur 
 
Since the target respondents are academics and experts in the UK and China, the built questionnaire 
have to be translated from English into Chinese. In order to translate the questionnaire items into the 
appropriate language, both forward and backward translation process were conducted. Two scholars 
from Wuhan University of Technology were consulted to ensure that the translated questionnaire had 
a clear understanding of Chinese respondents. Then, a third party translator subsequently translated 
the Chinese questionnaire back into English to ensure that the forward translation was an adequate 
representation of the English original. Hence the translated items were verified that the original 
meanings were accurately reflected.  
 
After designing the risk analysis questionnaire, the researcher sent a draft of the questionnaires to ten 
experts with very good knowledge and experience in CSCRM from UK and China in September 2014. 
It was deemed as a pilot test to assess the readability of representative measurement items. Face-to-
face discussions were carried out to help the questionnaire builder to obtain a clearer picture of the 
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meaningful advices. For instance, the experts from China suggested that “risk” was a sensitive word 
in the Chinese chemical industry. The respondents might not wish to offer any opinions or 
information related to the “risk” which could reduce the willingness to participate. Based on this 
comment, the translated questionnaires were properly modified to ensure the use of the words. The 
finalised English and Chinese questionnaires are attached in Appendix Two.  
 
3.5.3 Data analysis 
The analytical data processing method is applied to produce high quality data, which can be used in 
later hazard identification and risk analysis research. In the study, the questionnaires are designed to 
facilitate respondents to give a quick and clear answer, so that the numeric numbers are used to 
represent the corresponding abstractive category. To ensure that the gathered data is reliable and 
consistent, respondents‟ profile analysis and statistical test are conducted prior to carrying out risk 
analysis and risk reduction research. The analysis of the surveys is described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
7. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the research methodology, research strategy and research methods are presented and 
discussed, which lie at the core of the aim and objectives for the study. The SCRM framework is 
explained to lay down the foundations for the study through indicating the main philosophical views 
behind the research methodologies. Integrating SD modelling and simulation methods in CSCRM 
offers a methodological approach that deals with the complex interactions and dynamic feedback 
effects between the CSC system and hazardous events. Meanwhile, risk experts and analysts have 
contributed potential CSC risks to inform the construction of the SD models and generate various risk 
input values in different scenarios. The proposed research seeks to understand how a risk affects the 
CSC operations; how the risk effects can be assessed; and how CSCRM can be brought into an 
optimised measure to reduce undesired effects. The application of the proposed SD-based CSCRM 
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approach is followed in the next chapters to identify hazards, analyse and reduce the associated risks 
in the CSC. 
  
74 
 
CHAPTER 4  CHEMICAL SUPPLY CHAIN HAZARD 
IDENTIFICATION 
Summary 
An unforeseen event is a threat that can interrupt the operational process and has a negative impact on 
the CSC system in terms of time, financial, or reputational losses (Waters, 2011). It is widely 
recognised that hazard identification is a vital phase of conducting an effective risk management. The 
chapter gives a description of hazard identification undertaken to capture and verify the risk issues in 
the CSC. The distinct risks in the CSC and the general supply chain risks are combined to develop a 
comprehensive risk taxonomic diagram to strengthen the knowledge base in CSCRM. It not only 
extends the understanding of risks from the industrial perspective, but also decomposes the 
unstructured risks into different risk categorisations following a rigorous approach. In further risk 
analysis research, the classified risks can be assessed through applying various risk analysis methods 
to find out the unacceptable ones. 
 
4.1 A RISK PERSPECTIVE ON CSC OPERATIONS 
Complexities and uncertainties are regarded as the sources of risks, which pose significant challenges 
to CSC operations. In theory, a supply chain risk is a potential for an incident or accident arising from 
an internal system or external environment in which the effects of the inability to satisfy customer 
demand (Zsidisin et al., 2004). The industry and the public highly concern the risk issues. The 
globalisation, complexity, competition, uncertainty, and the hazardous characteristics of chemical 
substances challenge the CSC operations and result in financial loss, the damage to the environment, 
or the loss of human life  (Mullai, 2009; Bergkamp, 2013; Ehlen et al., 2014).  
 
4.1.1 Globalisation 
The CI and CSC have witnessed an expansion into global sourcing and international trade in the few 
last decades. In the global market, the geographic dispersion of CSC members leads to that huge 
volume of chemical substances often needing to be purchased and transported all over the world by 
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air, road, railway, pipeline or ship. It helps CSCs achieve the cost benefits in terms of tariff and trade 
concessions, comparatively lower labour cost, and capital subsidies (Ting, 1988; Meixell and Gargeya, 
2005). However, the growth in globalisation and the additional management not only diminish the 
effectiveness, but also increase the complexity in operations (Atthirawong and MacCarthy, 1980). The 
conflicts of various local cultures, different languages, inadequate worker skills and other problems 
are frequently experienced in the global CSCs.  
 
4.1.2 Complexity 
CSCs can be enormously long and complex, which can be divided into thousands of sub-systems 
according to products, geographies and customers. The complex operational processes destroy the 
efficiency of the CSC operations and bring the risks to the CSC system. Especially, the feedback 
effects among the logical loops emerging from the interactive relationships amplify or self-correct the 
disturbances, which cause the dynamic of system operations over time. It is suggested that the drivers 
of complexity should be mapped across different aspects, for example, cultures, technical standards 
and introduced policy (Ferrio and Wassick, 2008). As well, the effects arising from the complexity 
need to be addressed, so as to manage the CSC operations in a global market (Milgate, 2001).  
 
4.1.3 Competition  
The globalisation and technology innovation bring great changes in CSCs and thus lead to fiercer 
competition. More and more external competitors from different countries emerge as a result of the 
rapid development of the CI, especially in the Middle East and East Asia (Ballhorn et al., 2014). In 
these areas, the capacity of manufacturers is bigger, the technology used is more 
advanced and practical, and energy and labour cost is much lower than in developed countries. The 
local CSCs are able to take advantages of raw material sourcing and manufacturing, which drive the 
world CSC expansion. To survive, the traditional magnates in European and other counterparts have 
to alter their traditional viewpoint on the CSC and continuously cut their costs to maintain the market 
share (Johnson, 2010).  
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4.1.4 Uncertainty 
Dynamic demands, information distortion, and unexpected changes in external environment imposed 
by globalisation and complexity make it increasingly necessary to manage the uncertainties in the 
CSC. It is therefore essential that more effect should be put into identifying the uncertainties existing 
in both internal and external systems (van der Vorst and Beulens, 2002; Tsiakkouri, 2010).  
 
In the supplying process, the operational process can be easily interrupted by environment changes. 
According to the literature review results, special attention is given to environmental risks to identify, 
assess and reduce them in the supply chain level (Park, Hong and Roh, 2013). Meanwhile, the other 
drives towards uncertainty mainly arise from internal systems, which are recognised as dynamic 
customer demand and demand amplification (Das and Dutta, 2013). In practice, the customer demand 
is changing over time. The CSCs have to develop an understanding of the nature of customer 
requirements to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of operations. An important observation of 
demand distortion, known as the bullwhip effect, amplifies demand variation and increases supply 
chain operations costs (Mingers and White, 2010). Thus, it requires a robust and flexible CSC to deal 
with changeable customer demand with information sharing on system thinking. Additionally, 
chemical materials have their own inherent properties that potentially threaten the environment and 
human life (Thun and Hoening, 2011). The hazardous characteristics could aggravate the probability 
and consequence severity of actual or potential risks and lead to undesired effects. To ensure the 
safety of the CSC, it is important to evaluate the uncertainties associated with material characteristics 
to provide a guideline for operational activities (van Wyk and Baerwaldt, 2005).  
 
4.2 RISK CLASSIFICATION METHODS 
Hazard identification is provided to recognise the causes of accidents across the CSCs (Heckmann, 
Comes and Nickel, 2015). There is a substantial amount of risk decomposition methods to be found in 
literature that categorises the supply chain risks in many different ways and from different 
  
77 
 
perspectives. Table 4.1 gives a brief description of risk classification frameworks provided by 
different researchers.  
 
Table 4.1. Risk classification methods proposed in literature 
Author (Year) Risk classification method 
Jüttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) -- Environmental  
-- Organisational 
 
-- Network-related  
 
 
Lam (2003) -- Market  
-- Operational 
 
-- credit 
 
 
Chopra and Sodhi (2004) -- Systems 
-- Intellectual property  
-- Receivable  
-- Capacity 
 
-- Forecast 
-- Sourcing 
-- Inventory 
 
 
Rao and Goldsby (2009) -- Environmental risk 
-- Organisational risk 
-- Decision maker risk 
 
-- Industry risk 
-- Problem risk 
 
 
Tang and Musa (2010) -- Material flow risks 
-- Financial flow risks 
 
-- Information flow risks  
 
 
Singhal, Agarwal and Mittal (2011) -- Operational risks 
-- Market risks 
 
-- Strategy risks 
-- External environment risk 
 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012) -- Operational risk  
-- Macro risk 
-- Environment risk 
 
-- Security risk 
-- Policy risk 
 
 
Rangel, de Oliveira and Leite (2014) -- Plan  
-- Make 
-- Return 
-- Source  
-- Delivery 
-- Others 
 
Jüttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) defined supply chain risks based on three factors: environmental, 
network-related and organisational. Specifically, the environment risks refer to the interaction 
between the environment and the supply chain network, such as natural disaster, war and political 
instability. The risks arising from internal factors of the supply chain network and lying within the 
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interaction of entities are attributed to network-related risks, e.g., supply problem, information 
distortion, outsourcing risk. The organisational risks belong to the inbound risks of various supply 
chain entities, which refer to labour shortage, IT failure, etc. Based upon a framework originally 
proposed by Lam (2003), it mainly focused on the risks in the operational level and broadly classified 
the risks into three categories, which include market, credit, and operational risks. Similarly, Chopra 
and Sodhi (2004) offered an operational level risk classification method. It suggested that the supply 
chain risks cause unanticipated changes in the flow, which are attributed to disruptions and delays. 
Therefore, the systems risk, forecast risk, intellectual property risk, sourcing risk, receivable risk, 
inventory risk and capacity risk should be managed at the appropriate level across the entire supply 
chain network. Tang and Musa (2010) explored material, information and financial flow in the supply 
chain to address potential risks. The risks in material flow arise from physical movement in sourcing, 
manufacturing and delivering. In financial flow, the risks of exchange rate, price and cost, financial 
strength of supply chain partners, and financial handling and practice are the common risks. The 
information distortion, information system security and information disruption contribute to 
information flow risks. To facilitate proper risk classification from industrial practice, Rao and 
Goldsby (2009) expanded the risk decomposition method through investigating the industry 
characteristics. The supply chain risks were divided into five categorises, which are environmental 
risk, industry risk, organisational risk, problem risk and decision maker risk. In line with the supply 
chain functional aspects, Singhal, Agarwal and Mittal (2011) defined risk criteria and classified the 
risks associated with the identified hazards into four categories: operational, strategy, market and 
external environment. Vilko and Hallikas (2012) analysed both internal and external risks though 
investigating the risks related to supply, operational, security, macro, policy, and environment 
dimensions. Rangel, de Oliveira and Leite (2014) offered a novel risk decomposition method to 
categorise the risks based on their related process. It grouped the risks into plan, source, make, deliver, 
return, and other aspects.  
 
It is important to notice that the risks are about to become more complicated in the complex and 
global CSC, so that hazard identification and risk classifications are becoming increasing difficult. 
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Both academics and operators appreciate the need to follow a structural method to decompose, and 
validate CSC risks. Adapting the conceptualised risk classification principle proposed by Manuj and 
Mentzer (2008b), a unique classification framework for the CSC risk decomposition is developed, 
shown in Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1. Sources of risks in the CSC 
 
Based on the source of risks, it categorises the CSC risks into nine groups: supply risks, operational 
risks, demand risks, strategic risks, security risks, Macro-economic risks, political risks, natural 
environment risks and policy risks. Specifically, the operational risks arise from the specialised 
operational features of the internal organisation that may cause production, transportation or services 
disruptions. Strategic risks refer to the problems in strategic decisions within the organisations. 
Supply and demand risks are the undesired events resulting from the interactions between the 
members in the CSC, which happen external to the organisation, but within the supply chain. On the 
contrary, the security, macroeconomic, policy, political and natural environment risks occur from the 
interactions between the CSCs and the external environment (Mason-Jones, Naylor and Towill, 2000). 
Table 4.2 presents the definition criterion and features of each source of risks.  
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Table 4.2. Definition criterion and features of each source of risks 
Risk definition 
criterion 
Definition (Description and characteristics) 
Related to supply 
characteristics 
Supply risks stem from potential or actual disturbances surrounding the supply 
procedure in CSC operations. 
Related to operational 
characteristics 
Operational risks refer to the undesired events arising from operational activities in 
the focal firm that may cause product damage or service disruption. 
Related to demand 
characteristics 
Demand risks arise from downstream activities, which are specific to the changes 
of market or downstream members. 
Related to strategic 
characteristics 
Strategy risks relate to the characteristics of strategies that influence the whole 
supply chain context. 
Related to 
macroeconomic 
characteristics 
The source of macroeconomic risks is a broad term referring to economic 
fluctuations in economic activities and price changes. 
Related to security 
characteristics 
Security risks refer to third parties who surround the internal or external 
environment intend to steal proprietary, data, and knowledge or interrupt the CSC 
operations. 
Related to political 
characteristics 
Political risks stem from the uncertainty and instability when the major change 
happens in political regimes. 
Related to environment 
characteristics 
Natural environment risks refer to the natural disasters that bring the varitions of 
the CSC behaviour in the affected region. 
Related to policy 
characteristics 
Policy risks indicate the changes of legislation, regulations, and policies that may 
affect the CSC organisations and operations. 
 
4.3 CSC HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION 
The study seeks to facilitate proper and comprehensive hazard identification from industrial practice. 
The systematic literature review provides critical insights into CSCs to identify the addressed hazards 
in previous studies. Meanwhile, integrating the distinct risk perspectives of CSC strengthens the 
knowledge base in hazard identification that comprises a risk portfolio for the material, information 
and financial flows from original-supplier to end-customer. Furthermore, a classification and analysis 
is conducted to categorise captured risks to special named categories based on shared characteristics, 
which contain supply risks, operational risks, demand risks, strategic risks, security risks, 
macroeconomic risks, political risks, natural environment risks and policy risks. Figure 4.2 presents 
an organised CSC risk decomposition framework to describe where these risks are focused.  
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Figure 4.2. A schematic of where the risks are focused along the CSC 
 
4.3.1 Supply risks 
The physical extension of the CSCs originating from a global sourcing strategy leads to huge volumes 
of chemical substances purchased and transported around the world (Harland, Brenchley and Walker, 
2003; Colicchia and Strozzi, 2012). Supply risks appear and reside within the movement of material 
associated with inbound supply activity being unable to deliver the materials or provide the service to 
meet the downstream requirements. According to the survey conducted by Accenture, approximately 
50% of the respondents who involve 151 supply chain executives suggest that the leading risk to the 
CSC is supply disruptions (Waters, 2011). Conducting a critical interpretive synthesis of the literature, 
the hazards associated with the supply process are identified, including supply market uncertainty, 
high sourcing cost, supply activities disruptions, low supplier reliability, low supplier flexibility, 
complexity of materials‟ types, materials unavailable, low material quality, and lack of supply process 
monitoring. Figure 4.3 provides a schematic presentation of the supply risks discussed. 
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Figure 4.3. A schematic presentation of the supply risks discussed 
 
In the CI, there are more than 70,000 kinds of chemical products. The types of chemical materials are 
extremely complex, so that the sufficient understanding should be obtained by suppliers to distinguish 
and provide the required materials to the downstream members (Brown et al., 2014). Meanwhile, the 
exchanges of chemicals are extensive and the trades take place worldwide at any time. The prices of 
chemical substances fluctuate all the time, especially the fossil fuel, which leads to the necessity of 
opportunistic buying. In order to making more profit, chemical companies have to exploit every cost 
saving opportunity to avoid high sourcing cost.  
 
In the operations, the reliability and flexibility are two critical indicators used to measure the supply 
service. A reliable supplier is necessary to provide adequate quantities and qualities of inputs to the 
production process, while the flexibility of the supplier is regarded as one of the antecedents of supply 
chain flexibility to respond to the dynamic changes and complex requirements (Swafford, Ghosh and 
Murthy, 2006; Avittathur and Swamidass, 2007; Gosling, Pruvis and Naim, 2010). The majority of 
raw materials are sourced from remote and unstable areas of the world. In these areas, the supply 
activity disruptions, unavailable materials, and the damage of material quality are frequently 
experienced, which lead to supply process disruption or even breakdown, as well as contributing to 
the uncertainties of the supply market (The white paper of Advisen insurance intelligence, 2013). Due 
to frequent changes, the structure and operational process should be monitored continuously to reduce 
the risks. However, the low visibility of the sourcing phase obstructs the hazard identification. It is 
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imperative that the CSC members collaborate to improve the transparency of operations in the 
material, financial, and information aspects (Jüttner, 2005). 
 
4.3.2 Operational risks 
Operational risks refer to the uncertainties and disruptions arising from problems from internal 
controls, systems, or people that may cause products damage or services disruption (Manuj and 
Mentzer, 2008a). As described in the previous section, this kind of risk is the possibility of inherent 
uncertainties associated with focal company. Integrating risk perspectives of the CSCs with 
investigated hazards in the literature, Figure 4.4 describes the addressed operational risks in the CSC. 
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Figure 4.4. A schematic presentation of the operational risks discussed 
 
The operational risks are comprised of fourteen risk factors, which are hazardous nature of materials, 
breakdown in core operations, improper operational procedure selection, inadequate process capacity, 
high level of process variation, complexity of product types, lack of/inappropriate inventory 
management, lack of/inappropriate container management, problem of product quality, lack of 
qualified labours, technology innovation, information sharing delay, information sharing inaccuracy 
and financial problems. 
 
Specifically, chemical materials have their own inherent properties that determine the distinct features 
of the CSC operations. Especially, the hazardous characteristics, such as extreme low storage 
temperature, high storage pressure, flammable and explosive, endanger the whole operational 
  
84 
 
activities (Bruinen de Bruin et al., 2007). It is significant for the CSCs to ensure the safety of the 
operational process with the least negative impact (Van Wyk and Baerwaldt, 2005). The effort has 
been devoted to identify the operational process related hazards. The risks of improper procedure 
selection, inadequate process capacity, and breakdown in core operational process have been widely 
analysed and a number of risk management approaches provided to minimise the risk effects (Kenne, 
Dejax and Gharbi, 2012). In particular, 35% of 151 supply chain executives in U.S. pointed out the 
labour issues, including lack of skilled workers, strike of workers, carelessness and a lack of 
motivation among the workforce, generate the significant uncertainties and disruptions to supply 
chain operations (Waters, 2011). It is indicated that these captured risks may be short term, but with 
serious consequences in operational process (Jiang and Huo, 2008). To provide qualified products and 
required services, quality management has been widely applied to improve the service level (Tang, 
2006). As well, CSCs employ advanced technical, expensive and sophisticated equipment to support 
the movement and production of a wide variety of chemicals. The developing of information systems 
can be harnessed to help members reduce the deficiencies associated with information sharing, such 
as information sharing delay, information sharing inaccuracy and etc. (Yu, Yan and Cheng, 2001).  
 
In the operations, most chemical manufacturers implement a make-to-stock strategy to catch the huge 
demand and the reactions are always carried out in batch mode. These features compel the members 
to maintain a higher inventory level (Ryan and Silvanto, 2013). Inventory management is necessary to 
control the material flow through establishing collaboration to increase the communication. 
Meanwhile, containers are widely used to store raw materials, work-in-process (WIP), by-products 
and finished products during the operations. The characteristics of immiscibility and incompatibility 
of chemical substances determine that the containers cannot be mixed, therefore, the lack of container 
management is a distinct risk compared with other issues in the CSCs (Karimi, Sharafali and 
Mahalingam, 2005). However, very limited studies actually specify this risk issue in academic 
literature, as well as in practice. A coordinated approach is required to manage the inventory and 
improve the utilisation of containers through improving information visibility. In terms of financial 
aspects, the risks arise from the inherent money transactions and appear as poor returns on financial 
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performance (Waters, 2011). As described in Chapter 2, many studies have been carried out to 
optimise the investment planning in the CSC. The provided investigations estimated the financial 
problems in the planning stage, but additional work is necessary to provide a comprehensive 
framework to assess and manage the financial risks in the operations. 
 
4.3.3 Demand risks 
Demand risks specify to the possibility of unexpected changes arising from market or downstream 
members (Samvedi, Jain and Chan, 2012). Based on the literature review, it is found that the attention 
given to demand risks is much more than other sources of risks. The components of demand risks 
contain demand invisibility, customer requirement changes, forecasting errors, products substitution, 
and competitive uncertainty. A schematic presentation of the demand risk sources discussed is 
presented in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5. A schematic presentation of the demand risks discussed 
 
Compared with the general products, which can be distinguished according to the certain set of 
attributes, the majority of chemical products are hardly identified by this method as the attribute can 
only be defined in a certain range rather than a specific value (Bartels, Augat and Budde, 2006). 
Meanwhile, the multiple recipes can be used to produce the required chemical products. The CSC 
should understand the availability of alternative options, so as to reap the benefits in terms of cost 
saving (Mele, 2011; Brown et al., 2014). The CSCs have the incentive of adjusting its raw materials 
and manufacturing process to make the advantage position through evaluating financial performance 
and social obligation (in environment protection aspect). It requires supply chain members to develop 
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an understanding of the nature of customers‟ tastes and chemical substitution policy to ensure that the 
CSC outputs shift to expectation.  
 
Moreover, the CSC members make the plan of purchasing, manufacturing and other operational 
activities based on the forecasting. Chaos in system due to the distorted information from the 
downstream increases the possibility of overreactions (Udenio, Fransoo and Peels, 2015). The 
inaccurate forecasting will result in the loss of market opportunities, as well as damage the 
competiveness of CSCs. Miller (1991) indicates that the competitive risk covers the uncertainties 
associated with competition between the existing products and services and potential entrants. Based 
on the report of CEFIC (2012b), there is more external competition as a result of rapid expansion of 
the CI in some developing countries. The traditional chemical producers in developed countries have 
to take alternative strategies and continue to cut their costs to remain competitive. Otherwise, the 
original market share will shrink sharply under the increasing competition.  
 
4.3.4 Strategic risks 
According to the definition described in Chapter 2, the strategic risks appear and reside in the strategy 
level. The academics and operators have devoted great effort to extend current knowledge in strategic 
risks analysis and management, especially in supply policy management, network design, and supply 
chain relationship management (Schmidt and Wilbert, 2000; Leppelt et al., 2013). Taking into 
consideration the distinct CSC features, the strategic risks are captured and represented as improper 
network design, lack of information sharing, lack of partner relationship management, improper 
selection of facilities location, and improper supply chain strategy selection. Figure 4.6 presents a 
schematic presentation of the strategic risks discussed. 
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Figure 4.6. A schematic presentation of the strategic risks discussed 
 
It is interesting to observe that all the listed strategic risk factors have been identified and analysed in 
the previous study (shown in Section 2.4.1), except for the risk of improper supply chain strategy 
selection. In the SCM discipline, a strategy is defined as a plan establishing upon the system and 
surrounding environments to manage the supply chain operations in high hierarchy (Manuj and 
Mentzer, 2008b). Different strategies are determined to achieve the objectives, but the adverse 
impacts of a specific strategy may bring new risks at the same time. For instance, there are three kinds 
of supply strategies widely used, which include single, dual/multiple sourcing, and outsourcing 
strategy (Tang and Musa, 2011). The single sourcing strategy is implemented to reduce the sourcing 
price based on the stable schedule. The advantage of single sourcing is price reduction, while the 
supply disruption risk will increase accordingly. In contrast, dual/multiple sourcing strategies refer to 
purchasing materials from more than one supplier. This kind of strategy brings competition among the 
suppliers, which results in technological development, quality benefit and cost saving, while it is 
usually difficult to reduce the cost (Yu, Zeng, and Zhao, 2009). Outsourcing is another strategy that 
the firm outsources its non-core business to some other professional companies to obtain competitive 
advantages (Kroes and Ghosh, 2010). Even though there are many benefits to be yielded, outsourcing 
may exacerbate vulnerabilities because the relative processes are difficult to be controlled and 
monitored and that may cause catastrophic fracture (Van Wyk and Baerwaldt, 2005). Therefore, the 
proper CSC strategy selection is a challenging topic in CSCRM, which should be addressed in further 
research. 
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4.3.5 Security risks 
Security risks plague the supply chain managers, as well as bringing more worries to the public. The 
hazardous characteristics of chemical materials, complex interactions and globalisation increase the 
occurrence likelihood of security hazardous events and lead to more serious consequence in the CSCs. 
Combining the major risk perspectives of CSC with the identified hazards in the literature, the list of 
security risks is produced, which include information system security problems, infrastructure security 
problems, transportation security problems, labour strikes, criminal activities and terrorism. Figure 
4.7 shows a schematic presentation of the strategic risks. 
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Figure 4.7. A schematic presentation of the security risks discussed 
 
In the CSC, the operational flows could be interrupted by illegal activities, which are gaining more 
and more attention by the CSC. The security risks related to information system security problems, 
criminal and terrorism threaten the CSC operations and bring undesired consequence, especially in 
financial and reputation aspects (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a; Adhitya and Srinivasan, 2010). 
Obviously, the consequences of such activities could be catastrophic, not only because of the 
hazardous characteristics of chemical substances, but also the vulnerability of the world CSC. The 
majority of fossil fuels are sourced from dangerous areas of the world where they can be easily 
attacked, therefore, the infrastructure security and transportation security problems are the major 
risks for CSCs, which should be given much more attention (Ehlen et al., 2014). Additionally, labour 
issues are of high concern to the CSC. Rao and Goldsby (2009) suggested providing a comfortable 
working atmosphere for employees and, in turn, improving low productivity and reducing the 
probability of labour strikes.  
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4.3.6 Macroeconomic risks 
It is described that “the stability of the macroeconomic environment is important for business and, 
therefore, is important for the overall competitiveness of a country” (World Economic Forum, 2014). 
The source of macroeconomic risks is a broad term referring to economic fluctuations in the economic 
activity and price changes (Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1987; Rao and Goldsby, 2009). Apart from the 
addressed hazardous events in the literature, the captured macroeconomic risks contain economic 
fluctuation, financial crisis, price fluctuation, inflation, and exchange rate arbitrages, shown in Figure 
4.8. 
 
Macroeconomic 
risks
 
Financial crisis
 
Inflation
 
Price fluctuation
 
Exchange rate 
arbitrages
 
Economy 
fluctuation
Sources of risks  
Figure 4.8. A schematic presentation of the macroeconomic risks discussed 
 
In the CSCs, the macroeconomic risks show distinct characteristics, but few studies actually deal with 
them in a developed SCRM framework. Basically, the market economic environment is characterised 
by a high degree of fluctuations and uncertainties. The chemical products are sensitive to the material 
and operating cost, so that the economic changes will trigger the variation of system preformation 
(Adhitya, Srinivasan and Karimi, 2009). Meanwhile, the inflation of goods and financial crisis will 
lead to movement of chemical price, which brings uncertainties to the market (Rao and Goldsby, 
2009). The CSCs have to adjust their networks to the global market, so as to exploit benefits in terms 
of exchange rate arbitrage, optimal interest rates and low raw material or labour price (Gurnani and 
Tang, 1999).  
 
4.3.7 Political risks 
Due to the globalisation, huge volumes of chemicals are purchased and shipped from unstable regions 
of the world. It leads to the CSCs experience a higher probability of political risks (Shubik, 1983). 
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The academics and practitioners are increasing concerned about the risks of government instability, 
revolution, war and government attitude, shown in Figure 4.9. 
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Figure 4.9. A schematic presentation of the political risks discussed 
 
The wars in Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003) and political instability in Libya from 2011 disrupt the 
CSC operations and cause the feedstock prices to soar. The CSCs have to suffer the higher sourcing 
costs and operating costs in response to the threats (Robb and Bailey, 2003). After 2012, the on-going 
Syrian Civil War not only affects the local CSCs, but also brings a series of chain reactions to the 
world economy. The governments and chemical companies deliver interesting insights into the 
investigation of the connection between political problems and supply chain management research.  
 
In other aspects, the government attitudes can influence local firms and determine their trading 
partners in some cases. Thus, the government has the ability to hold one of the particular chemical 
materials as hostage that brings price fluctuation in world market. For instance, the Arab OPEC 
members decided to no longer sell oil to some countries that supported Egypt in 1973, which caused 
the oil crisis (Miller, 1993). The CSC managers are recognising the importance of evaluating political 
risks in respective regions to reduce the risks and make beneficial decisions. 
 
4.3.8 Natural environment risks 
In order to provide a detailed partition, the scope of general environment risks addressed in the 
literature review is narrowed down to be defined as the natural phenomena that could impair CSC 
operations in the affected region, which include natural disaster, infectious disease and weather risk 
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(Cruz and Krausmann, 2013). A schematic presentation of the various natural environment risks 
discussed is shown in Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.10. A schematic presentation of the nature environment risks discussed 
 
In recent years, the United Nations reports that the earth is becoming more active and that frequent 
natural disasters, such as bad weather, climate changes, and earthquake, happened in various parts of 
the world (Bahinipati and Patnaik, 2015). Also, the infectious diseases seriously affect CSC 
operations and cause tremendous loss. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) report, an 
outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome in Southern China has caused 775 deaths between 
November 2002 and July 2003 and spread to 37 countries within weeks (Wong et al., 2003). The lack 
of labour and government travel ban in the affected area resulted in 75% of the plants shutdown, 
which had serious economic losses to the CSCs. Increasingly, CSCs are aware of the importance of 
preparing for and responding to the natural environment risks. The risk relief procedure and 
emergency responding plan is developed to deal with the undesired effects in the supply chain level 
(Zsidsin et al., 2004) 
 
4.3.9 Policy risks 
Policy risks arise from the changes of legislation, regulations, and policies, such as new policy being 
introduced, quota restrictions and sanctions. Schildhouse (2006) indicates that it is significant to fully 
understand policy risks and all the available policy materials before getting down to business. In the 
CSCs, the most of attention on policy risk is given to the hazardous chemicals substitution, while 
there is very little literature addressing the problems in the requirement of environmental protection. 
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In this study, the sources of policy risks are described as changes in legislation/regulation/policy, the 
requirement of environmental protection and stakeholder/social attitudes, shown in Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.11. A schematic presentation of the policy risks discussed 
 
Hazardous characteristics of chemical substances pose significant challenges to CSC operations as 
well as to the surrounding environment, which potentially threaten ecological balance and endanger 
human health (Papageorgiou, 2009). Government and authorities play an important role in CSCRM, 
not only by preparing legislation but also by sending to industry informal regulatory guidance and 
recommendations (Scruggs et al., 2014). However, the changes in policy could affect the business 
community and bring challenges to CSC operations. For instance, CO2 emission is of such concern to 
government that CSCs are forced to reduce the carbon intensity. Under this circumstance, the CSC 
transportation cost per tonne-km increases (CEFIC, 2012b).  
 
Meanwhile, the stakeholder/social attitudes play a significant role in execution and implementation of 
that policy, which reflect how difficult the government policy is to implement. Recently, CSC 
participants have been aware of the significant liability risks, which associate with harmful effects of 
production and consumption of chemicals. CSC members seek to substitute the hazardous 
manufacturing materials and pollution intensive production process to achieve environmentally 
friendly. Therefore, stakeholder and social attitudes should be considered from the industrial 
perspective when conducting CSCRM. It should make great efforts to reduce risk and improve service 
level through a coordinated approach to making the environment diverse, sustainable and economical. 
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4.4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION DATA ANALYSIS AND TAXONOMIC DIAGRAM 
VALIDATION 
The visibility of the risks is one of the most challenging points in CSCRM, it is therefore essential to 
comprehensively identify and validate hazards existing in the CSC. The study started with identifying 
the hazards that have been addressed in the relevant literatures (shown in Chapter 2), and then 
extended to the general supply chain risks. A decomposition method was applied to classify 
unstructured hazards into different risk domains. The questionnaire was built to explore the 
appropriateness of the developed risk taxonomic diagram in order to ensure the comprehensiveness of 
identified hazards and the feasibility of the proposed risk classification method.  
 
The participants were selected based on their experience to the research topic using the university 
membership directories on SCM in Liverpool John Moores University, the University of Liverpool 
and Wuhan University of Technology in China. As well, more than 100 recognised CSCM companies 
in China were contacted to establish willingness to participate. The sample is a proportion of the 
population. To generalise the findings, the sample size calculations should fit in with statistical 
measures (McColl et al., 2001). In total, 118 questionnaires were sent out to collect the data from risk 
experts and analysts in May 2014 and 47 replies were received in three months. There were 29 valid 
questionnaires and 18 invalid ones, as the respondents did not reply or did not answer all the questions 
in the questionnaire, therefore the valid return rate was 24.58%.  
 
Then, a validity test was conducted to test whether the study measures the required items and whether 
the study receives the reliable responses (Davis, 2000). The reliability of the obtained results was 
examined through employing Cronbach's alpha method, based on the functions shown below (Sijtsma, 
2009; Cohen and Swerdlik, 2010):  
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where K is defined as the number of the questions in the investigation, X is the number of total 
sample,   
  is the variance of the total sample,    indicates the question i,    
  is the variance of the 
current question, and i is the question number. The Cronbach's Alpha is obtained in Eq. 4.1. In order 
to inspect extracted Cronbach's Alpha, Eq. 4.2 is provided to examine Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardised Items, where K is defined as the number of the questions in the survey and  ̅ indicates 
the mean of the non-redundant correlation coefficients. 
 
In this study, a total of 55 questions were tested. The Cronbach's alpha of the whole survey is 0.893 
and Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items is 0.889. In principle, the collected data is reliable 
when it is over 0.8, the result is acceptable when it is between 0.7 and 0.8, and the internal 
consistency is poor if the obtained answer is less than 0.7 (Cohen and Swerdlik, 2010). Therefore, the 
proposed survey achieves a high level of reliability. The Cronbach‟s Alpha of the reliability test is 
illustrated in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3. The reliability test for the questionnaire survey 
 Cronbach‟s 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardised Items 
Number of 
questions 
Whole survey 0.871 0.869 221 
 
Furthermore, decision makers and operators investigated the importance of the identified hazards to 
the CSCs, so as to suggest the concerned hazardous events. Table 4.4 illustrates the mean, the 
standard deviation (S.D.) and the ranking of the importance of the identified hazards based on the 
results from expert judgements. 
 
Table 4.4. Results of the importance of hazards to the CSC operations 
Identified Hazards How important is this 
hazard to CSC operations? 
Mean S.D. Rank 
Supply risks Supply market uncertainty 4.85 0.76 8 
High sourcing cost 3.38 2.44 38 
Supply activities disruptions 6.12 0.66 1 
Low supplier reliability 4.50 1.00 17 
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Low supplier flexibility 2.11 1.67 53 
Complexity of material types 2.31 2.11 52 
Unavailability of materials 2.35 1.44 51 
Low material quality 2.55 0.78 47 
Lack of supply process monitoring 4.01 1.11 20 
 
Operational 
risks 
Hazardous nature of materials 4.69 1.33 12 
Breakdown in core operations 6.01 0.69 2 
Improper operational procedure selection 5.77 1.56 4 
Inadequate process capacity 4.69 2.19 12 
High level of process variation 3.11 2.11 42 
Complexity of product types 2.72 1.20 45 
Lack of/inappropriate inventory management 4.56 1.00 14 
Lack of/inappropriate container management 4.99 1.45 7 
Problem of product quality 3.57 0.05 31 
Lack of qualified staffs 3.89 0.88 25 
Technology innovation 2.11 1.33 53 
Information sharing delay 4.71 1.20 11 
Information sharing inaccuracy 3.96 1.56 24 
Financial problems 3.24 1.41 39 
 
Demand risks Demand invisibility 5.89 0.33 3 
Customer requirement changes 3.58 0.88 30 
Forecasting errors 5.22 1.20 5 
Product substitution 3.61 1.45 30 
Competition changes 3.87 1.67 27 
 
Strategic risks Improper supply chain network design 3.99 1.78 22 
Lack of information sharing  3.45 1.33 36 
Lack of partner relationship management 4.52 0.88 15 
Improper selection of facilities location 3.47 1.20 35 
Improper supply chain strategy selection 4.75 0.82 10 
 
Security risks Information system security problems 3.18 2.19 41 
Infrastructure security problems 3.98 1.33 23 
Transportation security problems 4.12 1.05 18 
Labour strikes 3.22 1.56 40 
Criminal acts 3.54 1.41 34 
Terrorism 3.56 0.88 32 
 
Macroeconomic 
risks 
Economy fluctuation 3.56 1.45 32 
Financial crisis 2.98 2.11 44 
Price fluctuation  4.01 1.00 20 
Inflation 2.51 1.67 49 
Exchange rate arbitrages 3.06 1.41 43 
 
Political risks Government instability 2.57 1.41 46 
Revolution 2.36 1.56 50 
War 3.79 1.05 27 
Government attitude 2.54 1.41 48 
 
Natural 
environment 
Natural environment disaster 4.78 0.76 9 
Infectious disease 4.52 1.20 15 
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risks Weather risk 5.10 0.77 6 
 
Policy risks Changes in legislation/ regulations/ policies 4.03 0.71 19 
The requirement of environment protection 3.42 1.41 37 
Stakeholders‟/society‟s attitudes 3.65 1.45 28 
*S.D. = Standard Deviation 
 
The results show that the classified nine risk categories have close levels of overall importance 
(Average of supply risks: 3.61; Average of operational risks: 4.14; Average of demand risks: 4.43; 
Average of strategic risks: 4.04; Average of security risks: 3.60; Average of macroeconomic risks: 
3.22; Average of political risks: 2.82; Average of natural environment risks: 4.80; Average of policy 
risks: 3.70). The importance of each hazard is ranked to suggest the significant influential factors to 
CSC. According to the analysis, supply activities disruptions, breakdown in core operations, and 
demand uncertainty are of high concern to the participants, which could be frequently experienced in 
the CSC operations. S.D. represents the amount of variation or dispersion of an obtained set of data. 
In the survey, the obtained S.D. is between 0.70 and 2.44. A high standard deviation indicates the 
experts regard the value of measurement factor to spreading out over a wider range of values, while a 
low standard deviation suggests the participants share similar sentiments.  
 
After analysing the importance of each identified hazards in the previous questionnaire survey, the 
priority of the identified hazards is obtained over the population of respondents that illustrates the 
concerned hazardous events according to their overall importance. Based on the survey results, the top 
10 risks are supply activities disruptions, breakdown in core operations, demand invisibility, improper 
operational procedure selection, forecasting errors, weather risk, lack of/inappropriate container 
management, supply market uncertainty, natural environment disaster, improper supply chain strategy 
selection. The highly ranked CSC risks are regarded as the risks with serious risk effects from 
industrial perspectives, which are required to be given much more attention in the operations. As well, 
a CSC risk database can be developed with respect to the outcomes of risk ranking to support the 
further CSCRM research. It provides a foundation for applying various risk management methods to 
assess and mitigate risks and to improve both safety and reliability of the CSC systems. To 
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graphically illustrate the ranked CSC risks, a typological model was developed through the preceding 
discussion of risk factors in the CSCs and integrating summarised questionnaire results. The identified 
CSC hazards are ranked in each categorisation and outlined in a hierarchical structure, shown in Fig 
4.12. 
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Figure 4.12. A taxonomic diagram for CSC risks 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
It is widely recognised that hazard identification is a vital phase for conducting an effective CSCRM. 
The literature review serves as a base and guide to strengthen the knowledge base in hazard 
identification. The CSC risks addressed in the previous research and the general supply chain risks 
frame were integrated to develop a structured risks taxonomic diagram. In the developed diagram, the 
unstructured hazards were decomposed into different risk categorisations: supply, operational, 
demand, security, political, policy, macroeconomic and natural environment aspects. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire survey was carried out to make the inference about the attitudes and opinions from 
experts following a rigorous approach. The importance of the identified hazards to the CSC system 
was addressed, which provided a portfolio of risks and suggested the concerned hazardous events 
from industrial perspectives. In further research, the captured risks can be assessed through applying 
different risk analysis methods, so as to find out the risks that should be reduced. 
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CHAPTER 5  CONCEPTUAL MODELLING OF CHEMICAL 
SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS USING SYSTEM DYNAMICS APPROACH  
Summary 
This chapter discusses the development of a conceptual CSC model and its associated risks following 
a SD approach. In theory, the SD modelling process can be achieved by a description of several 
separate conceptual sub-models that contain the major interdependencies and feedback mechanisms in 
the system. The integration of developed models can be applied to analyse the changes of system 
behaviours arising from the disturbances in different scenarios, so as to investigate the various risk 
effects in different risk scenarios. A validation is carried out to test and verify the correspondence of 
the model structure and the robustness of the model‟s behaviours that establishes sufficient confidence 
in the developed model.  
 
5.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
In CSCRM, it is challenging to provide a novel risk analysis method employing both qualitative and 
quantitative data/information to manage changeable CSC risks taking into consideration the complex 
interactions between the hazardous events and their associated changes of system behaviour. In order 
to facilitate this problem, a SD modelling approach is implemented to address the time risk effects 
that bring about the variation in the system behaviours. The system thinking is adapted that considers 
the CSC as a system made up of interacting parts, rather than investigating the risk as an isolated 
event. Following the rigorous approaches described in Chapter 3, the first step is problem definition. 
The purpose of the modelling research is identified and the system boundaries are specified, so that 
the researchers can turn to planning and developing a problem solution. In particular, it provides the 
questions of what are the major concerns in modelling activities and which parameters or variables 
would contribute to those concerns (Sterman, 2000). According to the guideline suggested by Sterman 
(2000), a formal structure of problem definition in the SD method has been suggested to facilitate the 
problem definition in SD model developing, which consists of 1) Define purpose of system, 2) 
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Determine system boundaries, 3) List of variables. The section will follow this formal structure to 
specify the problem that should be defined in the research. 
 
Figure 5.1. Research approach for the problem definition 
 
In the problem definition stage, it starts with purpose identification and system boundary 
classification (Mashayekhi and Ghili, 2012). The aim of CSC risk modelling is to understand the 
structural causes that trigger the changes of system performance arising from risks. The SD modelling 
seeks to provide a novel risk management method that is capable of exploring a wider variety of 
hazardous events in the CSCs, and which accounts for the causal relationships and feedback effects 
existing in CSC operations. Therefore, it accommodates the need to describe the connections between 
hazardous events and their associated changes of system behaviours. In the proposed study, two sub-
systems are considered in the system boundaries, which are CSC system and hazardous event system, 
respectively. The CSC system comprises all the entities participating in a production chain in which 
raw materials are converted into final chemical products, and then delivered to customers. As 
described in previous research (shown in Figure 3.8), a CSC is made up of the central company, 
which is always the manufacturer, and its linked upstream suppliers and downstream customers. The 
structure resembles tree branches, which integrate suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers and 
customers in one system. In another aspect, it is significant to investigate the risk itself. As described 
in Section 3.5, a risk can be analysed in three dimensions, which are LO, CS and CP. According to 
these defined scope, the variables contained in the system are specified that include risk, 
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product/inventory, information, financial, human resources, and physical assets (Narasimhan and 
Talluri, 2009). From the perspective of the SD methodology, a list of basic variables is identified to 
help to clarify CSCRM issues, shown in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1. The list of major variables related to CSC risk modelling 
Risk Product/inventory Information 
 Occurrence likelihood (LO) 
 Consequence severity (CS) 
 Consequence probability (CP) 
 On order product 
 Product inventory on-hand 
 Work in progress (WIP) 
 Backlogged orders 
 On order raw material 
 Availability of raw material 
 Safety stock 
 Customer order 
 Lead time 
 Recovery time 
 Transparency of 
information 
 Time for information 
sharing 
Financial Human resources Physical assets 
 Price  
 Cost 
 Number of workers 
 Productivity 
 Amount of equipment 
 Equipment capacity 
 Public infrastructure 
 
5.2 CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM DEVELOPMENT 
Due to the potential for disruptions in the CSC, any or all of the materials, information and monetary 
flows can be affected by the occurrence of a hazardous event, so that there is a discrepancy between 
the actual operations and the planning. The analysis of CSC risk modelling that falls into the category 
mainly is carried out for the purpose of improving the understanding of dynamic system behaviours 
caused by risks through theory building. The conceptual causal-loop diagrams are created to formalise 
logical interactions within the CSC and to represent the risk evolution mechanism in previous 
research within the system boundaries (Lertpattarapong, 2002). In the research, the CSC risk model is 
expressed in two separate models: the CSC sub-model and hazard event sub-model.  
 
5.2.1 Chemical supply chain sub-model 
In the CSC, the sourcing, conversion, logistics, storage and other activities generate required outputs 
to fulfil the downstream demand within the CSC network. To develop the SD-based CSC model, it is 
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essential to identify the significant activities and formalise their associated cause and effect 
relationships in the system boundary. Adapted from the representative functions, the collection of 
separate models is developed to represent the CSC operations, which include the sourcing and 
forecasting sub-model, manufacturing sub-model, warehousing sub-model, and transportation sub-
model. Through properly connecting the developed sub-models, the whole picture of causal relations 
in the CSC system is obtained, which is capable of presenting the CSC operations. 
 
5.2.1.1 Source and forecast function sub-model 
In the global market, tremendous volumes of chemical substances have been purchased around the 
world. The sourcing process involves the movement of materials associated with inbound supply 
activity that delivers the materials to meet the downstream requirements. In practice, the customer 
demand is usually uncertain and difficult to be accurately forecasted. The CSCs have to develop an 
understanding of the nature of customer requirements, so as to minimise the gap in actual demand and 
the planning (Barlas and Gunduz, 2011).The traditional CI has reached maturity in the1990s, so that 
the development of the traditional CSCs can be predicted to some extent (Bartels, Augat, and Budde, 
2006). In contrast, there is usually very little historical data for speciality supply chains that in turn 
makes the job of demand forecasting difficult. Therefore, CSCs use both historical data and current 
downstream order as input data to forecast next term customer demand. An important observation in 
demand forecasting error represents the oscillation in the material flow that challenges the sourcing 
activities in the network, as well as in the CSCs (Udenio, Fransoo and Peels, 2015). To make the 
efficient plan of operational activities on systems' thinking, it requires identifying the causal 
relationships among the demand forecasting process. Figure 5.2 presents a conceptual causal loop 
diagram of demand forecasting process, which is established upon the implemented forecasting 
method.  
 
Figure 5.2. Causal loop diagram of demand forecasting 
Forecasted
demand
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data
Downstream
orders
Forecasting
method
+
+
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The dash line describes that the implemented forecasting method could determine the accuracy of the 
demand forecasting result, which is based upon the historical value or current downstream order. 
Meanwhile, the changes for the causative and effective variables share the same tendency under all 
circumstances that the increase of historical value or current downstream order will lead to a higher 
forecasted demand.  
 
Based on the forecasted demand and designed strategies, the raw materials are sourced from suppliers 
to provide required materials or services to the CSCs. Furthermore, the qualified suppliers are selected 
to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of CSC operations. The preference for supplier selection is 
established upon the long-term relationship, short-term performance, as well as the other criteria, such 
as reliability, cost, and reputation (Akkermans, 2001; Sarkar and Mohapatra, 2006). Accordingly, a 
causal loop diagram is developed to illustrate the supplier selecting mechanism, shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3. Causal loop diagram of supplier selection 
 
As shown in the figure, two distinct loops can be observed to represent the cause and effect 
relationships between the criteria and preference for suppliers. By multiplying the individual effect of 
each relationship, the polarity of the loop is addressed. In the developed diagram, the number of 
negative relationships in the loops is odd, therefore the changes of loops move toward a stable 
situation. It appears to reinforce the effect between the supplier performance and preference for 
supplier selection, and the increase of short-term performance and long-term relationship will 
contribute to the effected variable - “Preference for suppliers”. Under this circumstance, the 
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downstream customers are more likely to place more orders to the suppliers with better performance. 
However, the increase of orders placed puts pressure for the supplier to maintain the pace, which 
leads to the decrease of the short-term performance.  
 
5.2.1.2 Manufacture function sub-model 
In the CSC, the complexity and vulnerability are frequently experienced in the manufacturing process 
where the chemical products are formulated though blending, reaction and other activities with 
different recipes. Restrictions, such as the amount of reaction materials, reaction time, and sequence 
of material adding can be observed which are intended to ensure the safety of production activities. 
Growing interest in SCM has highlighted the necessity of developing a modelling framework that can 
be used to address this kind of complexity and uncertainty from the industrial perspective (Özbayrak, 
Papadopoulou and Akgun, 2007). Based on applied strategies, the manufacturing process is carried 
out in line with the schedule or the orders from downstream customers. Basically, the raw material 
inventory, labour productivity and equipment capacity determine the volume of chemical substance 
can be produced by the system (Georgiadis, 2013). Figure 5.4 describes the formalised interactions 
between the various components that determine the production capability.   
 
Figure 5.4. Cause and effect relationships of production capability 
 
In the developed conceptual model, the manufacturing capacity depends on the combination of the 
capacity of the available equipment and the size of the labour force to handle the equipment within the 
system. Specifically, equipment capacity is determined by the capacity of reactors and other 
instruments, which is difficult to be changed in a short period of time, while the size of the labour 
force can be controlled and managed by operators (Lertpattarapong, 2002). From industrial 
perspectives, lack of qualified labour or employing ineligible labours brings risks to the transportation 
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operations, which are of high concern to academics and participants. It is interesting to observe that a 
number of models are established to allocate the manufacturing capacity taking into consideration the 
causal relations and feedback effects between mentioned factors (Coyle, 2001; Cagliano, De Marco 
and Rafele, 2010; Weiler et al., 2011). The positive relationships indicate the improvement of 
equipment capacity and labour productivity could bring the simultaneous increase in manufacturing 
capacity. Meanwhile, the availability of raw materials is another critical element in the manufacturing 
system. The semi-continuous and continuous modes are frequently applied in production, so that the 
lack of raw materials could significantly delay the manufacturing operations and cause serious 
consequences. There is a negative effect between the raw material inventories and the ability to start 
the manufacturing process. To address the complex interactions in the manufacturing system, the 
causal loop diagram of the manufacturing sub-system is provided in Figure 5.5.  
 
Figure 5.5. Causal loop diagram of manufacturing sub-system 
  
5.2.1.3 Warehouse function sub-model 
Even though a basic distinction can be found among supply, trans-shipping and distribution 
warehouses, the major function appears the same, that the warehouse is a hub in the CSC network 
where goods are temporarily stored or rerouted to a different channel in the network. In the CSC, the 
immiscible and incompatible characteristics determine that the chemical substances have to be stored 
in the specific containers or tanks based on their identities (Pasman and Rogers, 2012). Basically, the 
increase of containers/tanks could offer extra warehouse capacity to some extent. Incorporating the 
containers/tanks issue, the warehouse‟s endogenous operation is explained in Figure 5.6. The 
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operations performed within manufacturing and handling is the functions of plenty of key variables, 
which often seem to have strong causal relations. The arrows are used to represent the directions and 
tendencies of relationships. In particular, the arrow with the symbol “||” not only describes the original 
and affected variables, but also indicates there is a time lag between the interactive variables. The 
delay between products in the early stage of manufacture and finished goods received can be observed 
in the developed diagram. Furthermore, it is observed that there are two distinct loops, one controlling 
products inventory and the other controlling manufacturing activities. In the inventory loop, an 
increase in customer service could lead to higher inventory levels and lowering the inventory levels 
could consequently cause the reduction of order fulfilment ability due to the generation of backlogged 
orders (Özbayrak, Papadopoulou and Akgun, 2007). Hence, there is a negative effect between the 
products inventory and the backlogged orders in the system. Any actions that attempt to reduce 
backlogged orders could cause an increase in the products inventory, while the changes in the 
products inventory could affect the ability of order fulfilment. Along the material flow, the containers 
or tanks are set up within each operation unit to store the non-discrete raw materials, work-in-progress 
(WIP), by-products and finished products based on their identities. Container management should be 
conducted to improve the utilisation and efficiency of the containers in the manufacturing process, as 
well as in the whole CSC system. 
 
Figure 5.6. Causal loop diagram of a warehouse and container sub-system 
 
The developed system as a whole is unstable in that it is dominated by a positive feedback loop (two 
of negative relationships contained). Any actions that attempt to improve the order fulfilment rate 
could lead to the oscillation of the system. To be specific, the flow of input products leads to the 
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warehouse inventory increase, while the increase of inventory has a negative effect on the generation 
of backlogged orders. The combination of downstream orders and backlogs is the orders needing to be 
fulfilled in the next simulation step. The containers are used to store chemical substances in the 
warehouse, therefore, it is necessary to address the interaction between the container system and 
warehouse capacity. Generally, the increase of the containers‟ capacity brings a positive effect to the 
warehouse inventory, so that the changes of both sides towards the same direction. 
 
5.2.1.4 Transport function sub-model 
CSCs require highly coordinated material, information and finance flows with the conveyance of 
hazardous substances between its members (Reiskin, White and Johnson, 1999). In order to support 
the movement of variety of materials, multiple transportation modes are employed and highly 
technical, expensive and sophisticated transportation equipment is used during the transportation. 
Hence, it is significant to observer the cause and effect relationships among the materials inventory, of 
transportation capacity and transportation time. Figure 5.7 incorporates transportation time as a 
variable to address the causal relations within the material movement.  
  
Figure 5.7. Causal loop diagram of transportation inventory 
 
It is worth observing that two distinct loops can be found in the diagram. The large loop describes the 
relationship between inventory level and order fulfilment, which contains the variable of “Inventory 
level”, “Backlogged orders”, “Order fulfilment”, and “Orders needing to be shipped”. The developed 
system is stable that it is dominated by a negative loop (three of negative relationships contained). 
Any actions that attempt to change the elements result in the self-correcting of the system. Transporter 
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inventory level is influenced by the calculation of the inflow of products from suppliers and shipped 
products to customers within a given period of time. Backlogged orders will happen if the outflow of 
shipped orders fails to keep pace with customer demand. In the next delivery, the backlogs should be 
first fulfilled, therefore, the negative effect is observed that the increase of backlogged orders will 
reduce the order fulfilment rate. In contrast, the other logic feedback loop is positive that there is self-
reinforcing effect existing. The increase of “Orders needing to be shipped” will cause the 
amplification of the “Backlogged orders”. 
 
Pet-Armacost et al. (1999) indicate that the transportation decisions could directly affect a 
transportation system‟s capability. The capacity of a transportation system is established upon the 
evaluation of infrastructure capacity and transporter capacity according to the choices of transport 
features, such as mode of transport, type of container and route of transport (Chen and Kasikitwiwat, 
2011). Infrastructure capacity is determined by the selected route, which cannot be changed by a 
transporter (Chen et al., 2002). In contrast, the capacity of a transporter could be controlled and 
managed by the transporter itself. Equipment capacity is determined by the capacity of instruments 
and a specified number of operators are required to handle the transportation equipment. Transporter 
capacity depends on the capacity of the available equipment and the size of the labour force within the 
system. The factors that affect transportation capacity are graphically described in a causal loop 
diagram, shown in Figure 5.8.  
 
Figure 5.8. Causal loop diagram of transportation capacity 
 
Transportation time is one of the key indicators in transportation activities. In transportation science, 
Bureau of Public Road (USA) indicates that transportation time can be calculated by:  
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     [    
 
 
  ] Eq. 5.1 
where T0 represents the transportation time when there is zero traffic flow on the transportation 
channel, C is set as the capacity of the transportation channel, V is the current volume of the products 
being transported, and α and β are two variable parameters (Schreckenberg et al., 2005).  
 
To address the dynamic transportation time, Figure 5.9 describes the interaction between the 
suggested factors based on the mathematical equation. The more transportation channel capacity leads 
to the shorter transportation time, while the increase of transported products on the road means that it 
requires longer transportation time. 
 
Figure 5.9. Causal loop diagram of transportation time 
 
5.2.2 Risk sub-model 
The developed CSC system could be affected by hazardous events and bring unexpected 
consequences during its operations.  
Indeed, there is a substantial amount of effort that has been devoted to presenting the level of the 
possible risks. Mokhtari et al. (2011), Vilko and Hallikas (2012), and Heckmann, Comes and Nickel 
(2015) suggested that a risk could be analysed in two attributes: Occurrence likelihood (LO) and 
Consequence severity (CS). Meantime, Ren et al. (2009), and Kumar, Himes and Kritzer (2014) 
argued that Consequence probability (CP) should be considered, which indicates the probability of 
suffering the given magnitude of the consequence, when the accident happens.  
 
In this research, the CSC hazardous events are described by the combination of LO, CS and CP. LO 
estimates whether a CSC risk will materialise. LO refers to the probability that an accident event 
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occurs by causing an undesired effect, CS indicates the magnitude of the possible consequence in 
terms of the negative aspects, and CP shows the probability of suffering the given magnitude of the 
consequence, when the accident happens. When a hazardous event occurs, the negative effects with a 
given degree of probability are represented by CS and CP to describe the experienced consequence. 
The set of corresponding data of each hazardous event is collected from risk experts and inserted into 
the developed SD model to explore the risk effects from the whole supply chain perspective. In order 
to capture the overall effect, it is essential to develop a risk model for comprehensively representing 
the generating mechanism of risk. Figure 5.10 illustrates the cause and effect relationship between 
identified risk attributes and the influenced variable.  
 
Figure 5.10. Causal loop diagram of a hazard and affected variable 
 
In the model, specific variables are created to represent the involved risk attributes. It is significant to 
note that the variables of CS and CP are determined by the combination of the hazardous event and 
the affected variable, whereas LO is decided by the hazardous event itself. The co-determination of 
LO, CS and CP represents the risk magnitude of a hazardous event, which is stored in the variable of 
“Variable damage rate”. It appears to be a reinforce effect between the “Hazardous event magnitude” 
and “Variable damage rate” that the increase of causative variable will amplify the changes in the 
affected variables. Through evaluating the associated changes of the system behaviour caused by the 
variation of risk inputs, the risk effects can be quantitatively assessed in order to explore possible risk 
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reduction solutions. To deal with the concerned risks, the implementation of the established risk 
management procedures contributes to the recovery of the damages over time. The undesired risk 
effects are reduced step by step, which is represented in the variable of “Variable recovery rate”. A 
distinct loop is observed to illustrate the feedback effect between “variable recover rate” and 
“variable value loss”, which are determined by “variable recover ability” and “variable damage 
stack”. The polarity of a loop can be addressed by multiplying the individual effect of each 
relationship: (-)×(+)×(+) ×(-) = (+), therefore, it has a positive effect in whole loop.  
 
5.3 STOCK AND FLOW DIAGRAM DEVELOPMENT 
In accordance with the provided SD modelling method (shown in Figure 3.6), the next step of the SD 
modelling is developing stock and flow diagrams through correspondingly translating established 
causal loop diagrams. It is carried out following the sequential steps: characterise elements, write 
equations, assign values to parameters, build model, and validate model. The reasons for using this 
software are that: 1) It combines the SD theory and simulation concept with discrete events, which 
can be applied to represent the uncertainties of individual CSC events in detail; 2) It demonstrates the 
causal relations between the stocks, flows and control variables with more specific quantitative 
information; 3) It offers a method to subsequently explore the time-dependent system performance; 4) 
It addresses the variation in system behaviours affected by the risks through modifying the system 
structure and variable setting. 
 
In order to ease and accelerate the modelling process, the collections of conceptual stock and flow 
diagrams are developed instead of capturing all the details in the developed system. The commonly 
used components of materials, information, money, demand, personnel and equipment are identified 
and used to create the collections of templates or libraries of the CSC. In the diagram, the system 
components are assigned to the level, auxiliary and flow variables. The individual relationship between 
the components is represented as a relatively simple algebraic equation to capture both the linear and 
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nonlinear relationships. Furthermore, changes and new situations can be adapted by modifying the 
developed model to explore the dynamic CSC system performance under various scenarios. 
 
5.3.1 Chemical supply chain sub-model 
The SD model is capable of simulating system operations and generating dynamic behaviours of 
system components under a specified state of the condition. It addresses sourcing, conversion, 
logistics, storage and some other activities and integrates suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, 
retailers and customers in one system. Based on the developed causal loop diagrams, five 
representative stock and flow diagrams are created: supplier sub-model, manufacturer sub-model, 
transporter sub-model, retailer sub-model and customer sub-model. The developed models are regarded 
as the conceptual models that can be customised to fit the real environment in further research. By 
connecting developed models, a multi-echelon CSC model is built to address the dynamic behaviours 
of the CSC system.  
 
5.3.1.1 Supplier sub-model 
In the CSC, the supplier provides products or services with required quality and quantity to 
downstream members within a period of time. From the addressed causal relations in the developed 
causal loop diagrams of sourcing (shown in Figure 5.2), warehousing (shown in Figure 5.6) and 
transportation (shown in Figure 5.7), it can be seen that the sourcing process is driven by the 
customer demand and supply process builds up the products for distribution. The developed 
conceptual supplier sub-model is required to capture these two causal links, which is represented in 
Figure 5.11. 
 
Figure 5.11. The causal links in the conceptual supplier sub-model  
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+
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Based upon the addressed causal links, the stock and flow diagram of conceptual supplier sub-model is 
developed, shown in Figure 5.12. The developed model plays the role of sourcing products from 
upstream suppliers, storing the products on-hand and delivering sourced products to downstream 
customers. It is noteworthy that the necessary variables have been suitably created to represent the 
identified functions in the supply phase. 
 
Figure 5.12. Stock and flow diagram of conceptual supplier sub-model 
 
To provide a detailed description, the key variables in the model are shown below: 
1) Downstream Orders (S)  
The variable represents the dynamic downstream requirements, which is considered as an auxiliary 
variable. During the simulation, the orders can be generated randomly based on a kind of uncertainty or 
the input of historic data. 
 
2) On Order Products (S) 
It is defined as a level variable used to describe the accumulation of materials. The inputs are 
determined by the orders placed to upstream suppliers, while the outputs are conditioned by the lead-
time of upstream suppliers.  
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3) Upstream Supplier Lead-time (S) 
Lead-time is regarded as an auxiliary variable that represents a phenomenon of the delay in the material 
flow. The disruptions would increase the lead-time and cause the undesired effects: the failure to fully 
satisfy downstream demands, stock out, and the delay in downstream operations. To respond, the time 
gap between the products ordered and received from upstream supplier can be controlled and managed 
by the CSC through carrying out planning, improving information exchanging and quick response (De 
Treville, Shapiro and Hameri, 2004). 
 
4) Product Inventory on-hand (S) 
It is considered as a level variable as it reflects the inventory that is available for shipping. The inflow 
of products received, outflow of products delivered and initial value determine the inventory level of 
products. In order to manage products handling risk, the efforts are spent on reducing the inventory 
level in the whole CSC network instead of minimising the amount of inventory in the entity level 
(Laínez, Puigjaner and Reklaitis, 2009). Hence, system thinking should be employed to analyse the 
inventory system taking into consideration the feedbacks between the material movements in the CSC. 
 
5) Backlogged Orders (S) 
This variable is used to store the un-served orders, so that it is regarded as a level variable. If the 
inventory could not meet the downstream demand, the backlogged orders appear and lead to the 
decrease of order fulfilment rate. Normally, the backlogged orders are priority that should be first 
fulfilled in the next operation. 
 
6) Products Delivered (S) 
The variable of products delivered represents a flow of materials used to satisfy the downstream 
demand. It is a flow variable conditioned by the lead-time, which modifies the products inventory 
position based on the time step. 
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7) Inventory Position (S) 
Inventory position is a vital auxiliary variable updated over time. According to the formalised causal 
loop diagram, the value of inventory position is obtained through evaluating the combination of “On-
order Products (S)”, “Products Inventory on-hand (S)”, “Products Delivered (S)”, and “Backlogged 
Orders (S)”.  
 
8) Demand Forecasting (S) 
In the diagram, it is an auxiliary variable that describes forecasted demand. Established upon the 
implemented forecasting method, the purchasing, manufacturing, inventory management, 
transportation and other activities are scheduled and executed based on the value of this variable. 
 
9) Order Fulfilment Rate (S) 
Order fulfilment rate indicates the reliability of a supplier to supply required products on time (Chae, 
2009). Basically, it is calculated by the comparison of products shipped and products needing to be 
shipped, therefore, it is a percentage of delivered orders in relation to the orders placed by 
downstream customer. In the CSC, the majority of fossil fuel is sourced from dangerous and unstable 
areas of the world, the activities of sabotage, war, terrorism and vandalism increase the uncertainty of 
supplying activities, which could significantly affect order fulfilment rate of a supplier. 
 
5.3.1.2 Manufacturer sub-model 
In the CSC, the manufacturing phase is a complex system where the chemical products are formulated 
through blending, separation, reaction and packaging processes. Diverse manufacturing recipes can be 
applied for converting raw materials to finished products, thus, the uncertainties existing in 
manufacturing processes simultaneously challenge the manufacturing operations (Ritchie and 
Brindley, 2007). However, the production activities are regarded as the internal activities carried out 
by the firm, which can be measured and controlled in terms of operational processes and system 
outputs (Mapes, New and Szwejczewski, 1997; Gunasekaran and Kobu, 2007).  
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In the modelling stage, a conceptual model of the manufacturer sector is developed instead of 
capturing all the details. The sourcing, manufacturing, storage, and shipment functions are established 
and properly connected based on the addressed relationships. Apart from the described causal links 
among the sourcing, storage, and distribution part (shown in Section 5.3.1), the logic interactions in the 
manufacturing process should be addressed before developing the SD model to simulate the 
manufacturing process. It can be described as the downstream demand drives the manufacturing 
activities and the inventory on-hand determines the products can be shipped. The production 
department owns a certain number of capacities that can produce a certain volume of final products 
for a set amount of time. At the same time, the logistics and warehouse department work together to 
ship the final products in the given time when the manufacturer receives the orders. To simplify the 
modelling process, there is only one step production in the developed conceptual manufacturer sub-
model. In further research, the model can be customised to simulate the multiple steps‟ production 
process. Following the described causal relations, the identified components have been created and 
linked to represent a conceptual manufacturing operation in Figure 5.13.  
 
In the developed conceptual manufacturer sub-model, the key variables and their functions are 
presented as follows: 
 
1) Downstream Demand (M) 
As described in the supplier sub-model, the downstream demand is considered as an auxiliary variable 
that drives the operations of the developed system. In this variable, the dynamic behaviour of 
downstream demand is represented using mathematic equations, so that the downstream orders are 
generated over time based on the defined principle or the information passed from the downstream 
members.  
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Figure 5.13. Stock and flow diagram of conceptual manufacturer sub-model 
 
2) Demand Forecasting (M) 
Based on the implemented forecasting method, the orders are predicted relying on the historical data or 
current orders. It is regarded as a vital auxiliary variable that supplies the information to CSC members.  
In general, there are two forecasting methods widely used in the CSC: the extant forecasting method 
and the consensus forecasting method (Goodwin and Wright, 2010). The extant forecasting method 
relies on the historical data and implements mathematical models to evaluate the customer demand, 
while the consensus forecasting method is a coordinated approach to forecast the customer demand 
and the forecasted demand is acknowledged by the members to achieve higher forecast accuracy 
On Order
Materials (M)
Product
Inventory
on-hand (M) Products
Delivered (M)
Flow of Material to
Manufacturer (M)
Inventory
Position (M)
Demand
Forecasting (M)
Downstream
Demand (M)
Backlogged
Orders (M)
Backlogged Orders
Delivered (M)
Fulfil Backlogged
Orders (M)
Material
Inventory
on-hand (M)Materials Delivery
to Manufacturer
Materials Used to
Produce (M)
WIP (M)
Manufacturing
Capacity (M)
Performance (M)
Reacting Time
(M)
Material
Lead-time (S)
Production
Start (M)
Products
Manufactured (M)
Avaliable
Capacity (M)
Capacity
Recovery (M)
Capacity Used
(M)
Capacity Recovery
Time (M)
<Reacting Time
(M)>
Capacity Adjust
Time (M)
Order Fulfilment
Rate (M)
<Production
Start (M)>
<Production
Start (M)>
<Material Inventory
on-hand (M)>
<Manufacturing
Capacity (M)> <Downstream
Demand (M)>
<Demand
Forecasting (M)>
  
119 
 
(Chae, 2009). According to the implemented method, appropriate mathematical equations are inserted 
in the variable to generate predicted values. 
 
3) On-Order Materials (M) 
As with the created variable of “On-order products” in the supplier sub-model, this variable is 
designed as a level variable to represent the accumulation of outstanding orders. 
 
4) Material Inventory on-hand (M) 
It is another level variable as it reflects the volumes of raw materials in storage, which are available  
for manufacturing. As decribed in a previous analysis of relationship formalisation, the lack of 
materials could disrupt the downstream conversion and bring undesired  consequences in terms of low 
service level, unqualified products, etc.  
 
5) Materials used to Produce (M) 
It supplies information of changed material inventory over time. Based on the interactive relationship, 
the volume of material used to produce can be observed which depands on the materials inventory and 
forecasted demands. 
 
6) Avaliable Capacity (M) 
Manufacturing capacity refers to the ability to respond to the dynamic requirements from downstream 
sectors. In practice, the manufacturer capacity is conditioned by the equipment capacity and labour 
capacity (Gunasekaran, Patel and McGaughey, 2004). In the developed model, available capacity is 
designed to accumulate the free capacity in a certain period of time. Therefore, it is set as a level 
variable modified by the input variable of capacity recovery and output variable of capacity used 
based on the time step. During the operations, the excess capacity represents that the system fails to 
receive sufficient orders to warrant the current productivity, which leads to resource wasting and 
profit lost (Baldwin, Gu and Yan, 2013).  
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7) WIP (M) 
Work in progress (WIP) represents the partialy finished products that are at various stages of the 
converting process. In the model, it is created as a level variable as it reflects the volume of materials 
under processing whose outputs are conditioned by the reaction time or the processing time 
corresponding to the input flow of products. 
 
8) Reacting Time (M) 
Reacting time describes the time required in the converting phase. It is an auxiliary variable 
representing a phenomenon of delay in material flow. In the CSCRM, it is necessary to measure the 
on time production and compare it with the initial plan, so as to evaluate the manufacturing operations 
in the time aspect (Thakkar, Kanda and Deshmukh, 2009). 
 
9) Product Inventory on-hand (M) 
As described in the supplier sub-model, it is considered as a level variable that presents the 
accumulation of products within a given period of time. This variable is amended by the variation 
between the products manufactured and products delivered along the time axis. During the CSC 
operations, the chemical reactions are carried out in batch, so that the inventory of finished products 
will sharply increase in a specific time. To provide sufficient capacity, an effective and efficient 
planning is required to manage products inventory as well as the container system. 
 
10) Inventory Position (M) 
In developed model, the inventory position is addressed through logically calculating the variables of 
“WIP (M)”, “Products Inventory on-hand (M)”, “Products Delivered (M)”, and “Backlogged Orders 
(M)”. It is a vital auxiliary variable updated over time.  
 
11) Prodocts Delivered (M) 
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It offers the information of the products delivered to downstream entities, which is determined by the 
minimal values of products inventory on-hand and customer demand. In a CSC, it could be the input 
of the materials flow to the downstream. 
 
12) Backlogged Orders (M) 
A backlog describes the outflow of shipped orders failing to maintian the pace with demand. As in the 
supplier sub-model, it is another level variable used to store the unserved orders.  
 
13) Order Fulfilment Rate (M) 
Order fulfilment rate is a flow variable that offers the information on manufacturing system 
performance, which suggests the capability of a manufacturer to provide the right products within the 
required time. The disruptions in manufacturing activities will result in the decrease of the order 
fulfilment rate and damage the relationship with downstream members.   
 
5.1.3.3 Transporter sub-model 
In the traditional CSCs, transportation process is regarded as a functional part of supply chain 
members or an intendant operating company that is used to connect the flow of materials between the 
supply chain members. Compared with other well organised processes in the CSC, the transporting of 
chemical substances is vulnerable in that the environmental factors and surrounding risks could easily 
disrupt the material movements and cause catastrophic effects. To practically analyse the 
transportation process, a representative stock and flow model is established based on the observed 
cause and effect relationships among the transportation that takes into consideration the inventory of 
materials, capacity of transportation system and transportation time, shown in Figure 5.14.  
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Figure 5.14. Stock and flow diagram of conceptual transporter sub-model 
 
As described in Figure 5.7, the transporter inventory level is determined by the arrival flow of 
products from the upstream members and the outflow of shipped products to the customers. The level 
variable of products required to be transported is developed to represent the accumulation of 
transporter inventory. Based upon Figure 5.8, the capacity of a transporter depends on the capacity of 
the available equipment and the size of the transporter‟s labour force within the CSCT system. 
Therefore, the equipment capacity is created to describe the capacity of instruments, while the labour 
capacity is developed to represent the number of operators handling the available equipment. When 
the products waiting for shipping exceed the maximum capacity, the materials cannot be shipped until 
the capacity is released. The increase of equipment capacity and labour productivity could offer an 
extra capacity to the transportation system, which can be used to fill the transportation capacity gap in 
the operations. In order to capture involved functions in the transportation phase, the key variables are 
explained as follows: 
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1) Products Required to be Transported (T) 
The focal company responds to downstream orders by shipping the requisite products for which the 
transportation system has sufficient available capacity, otherwise the unprocessed products will 
accumulate in this variable based on the time step. To realise this particular function, it is built as a 
level variable and the change of it is governed by the products ready for shipping and outflow of 
shipped products to customers within a given period of time.  
 
2) Products Transported (T) 
This variable is set as a flow variable that represents the movement of materials over time. The value 
of this variable changes immediately that establishes upon the transportation capacity and the 
inventory of the products waiting for transportation.  
 
3) Amount of Available Labours (T) 
The amount of available labour is regarded as a level variable that indicates the labour capacity can be 
used. The value of this variable is amended by the arrival flow of labour recovery and labour hired 
and the outflow of labour starting to work. 
 
4) Available Equipment Capacity (T) 
As is the consideration with the amount of available labour, this is another level variable as it shows 
the available capacity of equipment in a certain period of time. The value is modified by the input 
variable of capacity recovery and output variable of capacity used based on the simulation time step. 
In the transportation system, it refers to the ability of the transporter to respond to the dynamic 
demand. The lack of capacity leads to the failure of fully fulfilling the downstream requirements 
within the given period, while the excess of capacity causes resource wasting and profit losses.  
 
5) Infrastructure Capacity (T) 
Chen at al. (2002) indicate that infrastructure capacity is determined by the selected route and 
surrounding environment, which cannot be controlled or changed by the transportation service 
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providers. To supply this kind of information, it is created as an auxiliary variable in the developed 
model.  
 
6) Available Transporter Capacity (T) 
It offers the information of transporter capacity that can be used in the current situation. Based on the 
developed causal loop diagram, a specified number of operators are required to handle the 
transportation equipment, so that the transporter capacity depends on the capacity of the available 
equipment capacity and the size of the labour force within the transportation system. 
 
7) Available Capacity of Transportation System (T) 
The capacity and capability of a transportation system is determined by the transport features, such as 
route condition, transportation mode and transportation strategy (Peng et al., 2014). It is an auxiliary 
variable to supply information of the capacity of the transportation system. 
 
8) Transportation time (T) 
In transportation science, transport time is determined by the volume of products in transportation and 
the capacity of the available infrastructure, which is one of the key performance indicators to evaluate 
the delivery activity in terms of the time aspect (Massey and Jacobs, 2012). In the developed model, it 
is developed as an auxiliary variable that represents a phenomenon of the delay in material flow.  
 
9) Order Fulfilment Rate (T) 
As described in previous sub-models, order fulfilment rate is designed as an auxiliary variable that 
reflects the system performance. This variable supplies the percentages of order fulfilled in every 
simulation step to describe the reliability of transportation service providers.  
 
5.1.3.4 Retailer sub-model 
In the CSC, the retailer is an intermediate platform of evaluating and integrating the resrouces from 
suppliers and requirements of downstream members to provide sourced products to customers, which 
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is similar to the function of suppliers. Figure 5.15 shows a conceptual retailer sub-model, which 
illustrates purchasing, storage, delivery and demand forecasting activities in the system. 
 
Figure 5.15. Stock and flow diagram of conceptual retailer sub-model 
 
In the developed model, there are three functional departments, including the sourcing, logistics and 
warehouse departments. The retailer sources the required materials from upstream suppliers based on 
a pre-defined order policy and stores the purchased products in the warehouse. Cooperating with the 
logistics department, the required materials are shipped to the downstream members. Basically, the 
basic function of retailers is to provide sourced products to customers, so that the majority of created 
variables have the same definitions and functions as the variables described in the supplier sub-model 
(shown in Figure 5.13). In addition to the same place, the variables having specific features are 
explained as follows: 
 
1) On-Order Products (R) 
The retailer sources products from various upstream suppliers. To creat superior value and bring 
competitive advanages, the evaluation of the resrouces from potential suppliers is carried out to make 
beneficial sourcing decisions. A specific variable is developed to represents the accumulative effect of 
the products on ordered, which is conditioned by the lead-time of upstream suppliers. It is regarded as 
the input of the material flow in the retailer sub-model. 
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2) Product Inventory on-hand (R) 
This is another level variable as it describes the products which can be used to fulfil customer demands. 
It is obtained through accumulating the difference between the arrival flow of products received and 
the out flow of products delivered in each simulation step. In the operations, a specific control 
algorithm can be inserted in the developed variable to control and manage inventory on-hand, so as to 
reduce products handling cost and optimise system performance. 
 
3) Products Delivered to Customers (R) 
According to the order fulfilment strategy, a certain number of products are forwarded to the customers 
over time. A flow variable is created to describe the phenomenon of material movement in the 
developed model.  
 
4) Order Fulfilment Rate (R) 
It is an auxiliary variable that measures the performance of a retailer. A failed order completion results 
in the decrease of the order fulfilment rate and brings undesired losses in terms of money, reputation 
and market share. 
 
5.1.3.5 Customer sub-model 
In the CSC, the customers place orders to purchase goods or services from upstream members. 
However, competition and the changes of customer taste bring uncertainties to CSC operations. CSCs 
have to develop an understanding of the nature of the market and provide a robust and agile supply 
chain network to deal with dynamics. Figure 5.16 provides a conceptual model to present the 
interaction between the orders placed to upstream partner and the relationship with upstream partners. 
 
Figure 5.16. Stock and flow diagram of conceptual customer sub-model 
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In the created CSC model, the simulation is started from the customer placing an order in accordance 
with defined order policy or historical data. Total demand is an auxiliary variable i.e. it generates 
initial order information to developed system. To deal with the increased domestic and global 
competition, novel techniques and strategies are implemented to achieve the desired the market share. 
Instead of focusing on price competition, there is more and more attention paid to the criteria in terms 
of quality, reliability and lead-time aspects (Gulledge and Chavusholu, 2008). All the CSC members 
cooperate to shift the outputs to fit the various demands on the systems' thinking. Therefore, the 
variable of market share supplies the information that it is not conserved but updated over time. 
According to total demand and market share, the number of orders placed to the system is obtained, 
which is regarded as the driver of the built system operation. 
 
5.3.2 Risk sub-model 
A hazardous event is a threat in the sense that some undesired things can interrupt the operational 
process and have a negative impact on the CSC performance (Waters, 2011). As described in the 
causal loop diagram development phase, the particular features of a hazardous event are demonstrated 
in three aspects in order to address the time-dependent effects on system thinking. The created causal 
and effect relationships are correpondingly translated into a stock and flow diagram and the necessary 
variables have been suitably added, shown in Figure 5.17. 
  
Figure 5.17. Stock and flow diagram of risk sub-model 
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The risk sub-model is created based on the causal relations addressed in Figure. 5.10. The values of 
CS and CP for a given variable are determined by the combination between hazardous event and 
affected variable, while it is not to be expected that LO can be evaluated or managed in the variable 
level. The co-determination of LO, CS and CP represents the risk magnitude of a hazardous event. A 
reinforce effect can be addressed between the hazardous event magnitude and the damage of a 
particular hazardous event. The existing cause and effect relations in the system influencing the 
performance of CSCs escalate the risk effects and damage the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
operations. Therefore, the risk effects can be quantitatively assessed through evaluating the associated 
changes of the system behaviour caused by the variation of risk inputs. However, the existed risk 
management procedures contribute to the recovery of the damages over time. The damage is reduced 
in accordance with the variable recovery rate on a step by step basis. Based upon the mapped causal 
relations, the proper connections of risk variables following the identified interactive relationships 
reveal a representative risk generation mechanism. The descriptions of key variables are presented 
below: 
1) LO (R) 
It is considered as an auxiliary variable that indicates the possibility of a hazardous event occurring. 
The information is obtained from expert knowledge, historical data or other methods and set as input 
value of a risk scenario. 
 
2) CS (R) 
This variable presents the magnitude of the possible undesired consequence when the hazardous event 
does occur and affect the target variable. It is built as an auxiliary variable that supplies the 
information of the identified hazard, which is conserved during the simulation period. 
 
3) CP (R) 
As is the description with LO, this variable is considered as an auxiliary variable that supplies the 
information about the probability of suffering the given magnitude of the consequence when the 
hazardous event brought an unexpected consequence.  
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4) Hazardous Event Magnitude (R) 
Based on the inserted three attributes of risk, the magnitude of hazardous event is addressed, which 
contains two kinds of information: probability and severity. It is built as an auxiliary variable to 
govern the change of the affected variable. 
 
5) Variable Value Reduced (R) 
The information of a risk is passed to the level variable as it reflects the accumulation of the damage 
of the affected variable in a certain period of time. According to the addressed relations, it is modified 
by the arrival flow of value recovery rate.  
 
6) Variable Recover ability (R) 
It describes the ability to respond to undesired effects, which is built as an auxiliary variable that 
supplies the information of variable recovery rate. 
 
7) Variable Value (R) 
It is defined as an auxiliary variable that receives and passes the information in each simulation step. 
During the operations, the damage to variables‟ value are obtained and inserted into the developed 
CSC system to assess the risk effects.  
 
5.4 MODEL VALIDATION AND ANALYSIS  
A conceptual SD-based CSC risk model is designed and developed to support risk analysis and risk 
reduction against the backdrop of the scenarios. Before carrying out experiments to simulate system 
operations, the developed SD model should be validated in terms of the correspondence of the model 
structure and the robustness of the model‟s behaviours (Forrester and Senge, 1980; Qudrat-Ullah and 
Seong, 2010). Once validation and confidence in the behaviour of the built SD model had been 
established, a base case and a series of risk scenarios are generated to examine the variations in 
system behaviours produced by the changes.  
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5.4.1 Model validation 
The validation process is employed to ensure the assumption meets the research purposes and the 
CSC operations are technically presented in the built models, which is therefore an importation step in 
SD methodology (Forrester and Senge, 1979; Qudrat-Ullah and Seong, 2010). To verify the 
developed SD models, three rigorous tests involving both formal-quantitative and informal/qualitative 
methods are suggested: structure and parameters verification; testing under extreme conditions; and 
dimensional consistency examination (Barlas, 1994).  
 
Specifically, the principle behind SD is that the structure generates the observed behaviours (Viana et 
al., 2014). It is claimed that an SD model is developed based on the causal relationship from real 
systems (Barlas, 1996). Therefore, the structure of the proposed model is tested through comparing 
variables and equations against the observation from literature, available knowledge from the experts 
and referenced models. In particular, the model validation in this step means verification of the 
internal structure of the model, instead of concentrating on the system behaviours.  
 
The “statistical significance” testing is another critical part in the SD model validation process. It 
intends to find out whether the value of the parameter is estimated with sufficient accuracy (Moizer, 
1999). Especially, the parameter values under extreme conditions can be set by the model developers 
to assess whether the time-dependent performance coincided with the anticipated behaviour of the 
system in reality. The principle is applied: “if input A has affected the system, then behaviour B 
should be resulted” (Peterson and Eberlein 1994). The implementation of extreme-condition testing is 
provided by the “Reality Check” feature in Vensim© software. Based on the assumption of an 
independent input value of a variable, it exploits a better performance of the system to anticipate the 
dynamic and complex behaviours compared with human beings (Owen, Love and Albores 2008). 
However, it is crucial to note that a number of behaviour reproductions in the simulation should be 
analysed in trends, frequencies and fluctuations of system behaviour rather than to give a detailed 
mathematical account of a specific value (Das and Dutta, 2013). 
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Finally, the dimensional consistency tests are carried out to logically examine the dimensions of 
created variables. The well-established software provides a powerful dimensional calculation function 
that automatically checks the dimensional consistency of the developed model based on defined 
causal relations.  
 
SD is a scenario based modelling and simulation method to predict the system behaviours. Therefore, 
the model validation only can be conducted under certain conditions. The detailed descriptions of 
proposed analysis are given in later chapters (see in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). Following the 
described SD model verification method, the developed SD models can be validated and all the 
concerned variables are tested to verify whether the system behaviour matches the expected results to 
ensure the reliability and applicability.  
 
5.4.2 Scenario-based SD simulation  
Scenario analysis represents an approach for developing a set of stories that encourages considering a 
broad ranges of issues (van den Heijden, 1997). Applying SD to the scenario provides an integration 
interface between the system model and scenario models that allow the simulation of system 
behaviour sensibility to scenarios, assess system operations through developed model simulation, and 
find out the impact upon expected system behaviours (Lane, Monefeldt and Rosenhead, 2000). In the 
proposed research, the combination of participatory SD modelling and scenario analysis facilitates the 
CSC behaviours as far as the processes, information, and decision-making are concerned. As well, it 
maps the risks through quantifying of the system behaviours with a consideration of the interactive 
hazardous events on system thinking (Rozman et al., 2012). The scenario can be consulted and 
translated to variables in developed SD models by amending the model structure, modifying defined 
equations, and changing the inserted value of the created variable. It takes the advantage of 
transforming the risk input into the various system behaviours, so that the risk effects are quantified to 
address the signification risks. Furthermore, the associated risk reduction scenarios are provided to 
manage and control the undesirable risk impacts. Through iterating the provided SD modelling 
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approaches, the developed SD models can be properly amended under controlled conditions to 
estimate risk reduction outcomes in various scenarios, so as to suggest competitive CSCRM decisions. 
 
5.4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
In practice, the behaviour of the SD model is insensitive to plausible changes in most of the variables, 
while the variables significantly affecting the system operations need to be identified during model 
developing and validating phases (Forrester, 1969). The behaviour sensitivity test can help to confirm 
whether a small perturbation to a designed variable causes a significant change in the system‟s 
behaviour (Forrester, 1969; Moffatt, 1991). According to the historical or a hypothetical pattern, all 
the concerned variables can be tested regardless of the size of model and the sensitivity analysis 
outputs will allow a more representative picture of model behaviours, so that it can be used to 
calibrate the developed model to fit in with the scenario description or real world (Christopher and 
Patil, 2002).  
 
Meanwhile, sensitivity analysis can be implemented in risk reduction and investigation through 
varying the input of a system to assess the output on system operations. It takes the advantages of 
observing the risk effects lying in the system behaviours instead of setting the risk input as a static 
value. Specifically, the values of CSC risk attributes can be shifted to explore the variation in system 
behaviour that is produced by risks in the developed CSC system. Through comparing the range of 
simulation outcomes in each risk scenario, the significant risks are estimated and mitigated. Following 
the same procedure, the simulation of changing the variable value helps the modeller to observe 
where the sensitive variable locates in the specific risk scenario. The results provide a hint for the 
potential risk reduction solutions in further research.  
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter develops conceptual models along the CSCs and captures the risk generation mechanism 
following SD approaches. The elements of materials, information, money, demand, personnel and 
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equipment are identified and analysed to support modelling and simulation of the dynamic CSC 
operations based on qualitative and quantitative information. In the developed models, the assumed 
interactions are formalised to demonstrate the causal relations within the system boundaries and the 
collections of conceptual stock and flow models are developed to map the risks through simulating the 
system behaviour with a consideration of the interactive hazardous events on system thinking. To 
investigate various risk effects, an integration of system model and scenarios is provided that allows 
the simulation of system sensibility to scenarios, assesses system operations through the developed 
model simulation, and finds out the risk impacts upon expected system behaviours.  
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CHAPTER 6  CHEMICAL SUPPLY CHAIN RISK ANALYSIS AND 
REDUCTION USING SYSTEM DYNAMICS METHOD  
Summary 
This chapter discusses the application of SD-based CSCRM method for constructing a CSC model to 
assess diverse risks and to explore possible risk reduction measures. It combines the theory, method 
and scenario to investigate dynamic risk impacts in a CSC not only in operations, but also in the broad 
fields, such as planning, management and decision making aspects. As introduced in Chapter 5, SD is 
a scenario-based modelling and simulation method, so that all the concerned risks can be analysed 
regardless of the size of risk factors. The developed SD models can be customised and connected to 
generate the dynamic behaviour under a specified state of the condition. Through evaluating the 
difference between the expectation and real-time performance of the developed system, the simulation 
results represent more precise system behaviours, so as to address more accurate risk effects in the 
CSCRM research. 
 
6.1 APPLICATION OF DEVELOPED SD MODELS TO SIMULATE THE CSC 
OPERATIONS 
SD is applied to assess the variation of the system behaviours in various risk scenarios and explore 
possible risk reduction measures on system thinking. Findings from the formalised causal 
relationships and developed conceptual SD models in previous research are adapted in this chapter, 
which not only shortens the execution time of modelling process but also reduces the complexity of 
model development. The obtained numerical results can offer supportive information for assessing 
potential risk reduction measures and continuously improving the CSC system performance. 
 
6.1.1 Problem description 
To carry out scenario-based simulation, the problem and system boundaries should be specified in the 
first step. The developed CSC system consists of three representative echelons: a raw material 
supplier, a manufacturer, and a customer that specialises in supplying, manufacturing, storing and 
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delivering a certain type of chemical substances for industrial use. The customer places the orders 
following the requirements. Based on the forecasted demand, the supplier and manufacturer plan the 
sourcing and manufacturing activates. In the supplying phase, the raw materials are sourced from the 
upstream entity and supplied to the manufacturer in accordance with the transportation capacity. In 
the manufacturing phase, it consists of a complex structure, involving blending, separations, reaction, 
and storage. The complexity of the above manufacturing processes affects the effectiveness of 
performances of the company and may cause undesirable losses. The transportation by waterway and 
road using specialised vehicle connects the material flows and final products between raw material 
suppliers, manufacturers, and customers involved in the supply chain. The hazardous characteristics, 
such as extreme low storage temperature, high storage pressure, flammable and explosive, endanger 
the whole transportation activities from the origin to destination. Meanwhile, the weather conditions, 
newly introduced policies and other undesired events result in uncertainties and disruptions to the 
transportation operations where there is a major pressure for the CSC members to satisfy customer 
demand within a narrow time-window under the challenge of risks. CSCRM is required to assess and 
manage the inherent and surrounding risks to maintain the safety and efficiency of the supply chain 
operations. 
 
Having taken into account the above case, the following sections are developed to demonstrate the 
application how the developed SD-based CSCRM method can dynamically analyse the risks in CSCs. 
To simplify the SD modelling process, three conceptual sub-models are developed and sequentially 
connected, namely a raw material supplier, a manufacturer, and a customer. Figure 6.1 presents the 
movements from the raw materials to the final products, as well as the information shared between the 
supply chain members in the developed sub-models. 
 
Supply risks 
 
 
Operational risks
 
 
Demand risks
 
 
Supplier
 
 
Manufacturer
 
 
Customer
 
 
Information flow
 
 
Information flow
 
 
Material flow
 
 
Material flow
  
Figure 6.1. Flows of materials and information in the scenario 
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(1) Customer 
The simulation process begins with the customer ordering the final products in accordance with his 
requirements. The order is made every 7 days and the ordering pattern follows a normal distribution, 
with a minimum 100 tons, a maximum of 200 tons, a mean of 150 tons, and a standard deviation of 30 
tons.  
 
(2) Manufacturer 
To produce the final products in the given time, the sourcing, manufacturing, logistics and warehouse 
departments work together in the manufacturing sector. The manufacturer applies a make-to-stock 
strategy, so that the operational activities are executed based on the manufacturing schedule. In this 
study, 800 tons of raw materials can be converted into 800 tons of final chemical products per week 
without much loss in the manufacturing process. When the manufacturer receives the order, the 
logistics department cooperates with the warehouse operators to check the product inventory and to 
deliver the required quantity of products to the customer. The logistics department owns a certain 
number of specialised carriers that can ship 500 tons of final products per delivery. The forward 
transportation time is 4 days, and the capacity recovery duration is 3 days. To specify the state of the 
case study, there are several assumptions: (1) The operational activities are scheduled and executed 
based on the forecasted demand; (2) The next term customer demand is estimated based on the 
historical data (3) If the product inventory could not meet the customer demand, the backlogged 
orders appear. In the next delivery, the backlogged orders should be fulfilled first. 
 
(3) Supplier 
The supplier has three functional departments, including the sourcing, logistics and warehouse 
departments. The sourced raw materials are stored in a specific warehouse. Cooperating with the 
logistics department, the required materials are shipped to the downstream manufacturer within the 
maximum capacity of 200 tons per delivery and the lead-time of 2 week. Meanwhile, the supplier 
sources the required materials from upstream suppliers to fill the gap between the forecasted 
inventory level and the safety stock level according to a pre-defined order policy. In this study, the 
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raw materials‟ safety inventory level is 500 tons and the raw material lead-time is 3 weeks. It is 
assumed that the upstream supplier could provide the required quantity and quality of the raw 
materials immediately. 
 
6.1.2 Scenario-based SD model development 
According to the SD modelling procedures described in Chapter 5, the scenario-based CSC models 
were developed in accordance with the sequential steps: defining the problem boundaries, finding the 
causal relations in a CSC system, developing a stock and flow diagram, and validating the developed 
model. In particular, the causal relationships can be adapted from formalised cause loop diagrams. As 
well, the stock and flow diagram can be referenced from developed reference models of generalised 
CSC and hazardous event sub-model, which reduced the complexity of the model developing 
activities. A multi-echelon CSC model was developed to facilitate the risk management in a complex 
and vulnerable CSC. 
 
6.1.2.1 Finding causal relations in CSC system  
The causal loop diagram was developed to represent the cause and effect relations in the system. The 
variables were created to represent the system structure and the arrows were used to describe the 
direction of the causal relationships. It formed a macro-structure for the causal relations of the 
proposed CSC system through connecting interacted variables, illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2. Causal loop diagram of proposed CSC 
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In the developed causal loop diagram, four distinct loops are observed, which control the raw material 
supplying (S1), the manufacturing (M2), the warehousing (M3) and the shipping activities (M1) in the 
investigated CSC. Loop S1 contains a closed chain of causal relations to represent the interaction 
between the raw material inventory and production rate, indicating that the more raw materials 
supplied, the higher production rate can be achieved. Loop M1 shows that the produced products and 
shipped products govern the changes in the product inventory. The increase of the inventory has a 
negative effect on the generation of backlogged orders and will result in the improvement of the order 
fulfilment rate. Loop M2 describes a balancing effect in which the increase in the production rate 
results in the decrease in production backlogged orders. The production rate represents the number of 
products that can be manufactured during a given period of time. It is determined by the combination 
of the production capacity, the raw material inventory and the desired production rate. Furthermore, 
the variable of backlogged orders for manufacturing affects the desired production rate in the same 
direction, which is shown as a reinforcing effect (+). Accordingly, the improvement of the desired 
production rate increases the related production rate (+). The polarity of the whole loop is addressed 
by multiplying the individual effect of each relation: (-)×(+)×(+) = (-), which is negative. In Loop 
M3, a negative relationship is observed among the connected variables: production rate, product 
inventory, manufacturing gap and desired production rate. It describes the negative feedback effects 
between the production rate and the manufacturing gap.  
 
In the risk sub-model, the developed causal loop diagram (shown in Figure 5.12) was adapted to 
simulate the generation of the risk impact on the variable level. A risk was explored in three aspects 
(LO, CS, and CP) to address the time-dependent effects on system thinking. These obtained risk 
attributes represented the magnitude of a hazardous event, which were set as the input of the risk 
scenario simulation. Inserting consequence severity with given probability into the built SD model, 
the existing cause and effect relations in the system influencing the performance of CSCs escalate the 
risk effects and damage the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations.   
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6.1.2.2 Developing stock and flow diagram of CSC system 
The developed causal loop diagram represents the system structure and formalises the existing logical 
interactions between the related components within the defined system boundaries. Next, a stock and 
flow diagram of CSC is developed through translating the established causal loop diagram using 
VENSIM
©
 software, as shown in Figure 6.3.  
 
Figure 6.3. Scenario-based CSC sub-model development 
 
In this model, three types of variables are used to describe the structure of the system, which are 
named as stock, flow and auxiliary, respectively. Stock is a structural element, which is represented in 
the rectangle box and used to describe the accumulation of a variable‟s value in forms of material, 
information, finance, or energy. Flow only passes the information to change the value of the stock. 
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influence on a rate involves one or more intermediate calculations. The arrows connect the 
interrelated variables and indicate the directions of the cause and effect relations formed. 
 
To fit into the described environment, the developed sub-models (shown in Section 5.3) are customised 
and connected to simulate system operations and generate the dynamic behaviour of system 
components under a specified state of the condition. As described in problem definition, the supplier 
responds to downstream requirements by providing the requisite materials to the manufacturer. The 
manufacturer then produces final products and ships them to the customer in the anticipation that the 
transporter has sufficient available capacity. Referencing the developed models (shown in Figure 
5.13, Figure 5.14, Figure 5.15, and Figure 5.17), the necessary variables are developed and the 
involved functional parts are appropriately connected in line with the observed causal relations.  
 
Table 6.1 lists the definition of the key variables used to develop the CSC sub-model in this study.  
 
Table 6.1. Definition and role of major variables in built SD model 
Variable Equation Function 
Customer order (C) A probabilistic input Variable representing the 
uncertainty of placed orders 
Products desired shipment 
rate (M) 
Equal: Customer order (C)+Backlogged 
orders (M) 
Variable describing the volume of 
the products needed to be shipped 
Shipment rate gap (M)  IF THEN ELSE (Condition, 0, Products 
desired shipment rate-Products shipped) 
Variable returning the first value 
if condition is true; the second 
value if condition is false 
Product inventory (M) INTEG (input data of Products 
manufactured (M) – exit data of Product 
shipment rate (M) 
Variable representing an 
accumulation of the products 
Backlogged orders (M) INTEG (input data of Shipment rate gap 
(M)-exit data of Backlogged orders 
shipment rate (M)) 
Variable representing the volume 
of the backlogged orders in current 
situation 
Logistics department 
shipment capacity (M) 
Min (Min (Infrastructure capacity, 
Equipment capacity), Workforce 
capacity) 
Variable describing the maximum 
capacity of transportation system 
Products manufactured 
(M) 
DELAY FIXED (input WIP, delay time-
Reacting time (M), 0) 
Returns the value of the input 
delayed by the delay time 
Forecasted demand (M) SMOOTH((Average demand(M)+ 
Variance demand (M)), Forecasting 
factor (M)) 
Variable depending on the 
forecasting method and 
forecasting factor 
Raw material inventory 
(M) 
INTEG (input data of Raw material 
shipment rate (S) – exit data of Raw 
material used to produce (M) 
Variable representing the raw 
material inventory of the 
manufacturer 
Raw material inventory (S) INTEG (input data of Flow of material to Variable representing the 
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supplier (S) – exit data of Raw material 
shipment rate (S) 
accumulation of raw material in 
the supply sector 
Backlogged orders (S) INTEG (input data of Shipment rate gap 
(S)-exit data of Backlogged orders 
shipment rate (S)) 
Variable representing the volume 
of the backlogged orders in the 
current situation 
Logistics department 
shipment capacity (S) 
A flow variable defined based on the 
description of the case 
Variable describing the capacity of 
transportation system in the 
supplier sector 
Time step 1 week Variable indicating the simulation 
step 
Simulation period 50 weeks Variable representing the total 
simulation steps 
Note: C - Customer; M - Manufacturer; S – Supplier. 
 
The applied SD technique is a scenario-based simulation method, that the initial value of the system 
should be defined in the baseline scenario (Bouloiz et al., 2013). In this research, the simulation time 
step is set as 1 week, and the simulation period is defined as 50 weeks. The simulation process begins 
when the customer places an order, which follows a specific distribution. The system operations are 
simulated and system behaviour is addressed to provide a baseline for comparing the risk effects in 
different risk scenarios. However, the historical data of CSC risks is often unknown, and therefore the 
risk input data is obtained from expert judgements in estimating the dynamic risk effects. To 
rationalise the judgements, the Delphi technique is employed to quantitatively investigate the risk 
attributes in terms of LO, CS and CP. Nine-point Likert scale is adapted to investigate the level of 
agreement of each question from the respondents. And then, the obtained numerical number should be 
normalized into an accurate numerical percentage. The LO and CP indicate whether the risk or the 
risk consequence will materialise. Therefore, the normalized number should be scaled into [0, 1], in 
which 0 means never happen and 1 means always happen. A set of functions is developed to generate 
the risk magnitude of a hazardous event:  
                                       Eq. 6.1 
                                       Eq. 6.2 
                        
 {
                                                                
                                                               
} 
Eq. 6.3 
 
                    {
                                                 
                                                  
} 
Eq. 6.4 
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Eq. 6.5 
 
where Eq. 6.1 and Eq. 6.2 produce two random numbers, which are between 0 and 1. The simulation 
period is set as 50 weeks, so that there are 50 different number generated over time. When the 
generated number is larger than the value of LO, the output of Eq. 6.3 is true that indicates that the 
hazardous event happens. Conversely, the output of false represents that the hazardous event does not 
occur. Similarly, Eq. 6.4 represents whether the affected variable suffers the given magnitude of the 
CS. Eq. 6.5 shows that the hazardous event magnitude is established upon the particular risk features 
in terms of probability and consequence severity (LO×CS×CP). It incorporates time as a variable that 
assists the generation of hazardous events and estimates the risk consequence affecting the CSC 
system in practice. 
 
6.1.3 Model validation 
As suggested, the correspondence of the model structure and the robustness of the model behaviour 
need to be verified in both the normal and abnormal conditions. Comparing the simulated system 
behaviours against the anticipated behaviours, the confidence of the built model is obtained. Then, it 
can be employed to investigate the dynamic system behaviours in a series of risk scenarios and risk 
reduction scenarios. In the SD model validation study, three rigorous tests involving both quantitative 
and qualitative methods are suggested: Structure and parameters verification; Dimensional 
consistency examination; and System testing under extreme conditions (Barlas, 1994).  
 
(1) Structure and parameter verification 
In the first step, the model validation focused on the examination of the internal structure of the model, 
instead of verification of the system behaviour. It is claimed that an SD model is developed based on 
the causal relations, thus the represented cause and effect variables should coincide with the practice 
(Peterson and Eberlein, 1994). Following this principle, the model was tested through comparing the 
variables and equations against the existing literature and the available knowledge of the experts. 
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(2) Dimensional consistency examination 
The dimension consistency verification was carried out to check whether the dimension of each 
variable was properly set. The applied software providing a powerful dimensional calculation function 
helped verify the dimensional consistency of the model by tracking their fundamental dimensions as 
performed calculations. The screenshot depicts the operational interface of the Vensim
©
 as seen in 
Figure 6.4.  
 
Figure 6.4. Dimensional calculation in Vensim
©
 software 
 
The SD model was developed based on the logic interactions. Therefore, the dimensions could also be 
calculated according to the defined mathematical equations. The principle of dimensional 
homogeneity determined that only commensurable variables might be compared or calculated. For 
instance, the “Transporter inventory level” was calculated from the arrival flow of products from the 
suppliers (tons/week) and outflow of shipped products to the customers (tons/week) within a given 
period of time. Hence the dimensional unit of the “Transporter inventory level” should be defined as 
“Tons”. In some contexts, there were dimensionless variables expressed as “dmnl”, such as the 
percentages, risk input and risk effect. For instance, the order fulfilment rate was created to represent 
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the reliability of a supply chain member to supply required products on time, thus, it was a percentage 
of shipped orders (tons) in relation to the order placed by downstream customer (tons). Based on the 
equation, it was calculated by tons/tons = “dmnl”. In addition, the dimensionless variables did not 
affect the calculation of dimensional units in the equation. 
 
(3) Extreme condition testing   
The reliability of the developed SD model was verified through comparing the system performance 
under an extreme condition against the anticipated behaviour of the real system (Qudrat-Ullah and 
Seong, 2010). However, it is noteworthy that the test should focus on the logical results on the trend, 
frequency and fluctuation of the system performance, rather than to present a detailed mathematical 
outcome. Despite the size of model, all the concerned variables can be tested to verify whether the 
system behaviour matches the expected results. For instance, the “Raw material lead-time (S)” in the 
supplier sector is tested under an extreme condition. Poor transportation system, bad weather 
condition and other risk issues may cause disruption in delivery of raw material from the supplier‟s 
storage to manufacturer‟s one. The delay in raw material delivery postpones the arrival flow of raw 
material inventory and results in the gap of the raw material inventory in the manufacturer sector. To 
address the system performance under such an extreme condition, the delay of a raw material 
shipment from the supplier to manufacturer was set as 2 weeks, which equals to the initial raw 
material lead-time. Running the model, the system behaviour is observed as to how the developed 
system responds to the unexpected disturbance. Figure 6.5 presents the obtained system behaviour 
under the testing scenario. 
Customer order (C) Raw material shipment rate (S) 
  
 
Customer order(C)
200
150
100
50
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 2 2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Time (Week)
T
o
n
s/
W
e
e
k
"Customer order(C)" : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
"Customer order(C)" : Initial operating condition 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Raw material ship ent rate (S)
200
150
100
50
0
2
2 2
2
2
2 2
2
2 2 2
2
2 2
2
1 1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1 1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Time (Week)
T
o
n
s/
W
ee
k
"Raw material shipment rate (S)" : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
"Raw material shipment rate (S)" : Initial operating condition 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
  
145 
 
Forecasted demand (M) Raw material inventory (M) 
  
Product inventory (M) Order fulfilment rate (M) 
  
             System behaviour in test scenario:              1           1            1            1            1            1                                              
             Initial operating condition:            2            2            2            2            2            2            2               
Figure 6.5. System behaviour under the testing scenario of supplying delay 
 
In agreement with the setting, the raw material lead-time was extended to 4 weeks, which was twice 
that in the initial design. The delay of the raw material supply caused that the raw material inventory 
to drop to a low level until the shipped materials were received in week 5. The insufficient raw 
materials interrupted the production process, thus the products on-hand decreased. These were used to 
bridge the gap of the manufacturing delay. Compared with the initial simulation result, the inventory 
dropped following the simulation steps till week 7. Afterwards, the shipped products and arrival flow 
of products manufactured remained in a state of equilibrium. The product inventory maintained 
approximately 150 tons along the time axis. The time lag of raw material supplement affected the 
manufacturing activities which resulted in the failure to keeping pace with downstream requirements. 
According to the simulation results, the reduction of the average order fulfilment was forecasted to be 
44.76% during the simulation period. 
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In the created model, “Manufacturing capacity (M)” is another significant variable, which reflects the 
ability of the manufacturer to produce the required number of orders within a certain period of time. If 
the number of placed orders exceeds the available manufacturing capacity in the system, the backlogs 
will appear and accumulate to a high level following the simulation steps. In order to verify this 
phenomenon, a reduction of total manufacturing capacity was set to exam how the built system 
responds to the unexpected change of the manufacturing capacity. In theory, the manufacturing 
capacity could reduce to 0 tons/week in the extreme condition. In this circumstance, the system 
operation was completely interrupted in that there were no products provided to the customer during 
the simulation period. 
 
In order to extract a more meaningful explanation of the extreme condition verification, Figure 6.6 
presents the system behaviours under decreasing the initial manufacturing capacity by 25%. The 
No1# line presents the system performance under the testing of the reduction of manufacturers‟ 
capacity to 75%, and the No2# line indicates the initial system performance. 
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Product inventory (M) Order fulfilment rate (M) 
  
System behaviour in test scenario:              1           1            1            1            1            1 
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Figure 6.6. System behaviour under the testing scenario of manufacturing capacity shrinking 
 
In the proposed condition, the placed orders and forecasted demands maintain the same level, because 
there do not have any cause and effect relations with the variable of “Manufacturing capacity” in the 
developed system. The manufacturing capacity shrinking put huge pressure on the CSC manufacturer 
to fulfil the customer demand. The materials waiting for production accumulated to a high level 
following the simulation step. It was designed that the manufacturing capacity was 300 tons in total 
and the products required to be manufactured were 150 tons/week on average. Coinciding with the 
expectation, the oscillation of the manufactured products in each week was smooth and reached a 
stable level over time. In addition, the stocked products in the early stage were exhausted, so that the 
backlogs appeared during the latter simulation period. According to the model description, the 
backlogs were prioritised, so that the shipped products were used to first meet the backlogs in the 
following shipments. The order fulfilment rate was produced as an expected result - decreasing to 0%. 
 
6.1.4 Sensitivity analysis 
In the model developing phase, the variable or parameter was set to a constant, which turned out the 
loss of variation. However, the dynamics played a significant role in risk modelling and analysing. To 
calibrate the developed model to fit in with the model developers‟ expectation, a number of behaviour 
representations were intended to confirm whether the small disturbances of designed variables lead to 
a significant variation in the system behaviours (Forrester, 1969; Moffatt, 1991).  
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Sensitivity analysis is provided to practically experiment with different parameter values. The shifting 
of the parameter value represents the sensitivity of the variable to the model behaviours, which can 
help the developer to find out where the sensitive variable is located and suggests where more effort 
that should be devoted. A Monte Carlo technique is combined with the SD modelling and simulation 
to investigate the uncertainty and randomness that yields new insights in risk simulation. It tends to 
follow a particular pattern: (1) Defining the inputs domain; (2) Generating the random inputs from a 
probability distribution; (3) Imposing a deterministic computation on the inputs; (4) Outputting the 
result (Robert and Casella, 2013). The repeated random samples will be generated based on a 
probability distribution and the simulation output will allow a more representative picture of model 
behaviours that contributes to the understanding of built system.  
 
Vensim
©
 software provides an integrated Monte Carlo technique to produce hundreds or thousands of 
possible outcomes, so as to investigate the sensitivity of the created system‟s variables/parameters. 
The interface to set up the required values is shown in Figure 6.7. 
 
Figure 6.7. The interface of sensitivity simulation setup in Vensim
© 
 
A CSC system contains complex cause and effect interactions and dynamic feedback loops, so that 
oscillation is one of the frequently experienced behaviour modes (Hekimoğlu and Barlas, 2010). It is 
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difficult to address the non-linear and cyclic behaviour patterns using statistical methods, but an SD-
based sensitivity analysis offers a meaningful interpretation of the output behaviours. It is represented 
as a sensitivity graph that derives the tolerance interval of the outputs establishing upon all simulation 
runs. The assumption about the pattern of variability was analysed to exam the sensitivity of the 
interested objects. An example of sensitivity analysis was considered for the impact of the 
“Manufacturing capacity” variation. It was intended to address the oscillation of the system behaviour 
for a given probability distribution. The input of sensitivity analysis was set as a random triangular 
distribution: 
                                    , Eq. 6.6 
 
where a refers to the minimum value, b suggests the maximum value, c indicates the lower limit , d 
represents the peak value, and e shows the upper limit. The system generated numbers of noise seeds 
which are located in the triangle between the c and e with the peak at d. In this simulation, the “Total 
manufacturing capacity” was set as a Random Triangular (0, 600, 200, 400, 500) with the associated 
dimension of tons. This function represented that the total manufacturing capacity is a continuous 
probability distribution with lower limit 200 tons, upper limit 500 tons in a triangular distribution with 
the minimum value 0 tons, the maximum value 600 tons, and the peak value 400 tons. The potential 
system behaviours under different conditional probabilities were highlighted in Figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.8. Sensitivity graph for “Total manufacturing capacity” variation 
 
The developed SD model was believed to be capable of representing the changes in the behavioural 
pattern of a CSC system. Based on the simulation, it observes that a small disturbance of 
manufacturing capacity could lead to the significant variations in the system behaviours. In order to 
gain more knowledge on the developed model, more sensitivity analyses were conducted with 
different parameter distributions. In the built model, there were 9 exogenous parameters, which 
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governed the changes of interrelated variables. In order to explore the sensitive elements, these 
variables were set as the input parameters in different sensitivity simulation scenarios. The analysis 
was performed with the assumption that the parameter values were uniformly distributed within ± 50% 
range of base values. Parameter distributions setting of sensitivity analyses are given in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2. Parameter distribution setting of sensitivity analysis 
Parameter Name Model Value Range Distribution 
Raw material lead-time (S) 2 [1-3] Random uniform 
Raw material inventory safety level (S) 500 [250-750] Random uniform 
Logistics department shipment capability (S) 800 [400-1200] Random uniform 
Total manufacturing capacity (M) 400 [200-600] Random uniform 
Reacting time (M) 1 [0.5-2] Random uniform 
Equipment capacity (M) 180 [90-270] Random uniform 
Infrastructure capacity (M) 800 [400-1200] Random uniform 
Workforce capacity (M) 180 [90-270] Random uniform 
Forecasting factor (M) 0.2 [0.1-0.3] Random uniform 
 
Iterating the described SD modelling procedures and conducting sensitivity analysis, the simulation 
outcomes are given in Table 6.3.  
 
Table 6.3. Results table of sensitivity analysis of the built CSC model 
Parameter Name 
Range of Order 
Fulfilment Rate (S) 
Range of Order 
Fulfilment Rate (M) 
Raw material lead-time (S) [92.16%-96.08%] [56.26%-97.55%] 
Raw material inventory safety level (S) [12.15%-94.12%] [37.88%-96.72%] 
Logistics department shipment capability (S) [94.12%] [96.72%] 
Total manufacturing capacity (M) [94.12%] [14.92%-96.72%] 
Reacting time (M) [94.12%] [17.15%-96.72%] 
Infrastructure capacity (M) [94.12%] [96.72%] 
Equipment capacity (M) [94.12%] [2.45%-96.72%] 
Workforce capacity (M) [94.12%] [2.45%-96.72%] 
Forecasting factor (M) [94.12%] [62.48%-97.55%] 
 
Interestingly, the variation of the parameters in the manufacturer sector rarely affected the supplier‟s 
performance, while the changes of the upstream parameters could bring significant impacts to the 
downstream members. The reason was that there were no reverse loops between the manufacturer and 
the supplier in the developed model. The sensitivity analysis results table suggests that 2 of the 9 
parameters had very limited effect on the system performance, while the others - “Raw material lead-
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time (S)”, “Raw material inventory safety level (S)”, “Total manufacturing capacity (M)”, “Reacting 
time (M)”, “Equipment capacity (M)”, “Workforce capacity (M)”, and “Forecasted factor (M)” were 
sensitive to the developed CSC system. In these variables, the changes of the input value to an extent 
can lead to the variations of the system behaviour. Hence, more attention should be paid to these 
variables during the model developing and validation phase. 
 
6.2 RISK SCENARIOS SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
SD modelling is employed to describe the connections between the risks and their associated changes 
of the system behaviours. It is a scenario-based analytical method in which the risk with a set of risk 
attributes is defined as an input to the model. Through establishing different risk scenarios and setting 
specific risk input, the SD model is capable of representing the generating mechanism of all the 
concerned risks.  
 
6.2.1 The results of the base case behaviour 
The CSC system behaviour was obtained as the baseline through simulating the system operations 
under the initial operating condition. It was then used for benchmarking the comparison of the risk 
impacts under different risk scenarios. The key behaviours of the developed system are shown in 
Figure 6.9.  In the developed system, a series of random numbers are generated between 100 and 200 
based on the defined distribution that represents the dynamic of the customer demand. Using the 
previous order data, the demand forecasting is carried out to predict the next term downstream orders. 
In this arrangement, it makes the fluctuation smooth and narrows the gaps between forecasted demand 
and placed orders over time. Based on the forecasted demand, the members involved in the supply 
chain arrange the sourcing, producing and other operational activities. 
 
The manufacturer places orders to its upstream supplier when the raw material inventory drops below 
a pre-defined safety level. It is assumed that the upstream members are capable of supplying the 
required the raw materials immediately when the orders are placed. Therefore, the “Flow of raw 
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material to supplier (S)” is equal to “Order placed to upstream supplier (S)”. The order fulfilment 
rate indicates the reliability of a supplier to supply the required products on time (Chae, 2009). In the 
initial condition, the supplier offers sufficient materials to the downstream manufacturer, so that the 
“Order fulfilment rate (S)” is estimated to be 100% during the simulation period. 
Customer order (C) Raw material shipment rate (S) 
  
Order fulfilment rate (S) Forecasted demand (M) 
  
Product shipment rate (M) Order fulfilment rate (M) 
  
Figure 6.9. The behaviours of developed system in the base scenario 
 
6.2.2 Risk scenario definitions and simulation results 
One of the key contributions of the thesis is adapting the system thinking in CSC risk modelling and 
simulation to sequentially identify the CSC hazards, assess and reduce their associated risks within a 
changeable system. Based on the outcomes of Questionnaire One - the importance of hazards to the 
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CSC operations, the priority of the identified hazards are ranked over a population of respondents to 
illustrate the concerned hazardous events from industrial perspectives. Three typical risks are 
frequently experienced and mostly concerned by the risk managers or researchers, which are supply 
disruption, breakdown in the core manufacturing process, and unexpected changes in the customer 
demand. And then, Questionnaire Two are send out to collect a set of risk data (LO, CS and CP) that 
contributes to the generation of the input value of each risk scenario. Inserting the obtained risk 
attributes, the risk effects are quantified and the unacceptable risks are screened out through 
investigating the associated changes of the system behaviour on system thinking. 
 
6.2.2.1 Scenario 1 - Supply disruption 
Due to the geographic diversity of the involved members, a huge volume of chemical substances 
needs to be purchased and transported globally. The security problems, labour issues, political risk 
and others disturbances can be the triggers of the interruptions in the supply process (Achzet and 
Helbig, 2013). To investigate the risk impacts, the developed SD models can be properly amended to 
explore the associated changes of the system behaviour in a certain risk scenario. In this scenario, LO 
was set as 4.76, CS was assigned to 3.22, and CP was 2.78. Normalizing the obtained numerical risk 
data offer percentages of each risk attributes. The LO was evaluated as 16% in every supply activity, 
CS was assigned to delay the raw material shipment by 22%, and the forecasted CP was 57%. In 
particular, the LO and CP are the degrees of probability that indicate whether the risk or the risk 
consequence will materialise. Therefore, the obtained value should be normalized to the scale of [0, 1], 
in which 0 means never happen and 1 means always happen. To describe how the system performs 
under the developed risk scenario, an illustrative example is shown in Figure 6.10, which 
demonstrates the risk generation mechanism in the scenario of “Breakdown in core operations”.  
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Risk sub-model Risk attributes input 
 
 
Risk output:  
The occurrence of hazardous event 
 
Consequence severity 
 
Consequence probability 
 
Supply capacity reduction 
 
Figure 6.10. The risk generation in “Supply disruption” scenario 
 
Linking the risk sub-model with the developed CSC model, the risk effects on system performance 
were addressed, as shown in Figure 6.11.  
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Value reduced of the variable of raw material 
shipment rate 
Order fulfilment rate (S) 
  
Product start to produce (M) Order fulfilment rate (M) 
  
             System behaviour in the base scenario:            1           1            1            1            1            1                                        
             System behaviour in the supply disruption scenario:             2            2            2            2            2            
Figure 6.11. System performance in supply disruption scenario 
 
The No#1 line illustrates the system behaviour under the initial operating condition, and the No#2 line 
shows the system performance in the supply disruption scenario. During the simulation period, the 
flow of supply operations is interrupted by the unexpected events five times, so that the supplier fails 
to fully fulfil the downstream demand. The “Order fulfil rate (S)” is forecasted to drop approximate 
30% compared with the initial behaviour in the baseline scenario. It is interesting to observe that two 
consecutive hazardous events occur in week 3 and week 4, which postpone 60 tons of the raw 
material supplements. However, the manufacturing operation is not significantly affected by the 
supplement gaps. There are sufficient raw materials stored by the manufacturer, which can be used to 
maintain the production based on the schedule. In other periods affected by hazardous events, the 
amount of the “Product start to produce (M)” is reduced due to the insufficient raw material on hand. 
After receiving the delayed raw materials, a significant increase is observed in the following days that 
the manufacturing process is carried out to clear the backlogs. The late delivery of the raw materials 
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further leads to the outflow of the system failing to maintain pace to the customer demand. The 
average “Order fulfilment rate (M)” is forecasted to decrease to 94.39%, which is 3% less than the 
initial value. 
 
6.2.2.2 Scenario 2 - Breakdown in the core manufacturing process 
In the CSCs, the manufacturing is always a complex system and the devices are often vulnerable. To 
ensure the safety, many CSCs stakeholders are keen on insights into novel technologies and 
competitive strategies to reduce the vulnerability and maintain the competitiveness (Markmann, 
Darkow and von der Gracht, 2013). However, a slight change in the CSC system may interrupt the 
production activity and cause huge losses in terms of time, cost and reputation. Breakdown in the core 
manufacturing process is regarded as a risk with a low probability but serious consequence, which 
poses significant challenge to the CSC operations. In this study, a scenario was developed to simulate 
the effects of this particular risk. The input value of the scenario was inserted into built SD model to 
investigate the risk affected system performance. It was an undeniable fact that huge efforts have been 
devoted to the manufacturing domain, thus LO was much lower than other risks. It was forecasted to 
be 4% per manufacturing process. However, the CS of the hazardous event was catastrophic. It was 
estimated to reduce the volume of manufactured products by 38% because of the batch formulation 
characteristic. CP was assigned as 51% when the hazardous event occurred.  
 
Figure 6.12 shows the system performance in the proposed scenario. The No#1 line illustrates the 
system behaviour under the initial operating condition, and the No#2 line shows the system 
performance in the investigated scenario. Established upon the inserted risk attributes, the developed 
CSC system was affected by the hazardous events twice in this scenario, which were in week 7 and 
week 46. Furthermore, the severity of the consequence was critical, which directly caused a 49.79 
tons and 106.04 tons decrease of the manufactured products in these period. The significant decreases 
caused the oscillations of the inventory system along the downstream of the supply chain. To recover 
from the disruptions, more products were manufactured in the following weeks, therefore the system 
performed back to the normal. “Order fulfilment rate (M)” was established to indicate the 
  
158 
 
performance of the manufacturer satisfying the fluctuated requirements. In week 7, the manufacturer 
had sufficient inventories to fill the gap in manufacturing disruption, so that the “Order fulfilment rate 
(M)” maintained the same level as the base value. However, the hazardous event that occurred in 
week 47 caused serious consequences such that 22.5% of the orders were produced on time in the risk 
period. Under this circumstance, the average “Order fulfilment rate (M)” decreased to 90.97%. 
 
Value reduced of the variable of products 
manufactured 
Order fulfilment rate (S) 
  
Product inventory (M) Order fulfilment rate (M) 
  
             System behaviour in the base scenario:            1           1            1            1            1            1                       
             Breakdown in core manufacturing process:             2            2            2            2            2            2   
Figure 6.12. System performance in breakdown in core manufacturing process risk scenario 
 
6.2.2.3 Scenario 3 - Unexpected changes in customer demand 
The demand risk arises from downstream activities, which is specific to the possibility of an 
unexpected change of the orders. In practice, demand forecasting plays a significant role in the 
operations such that the supply chain members schedule the purchasing, manufacturing, transporting 
and other activities according to the forecasted demand. However, the mismatch between forecasted 
demand and actual demand obstructs the CSC from keeping pace with the customer requirements or 
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increases the CSC inventory level. Risk modelling and simulation is required to address the impact of 
demand fluctuation and to continuously improve the system performance in this case.  
 
In this study, the analysis focused on the risk in terms of increase of customer demand. Based on the 
expert judgement, the input values of this risk scenario were obtained: LO was inserted as 29%; CS 
was estimated to increase the initial value by 28%, whereas CP was set as 43% when the hazardous 
event occurred. Through running the developed SD model, the CSC system performance was obtained, 
as illustrated in Figure 6.13. The No#1 line illustrates the system behaviour under the initial operating 
condition, and the No#2 line shows the system performance in the scenario of customer demand 
increase. 
Customer order increased Forecasted demand (M) 
  
Product inventory (M) Order fulfilment rate (M) 
  
             System behaviour in the base scenario:            1           1            1            1            1            1          
             Customer demand increasing:             2            2            2            2            2            2            2     
Figure 6.13. System performance in customer demand increasing scenario 
 
It can be observed that the developed CSC system was affected by the unexpected accidents six times 
during the simulation period. The increased demand fluctuated between 45.9 tons and 66.8 tons 
depending on the placed order. In particularly, two consecutive hazardous events occurred in week 45 
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and week 46, so that “Order fulfilment rate (M)” decreased to 41.01% in these periods. The CSC 
system could not meet the suddenly increased demand due to the limited system capability. Therefore, 
“Product inventory (M)” consistently decreased in the first 21 weeks compared with the initial 
performance. However, the implemented forecasting method not only smoothened the oscillations of 
placed orders but also improved the mean of forecasted demand. The increase of manufactured 
products was accumulated following with the time step. Thus, the product inventory was estimated to 
hold up well against the base scenario. 
 
6.3.2.4 Analysis of risk scenario simulation results 
It was suggested that managing the CSC risks should first understand the source of risks, and then 
find a way of reducing the risk in probability and severity by having the proper action (Trkman and 
McCormack, 2009). The risk scenarios and associated risk attributes were proposed to investigate the 
risk effects from a whole supply chain perspective along the time axis. It is interesting to note that the 
obtained risk data show different characteristics. For instance, the risk of breakdown in the core 
operating process is rarely experienced. The reason is that the industry has devoted a lot of efforts to 
deal with it, so that the LO of these specific hazardous events is much lower than others. CP and CS 
are determined by the combination between the hazardous event and affected variable. There are 
different fitting results when selecting different variables, thus the simulation results are diversified.  
 
The risk attributes illustrate the risk consequence on the affected variable along the time axis. It is 
regarded as a disturbance that can pass along the feedback chains, which are made up of the contained 
causal relations. The developed SD model incorporates risk attributes to the CSC system and 
accommodates the need to describe the connections between risks and their associated changes of 
system behaviour. In order to provide more meaningful insights, the system behaviours in different 
risk scenarios were addressed with the maximum, minimum and average values during the simulation 
period, listed in Table 6.4. In particular, the variation of the system performance between the risk 
scenario and the initial behaviours were highlighted to suggest the significant risk, shown as “Var.”. 
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Table 6.4. The description of SD simulation results of proposed risk scenarios 
 Order fulfilment 
rate (S) 
 
(dmnl) 
Raw material 
inventory level 
(M)  
(tons) 
Products 
Inventory level 
(M)  
(tons) 
Order fulfilment 
rate (M)  
 
(dmnl) 
Scenario 1 - Supply 
disruption 
Max 1 Max 600 Max 550 Max 1 
Min 0 Min 77.09 Min 110.72 Min 0 
Ave 0.9137 Ave 178.15 Ave 271.27 Ave 0.9439 
Var -0.0275 Var 0 Var -4.23 Var -0.0233 
Scenario 2 - 
Breakdown in the 
core manufacturing 
process 
Max 1 Max 600 Max 550 Max 1 
Min 0 Min 80.13 Min 64.99 Min 0 
Ave 0.9412 Ave 181.93 Ave 267.64 Ave 0.9097 
Var 0 Var 3.78 Var -7.86 Var -0.0575 
Scenario 3 - 
Unexpected changes 
in the customer 
demand 
Max 1 Max 600 Max 550 Max 1 
Min 0 Min 80.13 Min 163.72 Min 0 
Ave 0.9412 Ave 183.65 Ave 282.98 Ave 0.9259 
Var 0 Var 5.5 Var -7.48 Var -0.0313 
 
In CSC risk simulation, different risk impacts were addressed to indicate the variation in the system 
performance produced by varying the risk inputs. According to the simulation result, the hazardous 
event of breakdown in the core manufacturing process could significantly affect the CSC operations 
and result in more serious impact. The developed system failed to meet customer requirements in 
some simulation steps and the average order completion rate decreased to 90.97% during the 
simulation period. To respond to and recover from this challenging risk scenario, more effort should 
be spent to provide a cost-effective risk reduction package. 
 
6.3 RISK REDUCTION SCENARIOS SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
Risk reduction procedure represents the method to address the research objectives of dealing with the 
risks in CSCRM. The flexibility of the SD model modification provides a powerful tool to explore the 
effects of potential risk reduction methods. Two potential methods are provided to screen out 
advantageous risk reduction approaches, which are iterating the general SD modelling procedures and 
conducting sensitivity analysis, respectively. Applying the proposed methods, the created SD model is 
modified to fit in with the implemented risk reduction measure. Then, the system performances under 
different scenarios are estimated, thereby helping make the advantageous risk reduction decisions. 
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6.3.1 General risk reduction method 
It is indicated that SD-based CSCRM decision-making does not require a decision-maker directly 
assessing different risks and providing arbitrary decisions based on past experience or historical data 
(Yeo, Pak and Yang, 2013). Instead, the expert just proposes potential reduction measures, and then 
the whole SD approach should be iterated to investigate the potential risk reduction outcomes. The 
flexibility of the SD model provides a powerful tool to investigate the dynamic system performance 
by appropriately amending the input of variables, re-defining the cause and effect relationships, and 
modifying the model structure under different scenarios. The variance of system performance is 
transparently presented, which suggests whether a particular risk reduction approach does indeed 
achieve the desirable objectives.  
 
In this section, three scenarios suggested by the experts were demonstrated to illustrate the SD-based 
risk reduction method: improving manufacturing reliability, increasing resilience to risks, and 
outsourcing orders in risk affected situation. The conditions of each scenario are presented in Table 
6.5.  
 
Table 6.5. Scenario conditions of suggested risk reduction methods 
Case study Related variable  Variable value set Description 
Scenario 1: Improving 
manufacturing reliability 
Hazardous event 
occurrence 
likelihood 
Occurrence likelihood 
(LO) decrease  
Current situation: 8% 
Degree of decrease: 20% of 
current situation 
Scenario 2: Increasing 
resilience to risks 
Consequence 
severity 
Consequence severity 
(CS) mitigate 
Current situation: 62% 
Degree of decrease: 20% of 
current situation 
Scenario 3: Outsourcing 
orders in risk affected 
situation 
Adding new 
structure and 
associated variables 
Outsourcing orders Outsourcing maximum 20% of 
current ordering period 
 
In each of the scenarios, the effects of implemented reduction methods were simulated by 20% 
variation of the base value, which was widely used to test the performance of implemented risk 
reduction approaches in the real world (Bouloiz et al., 2013). In particular, the method of improving 
manufacturing reliability sought to experience a lower occurrence likelihood of the hazardous event. 
The measure of introducing the risk response method was intended to reduce the consequence severity 
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of a hazardous event. The application of these two risk reduction measures could be achieved through 
modifying the inputs of the created variables without amending the model structure. On the contrary, 
the risk reduction method of outsourcing offered a scenario that required the model developers to 
modify the developed model and add new structural units. All the SD modelling approaches were 
iterated to explore the system performance in the proposed scenario.  
 
Making revisions in accordance with the design ensured that the potential outcomes of implemented 
risk migration methods could be correctly observed. The simulation period was set as 50 weeks and 
the time step was set as 1 week. The simulation result of each risk reduction scenario is given in 
Figure 6.14.  
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Case 3: Outsourcing orders in risk affected condition 
  
  
             Risk reduction scenarios:          1           1            1            1            1            1            1            1                       
             Breakdown in core manufacturing process:          2            2            2            2            2            2                    
Figure 6.14. System performances of suggested risk reduction scenarios 
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In improving the manufacturing reliability scenario, the implemented measure reduced the occurrence 
likelihood of the hazardous event, so that the hazardous event did not bring any disturbance to the 
CSC operations in week 46. In this circumstance, the system only needed to deal with the undesired 
disturbance in week 7. According to the simulation result, the system absorbs the negative risk 
impacts and the average “Order fulfilment rate (M)” improves to 96.72% in 50 weeks. In contrast, the 
reduction method of introducing the risk response method reduced the consequence severity instead of 
avoiding the generation of negative consequence. The simulation result suggested that the CSC 
system operations coincide with the scenario assumption. The system is interrupted by the hazardous 
events in week 7 and week 45 with the lower risk damaging values of 39.83 tons and 84.83 tons, 
respectively. In the circumstances, the average “Order fulfilment rate (M”) is forecasted to increase to 
92.86% during the simulation period. 
 
In order to respond to the two hazardous events, the outsourcing decision was applied to fill the gap in 
the manufacturing disruptions. Even though the produced products maintained the same quantity in 
the risk affected situation, the extra products sourced from outside could be used to meet the shortage 
because of damage. In this scenario, the average “product inventory (M)” is higher than other 
implemented risk reduction methods, which is estimated to increase to 292.97 tons in average. 
Accordingly, the increase of product inventory leads to the improvement of average “Order fulfilment 
rate (M)” to 95.68% over time. 
 
The SD technique provides a systematic and flexible approach to evaluate the risk reduction decisions 
that may improve the CSC system performance. The addressed system behaviours in different 
scenarios could be benchmarked to reveal the gap between the expectation and the real-time 
performance, so as to suggest the beneficial reduction decisions. In order to provide the meaningful 
insights, Table 6.6 extracts the numerical results from the SD simulation that depicts the system 
performance of each risk reduction scenario. The system behaviours in different scenarios were 
observed from the simulation results.  
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Table 6.6. Simulation results of suggested risk reduction methods 
 
The volume 
of damaged 
products  
(tons) 
The average 
manufactured 
products (M) 
(tons) 
Outsourced 
orders in 
total 
(tons) 
The average 
product 
inventory (M) 
(tons) 
The average 
order fulfilment 
rate (M) 
(dmnl) 
Risk scenario  
 
126.98 149.40 0 267.64 0.9097 
Risk reduction 
scenario 1 
66.23 147.32 0 270.31 0.9672 
Risk reduction 
scenario 2 
101.58 148.46 0 270.53 0.9286 
Risk reduction 
scenario 3 
126.98 149.40 87.62 292.97 0.9568 
 
Comparing the indicators of the system performance, the risk reduction measure of improving 
manufacturing reliability achieved a better result. In this scenario, it not only provided a more reliable 
CSC system to deal with the hazardous events but also cut the production rate. As well, both the 
service level and the manufacturing cost had been led to a better record.  
 
The proposed risk reduction method quantitatively analyses the system performance in different 
scenarios, instead of directly assessing the risks and providing the arbitrary decisions by experts. 
Establishing upon the flexibility of SD model modification, the model developers can insert different 
input values and amend the developed model structure throughout the life cycle specifically in design 
and operations phases. The obtained numerical results serve as supportive information for assessing 
potential risk reduction measures and continuously improving the CSC system performance. In further 
cost and benefit analysis, the developed SD model and obtained results can also be employed to 
estimate the equilibrium point between the investment and the benefit of CSCRM decisions. 
 
6.3.2 Sensitivity analysis-based risk reduction method 
As described in the model validation section (Section 6.1.3), combining the sensitivity analysis with 
SD simulation can be used to investigate whether a small disturbance of a designed variable brings a 
significant variation in the system behaviours. Using this method, all the concerned variables in the 
developed model can be tested regardless of the size of model, so that it offers a method to help the 
model developers to practically explore the possible risk reduction outcomes by testing the sensitive 
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variables in the risky condition. The simulation results derive the tolerance interval of the outputs 
based upon all simulation runs, which is regarded as the range of the possible risk reduction outcomes. 
Comparing with the general SD-based risk reduction method describing in the previous section, it 
takes the advantage of observing the variations lying in the system behaviours instead of setting the 
variables or parameters as a static value.  
 
In the sensitivity analysis, the first step is the input parameters identification and their distribution 
functions definition. The variations of different variables were performed with the assumption that the 
parameter values were uniformly distributed within ± 50% range of the base values. Using the 
identified parameters and their distributions given in Table 6.2, the sensitivity analysis was conducted 
to explore the sensitive variables in different risk scenarios. The simulation outcome of each 
parameter is given in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7. Results table of the sensitivity analysis in the risk reduction research 
 
Parameter Name 
Range of 
Order 
Fulfilment 
Rate (S) 
Range of 
Order 
Fulfilment 
Rate (M) 
Scenario 1 - 
Supply 
disruption 
Raw material lead-time (S) [0.8996-0.9333] [0.5468-0.9755] 
Raw material inventory safety level (S) [0.0933-0.9137] [0.3562-0.9439] 
Logistics department shipment capability (S) [0.9137] [0.9439] 
Total manufacturing capacity (M) [0.9137] [0.9439] 
Reacting time (M) [0.9137] [0.9439] 
Infrastructure capacity (M) [0.9137] [0.9439] 
Equipment capacity (M) [0.9137] [0.0245-0.9439] 
Workforce capacity (M) [0.9137] [0.0245-0.9439] 
Forecasting factor (M) [0.9137] [0.6094-0.9755] 
 
Scenario 2 - 
Breakdown in 
the core 
manufacturing 
process 
Raw material lead-time (S) [0.9216-0.9608] [0.5414-0.9755] 
Raw material inventory safety level (S) [0.1088-0.9412] [0.3398-0.9097] 
Logistics department shipment capability (S) [0.9412] [0.9097] 
Total manufacturing capacity (M) [0.9412] [0.9097] 
Reacting time (M) [0.9412] [0.9097-0.9697] 
Infrastructure capacity (M) [0.9412] [0.9097] 
Equipment capacity (M) [0.9412] [0.9097] 
Workforce capacity (M) [0.9412] [0.9097] 
Forecasting factor (M) [0.9412] [0.9097] 
 
Scenario 3 - 
Unexpected 
Raw material lead-time (S) [0.9216-0.9608] [0.5942-0.9268] 
Raw material inventory safety level (S) [0.1156-0.9412] [0.2994-0.9259] 
  
168 
 
changes in the 
customer 
demand 
Logistics department shipment capability (S) [0.9412] [0.9259] 
Total manufacturing capacity (M) [0.9412] [0.9259] 
Reacting time (M) [0.9412] [0.5950-0.9259] 
Infrastructure capacity (M) [0.9412] [0.9259] 
Equipment capacity (M) [0.9412] [0.0245-0.9259] 
Workforce capacity (M) [0.9412] [0.0245-0.9259] 
Forecasting factor (M) [0.9412] [0.6925-0.9268] 
 
In the different scenarios, the sensitive variables appeared to be various in the developed model. For 
instance, reducing raw material lead-time could bring a positive impact on order fulfilment rate when 
the manufacturing process was interrupted. The average “Order fulfilment rate (S)” was observed a 
significant improvement by 1.86% and the average “Order fulfilment rate (M)” increased to 97.55% 
over times. Similarly, the method of reducing reacting time could improve the flexibility of the 
manufacturing system and obtain a preferable system performance based on the results of sensitivity 
analyses. The proposed reduction method raised the average “Order fulfilment rate (M)” from 90.97% 
to 96.97% in the simulation period. However, the parameter of “Reaction time (M)” was insensitive to 
the developed system in the scenarios of supply disruption and customer demand increase. In this case, 
there is no need to consider the possible risk reduction method of amending this variable in further 
analysis. 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter describes the implementation of the SD modelling and simulation to analyse, evaluate 
and reduce the risks in CSCs. The proposed method is capable of representing the CSC operations and 
predicting the dynamic behaviours as the system changes under different risk circumstances. As well, 
it enhances the studying of the complex interactions between the CSC and the hazardous events, the 
dynamic feedback loops among the developed system, and the uncertain nature of the risks. It is 
particularly innovative, when being used to support risk management in a dynamic environment, 
compared to the traditional static risk analysis methods largely based on the experts‟ knowledge or the 
limited historical data. The expert intervention is applied to generate risk scenarios and corresponding 
risk reduction scenarios in the methodology. Through benchmarking the system behaviour in different 
scenarios, the risk generation mechanism is simulated and the risk effects are addressed. Furthermore, 
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two potential risk reduction methods are suggested, which are established upon the general SD 
modelling procedures and sensitivity analysis method. In accordance with requirements, the developed 
SD model can be re-structured and updated to explore the outcomes of potential risk reduction 
solutions, which can assist the decision-makers to avoid direct management of the risks based on 
arbitrary decisions. 
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CHAPTER 7  CASE STUDY OF CHINA’S CHEMICAL SUPPLY 
CHAIN TRANSPORTATION RISK MANAGEMENT  
Summary 
This chapter presents the implication of the proposed SD-based CSCRM on a CSCT system. The case 
study helps to understand and improve the formalised causal relations and conceptual models 
developed in previous research. The applied SD model not only simulates the CSCT operations, but 
also predicts the dynamic behaviours as the system inputs change under different risk circumstances. 
Furthermore, the results of implementing the procedure of risk reduction will be discussed by taking 
the advantage of flexible model modification. The outcomes of different risk reduction approaches are 
compared to offer the decision makers an alternative CSCRM package. 
 
7.1 CASE OVERVIEW  
The case study used in this chapter is mainly from the annual report of a focal company - Guoqiang 
Logistics Company located in the Wuhan Chemical Industry Park in Wuhan City, China. The 
investigated specific CSC specialises in supplying, manufacturing, storing and delivering a certain 
kind of chemical substance for industrial use, which is essential to produce chemical products, such as 
polyethylene, ethylene propylene rubber and detergents (Li, 2014). Guoqiang Logistics Company has 
made its mark in Wuhan, China for over 15 years. It started up in providing energy in fuel and later on 
specialty chemical transportation service to the CSCs. To support the movement of the materials, 
multiple transportation modes are employed and highly technical, expensive and sophisticated 
transportation equipment is used during the transportation (Guoqiang Logistics Company official 
website, 2015). According to the report, it owns 20 special vehicles, each with a capacity of 20 units. 
These vehicles are used to deliver a certain kind of chemical substance to the downstream partner for 
industrial use, which forms the essential inputs to produce the chemical products, such as 
polyethylene, ethylene propylene rubber and detergents. The normal transportation time is 2 days and 
has a cost of $100 per unit (Li, 2014). It is interesting to note that the choice of transport feature could 
directly affect the capacity of a transportation system, whereby the infrastructure capacity and 
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available transporter capacity are two important elements. In particular, the infrastructure capacity is 
determined by the selected route and external environment, while the capacity of a transporter can be 
controlled and managed by the transporter itself (Lahmar, Assavapokee and Ardekani, 2006). In order 
to manage the inventory and monitor the chemical transportation process, the company launched a 
new IT system to collect and share the information (Li, 2013). The inventory system is a significant 
part that manages the material flow in the supply chain. After receiving the orders from the customer, 
the chemical substances will be temporarily stored in a specified warehouse owned by the company. 
The gross storage capacity is 300 units and the storage cost is $10 per unit-day. The failure of the 
shipped products keeping the pace with the requirements leads to the backlogged orders. The delays 
in the transportation service flows add to the cost of transportation with an extra cost of $50 per unit-
day (Li, 2014).  
 
Due to the complexities and uncertainties, there is a huge pressure on the company to satisfy the 
customer within the requirements of shorter lead-times. The hazardous characteristics, such as 
extreme low storage temperature, high storage pressure, flammable and explosive, challenge the 
transportation activity. Furthermore, the competition, bad weather conditions, policy introduced, and 
other associated risks bring unexpected disruptions and result in the undesired effects on the CSCT 
system in terms of time, financial, and reputation aspects. The stakeholders and operators realise the 
importance of improving the safety and reliability in the CSCT system, to prepare for, respond to and 
recover from the risks. 
 
7.2 SD MODELLING AND VALIDATION  
SD modelling is employed to accommodate the need to describe the connections between the risks 
and their associated changes of the system behaviour (Hirsch, Levine and Miller, 2007). It enhances 
the studying of a complex CSCT operations, and then expands to a diversity of disciplines, which not 
only provides a valid description of the real system, but also reflects the interactions of hazardous 
event and managerial activities in this system (Sterman, 2000). Moreover, it offers a flexible model 
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modification function to amend the built system in the design and operations phases, which is capable 
of helping decision makers to estimate the system performance under different scenarios and reveal 
the gap between the expectation and the real outcomes.  
 
In the previous chapter, the development of conceptual CSC models and its associated risks are 
discussed following the provided SD modelling approach (shown in Chapter 5). The major 
interdependencies and feedback mechanisms in the investigated system are addressed, which provides 
a conceptual structure and understanding of the general CSC system. Referencing the developed 
conceptual models, the structure of the referenced models can be customised and the necessary 
variables can be added in line with the real situation. The proposed modelling and simulation research 
tests the experimental modelling set up for its viability and for bridging the gap between the theory 
and the practice. The risks inherent in the CSCT are quantitatively analysed, and the outcomes of 
alternative risk reduction decisions are systematically predicted. Four interlocking steps are described 
to develop an SD model including novel risk modelling, risk analysis and risk reduction approaches. 
These four aspects are: (1) developing an SD based CSCT model based on the cause and effect 
relationships within the system; (2) running the created SD model to investigate the risk effects of a 
variety of risk scenarios; (3) benchmarking the series of system performances that resulted from the 
initial situation and the risk scenarios to identify the critical hazards; and (4) providing flexible 
methods to explore the potential risk reduction methods and measure the outcomes of alternative risk 
reduction decisions. 
 
7.2.1 Defining the causal relations between variables in risk affected CSCT systems 
Following the application of the SD modelling approach, the assumed interactions between the system 
components are formalised and the temporal basis functions are set to represent the interdependences 
with more quantified information. Therefore, an SD model is developed to represent the structure of 
the system and reflect the dynamics of system behaviours due to contained feedback effects.  
 
  
173 
 
7.2.1.1 The impact of hazardous events 
The study intended to address the dynamic impacts caused by the risks in a developed CSCT system. 
The risk experts and analysts helped identify the potential CSCT hazards to inform the construction of 
the model. Their experience was collated by questionnaire and set as the input values of the different 
risk scenarios. The formalised causal loop diagram of a hazardous event (shown in Figure 5.12) was 
adapted to address time-dependent risk impact, which took into consideration the observed probability 
and represented the risk consequence on the variable level. The existing causal relations and feedback 
effects amplified or corrected the change of variable that resulted in the variation of system 
performance. The applied SD modelling and simulation method accommodated the need to describe 
the connections between the diverse risks and the CSCT system and address the variation in the 
system behaviours and the changes under different risk circumstances. 
 
7.2.1.2 The dynamic inventory system 
In the CSC, large volumes of chemical substances are transported across the regional boundaries in 
response to periodic ordering (Reiskin, White and Johnson, 1999). Warehouse and special containers 
were used to store the chemical materials, but the features of immiscibility and incompatibility 
dictated that the containers could not be mixed during transportation and storage (Erera, Morales and 
Savelsbergh, 2005). The disruptions from the internal system or external environment could interrupt 
the transportation process and result in the decrease of service level. In particular, the inventory 
system could be significantly affected due to the existing feedback effects among the logical loops 
emerging from the interactive relations. A coordinated approach was necessary to manage the 
inventory level and improve the utilisation of the storage capacity (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a). In 
order to address the generation mechanism of this phenomenon, the conceptual model of the inventory 
system (shown in Figure 5.6) was adapted to formalise the causal relations among the proposed 
CSCT system. To present the described causal relations using the SD modelling software, the causal 
loop diagram of the CSCT inventory system is shown in Figure 7.1.  
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The conceptual causal loop diagram of 
CSCT inventory system 
(As shown in Figure 5.7) 
Customized causal loop diagram of CSCT 
inventory system 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Causal loop diagram of the CSCT inventory system 
 
From the completed goods inventory, the required products are shipped to the customers with a 
certain number of capacities. However, the failure of the shipped products keeping the pace with the 
requirements leads to backlogs. The delays in the transportation service flows could reduce the order 
fulfilment rate and damage the relationship with its suppliers. In the customized causal loop diagram, 
there is a feedback loop found in the diagram, which governs the changes in the inventory system. 
The developed model appears to be stable, and dominated by a negative loop (containing three of the 
negative relationships). Any actions that attempt to change the variables result in a self-correction of 
the system. As soon as the products leave the supplier‟s plant, they are on the company‟s inventory. 
When the products waiting for shipping exceed the maximum capacity, the materials cannot be taken 
over from the supplier until the capacity is released. The transporter inventory level is calculated by 
the arrival flow of products from the suppliers and the outflow of shipped products to the customers 
within a given period of time. If the shipped orders fail to keep pace with the customer demand, the 
backlog of orders will appear and a reduction in the order fulfilment rate can be observed during the 
simulation. The arrow with the symbol “||” is used to represent the delay in order processing, and a 
time lag between the interactive variables.  
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7.2.1.3 The dynamic transportation capacity 
The capacity of a transportation system is particularly vulnerable in the event of a natural disaster, 
terrorism or other significant disturbances (Peng et al., 2014). The infrastructure capacity is 
determined by the selected route and environmental factors, while the capacity of a transporter 
depends on the capacity of the available equipment and the size of the transporter‟s labour force 
within the CSCT system. The equipment capacity is created to describe the capacity of instruments, 
which refers to the ability of a transporter to respond to the dynamic orders. Meanwhile, a specified 
number of operators are required to handle the available equipment, so that the size of the labour force 
also needs to be managed. To represent these relationships, the CSCT capacity causal loop diagram is 
developed based on the conceptual transportation capacity sub-model (shown in Figure 5.8). The 
structure of the referenced model was customised and the detailed information was addressed, as 
shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2. Causal loop diagram of the dynamic transportation capacity 
 
In the developed causal loop diagram, two distinct loops were observed that represented the feedback 
effects related to the labour issue and transportation equipment capacity, respectively. The increase of 
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equipment capacity and labour productivity could offer an extra capacity to the transportation system, 
which can be used to fill the transportation capacity gap in the risk scenarios. 
 
7.2.1.4. Dynamic transportation time 
A hazardous event can interrupt the flow of CSCT operations and result in significant disturbance to 
the CSCT system. It is crucial to understand how the dynamic variables within the model evolve in 
response to time delays. The transport time can be calculated by Eq. 5.1 in transportation science. 
However, it is suggested that there will be an over- exaggeration when the ratio of V/C is larger than 
1.2, so that the function utilisation is obstructed in conditions when infrastructure capacity sharply 
decreases. To fill this gap, a segment function is provided to estimate transportation time in the post-
seismic supply chain (Peng et al., 2014). The authors have tailored this segment function to ensure 
that it can account for the transportation time in a risk affected CSCT system, which is represented as: 
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}
 
 
 
 
 Eq. 7.1 
 
where T represents an operator-estimated transportation time. T0 is described as the initial 
transportation time. Vt is the current volume of products in transit and Ct is the current infrastructure 
capacity. Ct = 0 represents that the transportation route is blocked, while Tblock is the length of 
blockage time.   is a factor describing the change of the initial transportation time when a hazardous 
event happens. Transportation time under different conditions can be estimated.  
 
7.2.2 Developing stock and flow diagram of risk affected CSCT system 
The causal-loop diagram is developed to represent both the interdependencies within the CSCT and 
the risk evolution mechanism. Referencing the developed conceptual SD models, the formalised 
causal loop diagram is converted to a stock and flow diagram. As described in the case, the supplier 
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responds to downstream requirements by providing the requisite materials to the transporter, in the 
anticipation that the transporter has sufficient available capacity. The transportation capacity is 
determinate by the combination of equipment capacity, labour capacity and infrastructure capacity. 
The delays in the transportation service flows could damage the order fulfilment rate and add to the 
cost of transportation. To illustrate the inventory of materials, capacity of transportation system and 
transportation time, the developed conceptual transportation sub-model (shown in Figure 5.15) was 
customised and more detailed information was added in Figure 7.3. Meanwhile, the risk sub-model 
(shown in Figure 5.18) could be linked with the developed CSCT system sub-model that assisted the 
generation of hazardous events and estimated the risk consequence affecting the CSCT system in 
practice. 
 
CSCT system sub-model 
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Risk sub-model 
 
Figure 7.3. Stock and flow diagram of risk affected CSCT system 
The variable in the rectangle is a stock, which is regarded as the structural element in the built model. 
In the diagram, the variables of inventory level, the quantity of labour and equipment, backlogged 
orders and variable values reduced are created as stocks to describe the accumulation of a material, 
information, or financial behaviour over time. A flow only passes the information that governs the 
change of stock. The developed CSCT model is a system that allows for the occurrence of a major 
incident, which disrupts the supply chain operations and impairs system performance. Control is used 
to describe the hazardous events that govern the changes of the CSCT model. Table 7.1 defines the 
major variables used to build the SD model. 
 
Table 7.1. Definition and role of major variables used to model the risk affected CSCT system 
Variable Name Definition Function 
Downstream Order A probabilistic input Variable assuming a kind of 
uncertainty 
Upstream Fulfil 
Customer Demand 
DELAY FIXED (input-Downstream Order, 
delay time-Upstream Lead-time, 0) 
Returns the value of the input 
delayed by the delay time 
Inventory Level  INTEG (input data of Upstream Fulfil 
Demand –exit data of Products Transported) 
Variable representing the volume 
of the products needing to be 
transported 
Backlogged Orders INTEG (input data of Products Required to be 
Transported –exit data of Products 
Transported 
Variable representing an 
accumulation of the backlogged 
products  
Net Inventory Level Equal: Inventory level – Backlogged Orders Variable representing the volume 
of products 
Products received DELAY FIXED (input-Products transported, 
delay time-Transportation time, 0) 
Returns the value of the input 
delayed by the delay time 
Transportation 
Capacity Used 
Min (Transportation Capacity can be used, 
Products Required to be Transport)                                                                
Variable representing the 
products transported with the 
Variable Value
Reduced Variable Value
Recovery Rate (R)
Hazardous Event
Magnitude (R)
CS (R)
Variable Value
Loss (R)
LO (R)CP (R)
Varibale Factor
(R)
Variable Recover
Ability (R)
Variable Value (R)Initial Variable
Value (R)
Risk Factor (R)
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maximum capability 
Infrastructure Capacity Depends on the selected route and 
environment condition 
Variable affecting the value of 
transportation capacity 
The Available 
Transporter Capacity 
Depends on the operational capacity of 
transporter 
Variable partly determining the 
value of transportation system 
capacity 
Order Fulfil Rate Equal: Products Received / Order needs to be 
fulfilled 
Variable representing the rate of 
order completion 
Random Number RANDOM UNIFORM (0, 1, 365) Generating uniformly distributed 
random varieties on the closed 
interval [0, 1] 
LO IF THEN ELSE (Random Number > 
Occurrence Likelihood of Hazardous Event 
Occurrence, 0, 1) 
Variable active when the value 
of it exceeds Random Number 
CS Depends on the effects of hazardous event Variable representing the impact 
of hazardous event 
CP IF THEN ELSE (Random Number > 
Probability of Consequence, 0, 1)  
Variable active when the value 
of it exceeds Random Number 
Variable Value Reduce INTEG (input data of Variable affected by the 
hazardous event – exit data of Variable value 
recover rate) 
Variable representing the level of 
variable affected by the 
hazardous event 
 
7.2.3 Model validation 
The developed SD model should be tested before carrying out experiments to simulate system 
operations (Qudrat-Ullah and Seong, 2010). The validation is focused on the verification of the 
correspondence of the model structure and the robustness of the model behaviours. Forrester and 
Senge (1980) suggest three validation tests - of the structure and parameters; under extreme 
conditions; and of the dimensional consistency of SD models. 
 
In addition to the tests, the structure of the proposed model was tested by comparing the variables and 
the equations against existing literature and available expert knowledge. It was claimed that the model 
was developed based on the causal relations; thus, the model structure and the contained interactions 
should be examined against the real system (Barlas, 1996).  
 
“Statistical significance” testing is another critical part in the SD model validation process. Regardless 
of the size of the model, all the variables of concern to the system developers could be tested to 
address whether the model adequately represented the real system at the operational level. The 
parameter values under extreme conditions were set by the authors in order to assess whether the 
performance of the model coincided with the anticipated behaviour of the system in reality. Based on 
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the assumption of an independent input value of a variable, it elicited a better performance of the 
system compared with human beings. However, it was significant to note that the emphasis was on 
the trend, frequencies and fluctuation prediction, rather than the value of system behaviour prediction 
(Das and Dutta, 2013). In the examination, a logical result was obtained to verify the developed 
system.  
 
To demonstrate the proposed method, an illustration is provided to describe the SD model validation 
under extreme conditions. In the CSCT system, the transportation capacity is a significant variable, 
which reflects the ability of the transportation system to ship the orders to the customers. The value of 
transportation capacity depends on the combination of the current transporter capacity and 
infrastructure capacity. If the average number of placed orders is larger than the available 
transportation capacity, the backlogged orders are expected to accumulate to a high level following 
each simulation step; otherwise the backlogs do not appear. In order to verify this phenomenon, an 
increase of average downstream orders was set to explore how the built system responded to the 
unexpected changes. The increase of “Downstream order” by 5% is shown in Figure 7.4. The No1# 
line presents the testing of increasing downstream orders by 5% and the No2# line indicates the base 
system performance. 
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Order fulfilment rate Transportation cost 
  
             CSCT performance under 5% increase of “Downstream order”:          1          1         1         1 
             Base CSCT performance:          2          2          2          2          2          2          2          2          2 
Figure 7.4. CSCT system performance under 5% increase of “Downstream order” 
 
According to the simulation results, the downstream orders were forecasted to fluctuate between 
58.13 units and 104.73 units during the simulation period. The unexpected customer demand increase 
puts huge pressure on the transportation system to fulfil the increased requirements. The backlogs 
frequently appear when the shipped orders fail to maintain the pace with customer demand. The order 
fulfilment rate represents the performance of the CSCT system, which drops from 82.09% to 75.92%. 
According to the simulation results, the developed model presents a representation that coincides with 
logical behaviour in the scenario. In accordance with the system design, the developed CSCT model 
has spare capacity to gradually adapt to the negative effects of demand increase. Though it is regarded 
as a kind of waste in normal situation, it provides the backup capacity to deal with the unexpected 
requirements in risk scenarios. During the “statistical significance” testing, it is significant to identify 
the extreme value at which the developed system could absorb the negative effects and perform as 
initially expressed. Through changing the input value of downstream demands, the threshold value 
was experimentally addressed that if a 2.54% increase of downstream orders was imposed on the 
valid model, more backlogs would appear during the simulation period.  
 
Finally, the dimensional consistency tests were carried out to examine the dimensions of the provided 
equations. The SD model was developed based on the existing causal relations and feedback effects, 
thus the dimensions of variables also can be calculated according to the provided mathematical 
equations. It is significant to verify whether the dimensional units on both sides of the equation are 
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presented the same. In the research, the software used provides a powerful function of dimension 
calculation that automatically verifies the dimensional consistency of this model. It verifies the 
relationships between interacted variables by tracking their fundamental dimension as performed 
calculations. Once validation and confidence in the behaviour of built SD model had been established, 
it could be used to address the system performance in a series of risk scenarios and risk reduction 
scenarios. 
 
7.3 RISK DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND VALIDATION 
Due to the lack of accurate industry-specific data, expert intervention is applied for generating risk 
scenario input value to estimate risk effects in the methodology. Based on the identified hazards, the 
questionnaire is built to collect risk data from respondents. To ensure the reliability and consistency of 
obtained data, the results of the questionnaire are measured using Cronbach's alpha method. Then, the 
validated risk data are inserted as the input values of established risk scenarios to simulate the distinct 
risk effects on CSC operations. 
 
7.3.1 Risk data collection  
In the study, the transportation service provider is determined as the focal company in the CSC and 
the primary data are collected on described risk attributes regarding the operational aspects. 
Operational risks refer to the specialised internal features of CSCT that may cause transportation 
delay or damage. Adapting the identified hazards in the developed risk taxonomic diagram (shown in 
Figure 4.12), fourteen major risks inherent in the CSCT operations were empirically analysed, which 
are hazardous nature of materials; breakdown in core operations; inappropriate choice of service 
provider; inappropriate choice of transportation route; inadequate transportation capacity; high 
levels of process variation; the complexity of the products to be transported; lack of/inappropriate 
inventory management; lack of/inappropriate container management; lack of qualified labour; the 
challenge of technological innovation; information sharing delay; information sharing inaccuracies; 
and financial problems.  
  
183 
 
 
Although both academics and practitioners have raised the awareness of CSCRM, the insight from 
risk issues linked to the transportation process is limited, emerging from increasing challenges in 
today‟s already volatile environment. In literature, the CSCT risk consequence is frequently evaluated 
in terms of time, cost, and quality aspects (Vilko and Hallikas, 2012). The time-based consequence 
refers to delay and disruption in material or information flows, the cost-based consequence exists in the 
financial flow that may lead to cost increase or profit loss, while the quality-based consequence refers 
to the damage of quality of product, service or property. Transportation activities can be disrupted by 
physical damage, which not only affects service levels, but also results in cost increases within the 
CSCT system (Wilson, 2007; Liu et al., 2011). Tatano and Tsuchiya (2008) provide a framework to 
estimate the economic losses accruing from transportation interruption. Leonelli et al. (2000) and 
Fabiano et al. (2005) have investigated the CSCT risks relating to available infrastructure capacity, 
available vehicle capacity, amount (quantity) and type (quality) of damage and transportation time. To 
demonstrate the interaction between the investigated system and risk factor, the core elements of the 
CSCT system are determined, which are available infrastructure capacity, available transporter 
capacity, transported object damage (quality), transported object damage (quantity), transportation 
time, timeliness of information sharing, accuracy of information sharing, transportation cost. Based on 
the identified hazards and selected core elements of CSCT system, the questionnaire was designed to 
comprise the input values of risk scenarios. Nine-point Likert scale was adapted to investigate the level 
of agreement of each question from the respondents. The experts as the executives in the CSCT 
process were selected as the target participants. In particular, the experience of respondents should be 
in line with the research objectives and requirements. The gathered risk data was analysed and 
validated prior to being inserted into the developed SD model to conduct risk analysis and risk 
reduction research.  
 
7.3.2 Risk data analysis and validation 
Empirical studies are designed for the collection of risk data forming the target population for this 
study, so as to deal with the lack of accurate industry-specific data. The questionnaire responses 
  
184 
 
informed a set of corresponding data – LO; CS and CP. In the following section, the obtained risk data 
is analysed and validated to ensure the reliability and consistency of results. 
 
7.3.2.1 Respondents‟ profile analysis  
The survey has to narrow down the target population to the research institutes or companies involving 
in CSCT process in China. The sample size should fit in with statistical measures, so that it is able to 
generalise the findings (McColl et al., 2001). The author had randomly contacted about 200 domain 
experts using the university membership directories on SCM or chemical engineering in Wuhan 
University of Technology. Also, the same amount of recognised practitioners had been randomly 
chosen from CSCT services providers to elicit their opinions as an executive with expert knowledge on 
CSCT risk management. 
 
In total, 181 questionnaires were sent out between 27th April 2015 and 31th July 2015 and 59 replies 
were received in three months. There were 42 valid questionnaires and 17 invalid ones, as the 
respondents did not reply or did not answer all the questions in the questionnaire, therefore the valid 
return rate was 23.20%. The questionnaire was also converted to an online questionnaire via e-survey 
creator to ensure that more validated participants can take part in the survey. It was expected that after 
participants completed the questionnaire, the researcher was able to sign in onto e-survey creator and 
view the given answers. Till the end of July 2015, there were 37 valid questionnaires and 11 invalid 
ones, as the respondents did not answer all the questions of this survey. Hence, 79 valid responses were 
received in total. The summary of questionnaires reply detail is shown in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2. The summary of questionnaires reply detail 
 Questionnaire 
distributed 
Questionnaire 
returned 
Valid 
replies 
Invalid 
replies 
Valid reply 
rate 
In person and by email 181 59 42 17 23.20% 
Online - 48 37 11 - 
 
The balanced sample obtained the opinions from academic researchers and industrial experts with 
equal weights. It is interesting to note that the majority of respondents are the researchers in academia 
  
185 
 
(51.90%), while the others work in the industry, which account for 48.10% of the total respondents 
(working in service provider: 21.52%; goods provider: 16.64%; infrastructure provider: 7.59%; and 
other: 2.53%).  
 
In terms of involved transportation modes, almost all respondents select road transport. It indicates that 
the road transportation mode dominates the chemical transportation process. Even though the chemical 
substances can be conveyed by other methods, it also requires vehicles to deliver the products from 
port/dock to the final destination. Due to numbers of participants coming from Wuhan, which is the 
one of the most developed inland shipping districts and the central node of the railway network in 
China, approximately 35.44% and 29.11% of respondents have been involved in railway and waterway 
transportation modes.  
 
From an organisation‟s gross revenue aspect, many participants are working in research institutes, so 
that more than 50% of the respondents work for a non-profit or low profit organisation (56.96%). In 
Chinese CIs, there are a lot of Small and Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs) (Gross revenue < $50M) 
providing chemical transportation services, which account for 85.83% of the respondents. In the 
analysis, there are only 4 respondents working for state owned super-giant enterprises involving in the 
chemical manufacturing and transportation.  
It indicates that approximately 82.28% of the respondents have been engaged in the CI and the CSC for 
more than 5 years. The long professional working experiences of the participants contribute to this 
questionnaire achieving a high reliability. The 79 respondents‟ profile in the survey is presented in 
Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3. The summary of questionnaires respondent profile 
Respondent Profile Number % 
What is the type of your 
organisation? 
 
Goods Provider (e.g. Manufacturing)  13 16.46 
Service Provider (e.g. Distribution, Warehousing)  17 21.52 
Infrastructure Provider (e.g. Port) 6 7.59 
Researchers in the academia 41 51.90 
Other 2 2.53 
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What types of 
transportation modes are 
you involved in? (Please 
tick all that apply): 
Road Transport 78 98.73 
Rail Transport 28 35.44 
Air Transport 6 7.59 
Waterway Transport 23 29.11 
What is your 
organisation‟s gross 
revenue? 
 
$0-$1M  45 56.96 
$1M-$5M  20 25.32 
$5M-$10M  12 15.19 
$10M-$50M  8 10.13 
>$50M 4 5.06 
For how many years have 
you worked in the 
chemical industry or 
chemical supply chain? 
1-5 years  14 17.72 
6-10 years  17 21.52 
11-15 years  19 24.05 
16-20 years  16 20.25 
>20 years 13 16.46 
 
7.3.2.2 Risk data analysis and validation 
The questionnaire survey with academic experts and company managers generated insights into the 
CSC system and its associated risks that contributed to bridging the gap in risk data visibility. In 
particular, the reliability of the obtained results are of high concern to the questionnaire builders, so 
that a validity test is conducted to test whether the study measures the required items and whether the 
study receives the reliable responses (Davis, 2000). As described in Chapter 4, Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.2 are 
applied to measure the reliability of the questionnaire survey through employing Cronbach's alpha 
method. 
 
A total of 221 questions are tested, which contain the occurrence likelihood of hazardous events (13 
questions), consequence severity and associated consequence probability (208 questions). In this 
study, the Cronbach's alpha of the whole survey is 0.871 and Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardised Items is 0.869. It is important to note that the proposed survey achieves a high level of 
reliability according to the evaluation criteria provided by Cohen and Swerdlik (2010). Additionally, 
the reliability of occurrence likelihood of the investigated hazardous events, consequence severity and 
consequence probability of hazardous events are examined separately to verify the consistency and 
stability of the scores from the measurement scales. The Cronbach‟s Alpha of each reliability test is 
illustrated in Table 7.4. 
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Table 7.4. The reliability test for the questionnaire survey 
 Cronbach‟s 
Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardised Items 
Number of 
questions 
Whole survey 0.871 0.869 221 
Occurrence likelihood of hazardous events 0.854 0.853 13 
Consequence severity of hazardous events 0.866 0.864 104 
Consequence probability of hazardous events 0.859 0.860 104 
 
According to the outcomes of the questionnaire survey, the risk attributes are obtained which 
represent the hazardous events in terms of probability and severity aspects. The results will be 
categorised and analysed in order to establish deeper understanding of obtained risk data. The 
occurrence likelihood of hazardous events is measured to subjectively estimate whether the risk will 
materialise using a nine point Likert scale. LO is defined as a subjective view of whether the risk will 
materialise, which are evaluated using nine-point scale in the questionnaire. Table 7.5 summarises the 
acquired data on occurrence likelihood of identified hazardous events (LO). And then, the obtained 
numerical number will be normalized into an accurate numerical percentage, which is supposed to be 
calibrated into [0, 1], in which 0 means never happen and 1 means always happen. 
 
Table 7.5. The summary of data on occurrence likelihood of hazardous event (LO) acquired 
 
Occurrence likelihood of hazardous 
event (LO) 
Mean S.D. 
Hazardous nature of materials 5.98 0.88 
Breakdown in the core operations 3.22 1.20 
Improper service provider selection 2.33 1.00 
Improper transportation route selection 4.78 1.86 
Inadequate transportation capacity 5.44 0.88 
High level of process variation 4.78 1.20 
Complexity of product types 5.00 1.41 
Lack of/inappropriate inventory management 4.11 1.45 
Lack of/inappropriate container management 4.33 1.41 
Lack of qualified Labour 3.89 1.05 
The challenge of technology innovation 2.33 1.00 
Information sharing delay 4.78 1.56 
Information sharing inaccuracy 5.22 1.20 
Financial problems 1.44 0.88 
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As shown in the survey, the hazardous events of inadequate transportation capacity, complexity of 
product types and information sharing inaccuracy are the frequently experienced problems in the 
operational process. The risks of improper service provider selection, the challenge of technology and 
financial problems rarely disrupt the CSCT operations. No risk falls into the scale of circumstances 
frequently encountered on a monthly or daily basis. Therefore, the obtained data can be classified into 
three levels: (1) high likelihood: the hazardous event is likely to happen at some point within a few 
months (red colour, the mean value of a risk attribute is greater than 5); (2) moderate likelihood: the 
circumstance may occur within one year (yellow colour, the mean value of a risk attribute is between 
3 and 5); and (3) low likelihood: the hazard is only likely to happen within a few years (green colour, 
the mean value of a risk attribute is less than 3).  
 
Although some of the circumstance may occur within one year or several years, the consequence 
severity could be catastrophic and cause significant loss. The magnitudes of possible consequences in 
terms of negative aspect depend on the combination of hazardous event and affected variables. Table 
7.6 lists the summary of data on consequence severity and consequence probability acquired, which 
can be inserted into the developed SD model to estimate the risk impacts in later risk scenario 
simulation research. 
 
Table 7.6. The summary of data on consequence severity and consequence probability acquired 
Hazardous nature of materials 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 3.44 1.05 2.78 1.20 
Available Transporter Capacity 4.78 1.67 4.78 1.76 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 4.11 1.67 4.11 1.67 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 4.78 1.41 3.45 1.05 
Transportation Time 6.12 1.06 5.44 1.33 
Timeliness of Information sharing 3.16 1.56 4.56 0.88 
Accuracy of Information sharing 3.21 1.86 3.49 1.20 
Transportation Cost 5.78 1.05 4.33 1.06 
Breakdown in the core activities 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
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Available Infrastructure Capacity 3.89 1.05 2.11 1.05 
Available Transporter Capacity 6.78 1.56 5.44 1.33 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 3.44 0.88 4.11 1.05 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 4.78 1.56 4.78 1.20 
Transportation Time 7.67 1.00 6.11 1.76 
Timeliness of Information sharing 3.67 1.00 4.11 1.05 
Accuracy of Information sharing 4.11 1.05 4.78 1.20 
Transportation Cost 6.33 1.41 5.89 1.05 
Improper service provider selection 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 3.22 1.86 2.78 1.86 
Available Transporter Capacity 4.11 1.45 4.11 1.45 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 4.56 1.05 5.44 1.33 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 4.56 0.88 5.00 1.00 
Transportation Time 5.00 1.00 6.27 1.33 
Timeliness of Information sharing 4.11 1.05 4.11 1.05 
Accuracy of Information sharing 5.22 1.86 4.65 0.77 
Transportation Cost 4.99 1.20 5.89 1.76 
Improper transportation route selection 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 3.22 2.11 3.89 1.45 
Available Transporter Capacity 3.89 1.05 3.44 0.97 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 1.44 0.88 3.67 1.00 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 1.67 1.00 4.11 1.45 
Transportation Time 5.67 1.06 6.33 1.00 
Timeliness of Information sharing 2.56 1.67 4.56 1.41 
Accuracy of Information sharing 3.44 1.67 4.56 2.11 
Transportation Cost 5.22 1.20 5.67 0.88 
Inadequate transportation capacity 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 1.67 1.41 0.89 0.33 
Available Transporter Capacity 4.78 2.11 5.44 1.04 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 3.44 1.33 3.44 1.67 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 3.67 2.00 3.22 1.56 
Transportation Time 6.56 1.33 6.78 1.20 
Timeliness of Information sharing 2.87 2.07 4.11 1.57 
Accuracy of Information sharing 4.11 1.05 4.62 1.05 
Transportation Cost 5.89 1.44 6.11 1.45 
High level of process variation 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 1.89 1.05 3.22 1.20 
Available Transporter Capacity 2.99 1.81 3.89 1.05 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 2.78 1.20 3.70 1.21 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 3.22 1.56 3.45 1.46 
Transportation Time 4.78 1.20 5.00 0.87 
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Timeliness of Information sharing 3.44 0.88 4.33 1.00 
Accuracy of Information sharing 3.89 1.45 4.78 0.67 
Transportation Cost 4.78 1.56 4.36 1.22 
Complexity of product types 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 1.89 1.45 2.11 1.15 
Available Transporter Capacity 3.44 1.67 3.67 1.09 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 2.78 1.02 2.78 1.22 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 2.56 1.33 3.44 0.88 
Transportation Time 4.78 1.20 5.22 1.20 
Timeliness of Information sharing 3.67 1.73 3.67 1.41 
Accuracy of Information sharing 4.33 1.00 4.78 1.29 
Transportation Cost 4.50 1.66 3.49 1.21 
Lack of/inappropriate inventory management 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 2.56 1.67 3.00 2.24 
Available Transporter Capacity 3.00 1.41 3.44 2.19 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 5.89 1.05 5.44 0.88 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 6.33 1.00 5.67 1.41 
Transportation Time 5.00 1.41 5.22 1.20 
Timeliness of Information sharing 3.22 1.20 5.00 1.41 
Accuracy of Information sharing 4.11 1.45 5.67 0.84 
Transportation Cost 5.89 1.36 5.67 0.91 
Lack of/inappropriate container management 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 2.56 1.33 2.56 2.19 
Available Transporter Capacity 3.22 2.11 3.22 2.11 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 6.78 1.20 6.78 1.56 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 6.33 1.73 6.33 1.41 
Transportation Time 4.33 1.41 5.44 0.88 
Timeliness of Information sharing 2.56 1.88 5.22 1.28 
Accuracy of Information sharing 4.56 0.69 5.67 1.06 
Transportation Cost 6.11 1.45 5.89 1.09 
Lack of qualified Labour 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 1.67 1.10 3.44 1.67 
Available Transporter Capacity 3.89 1.04 4.56 1.33 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 3.91 0.99 5.44 1.33 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 4.11 1.01 5.22 1.28 
Transportation Time 4.78 1.23 5.44 1.45 
Timeliness of Information sharing 3.89 1.10 3.89 1.29 
Accuracy of Information sharing 4.57 1.68 4.33 1.10 
Transportation Cost 4.30 1.31 4.78 1.26 
The challenge of technology innovation 
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In the empirical analysis, the consequence severity of hazardous event was explored in the variable 
level in terms of system capacity, product damage rate, transportation time, information sharing and 
transportation cost. For instance, the financial problems of a transportation service provider could 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 1.67 1.01 2.78 1.56 
Available Transporter Capacity 2.78 1.22 3.89 1.95 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 2.33 1.41 2.33 1.42 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 1.89 1.45 3.44 1.38 
Transportation Time 3.22 1.18 3.67 1.41 
Timeliness of Information sharing 3.56 0.93 3.89 0.98 
Accuracy of Information sharing 2.89 1.54 3.22 1.66 
Transportation Cost 3.89 1.05 3.89 1.45 
Information sharing delay 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 0.89 0.33 1.00 1.03 
Available Transporter Capacity 1.44 0.85 1.78 1.27 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 1.89 1.59 1.89 1.49 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 2.02 1.11 1.21 0.96 
Transportation Time 3.89 1.36 4.38 1.67 
Timeliness of Information sharing 4.78 1.23 5.00 1.73 
Accuracy of Information sharing 4.56 0.67 5.54 1.37 
Transportation Cost 4.33 1.41 5.21 1.42 
Information sharing inaccuracy 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 1.11 0.79 1.67 1.15 
Available Transporter Capacity 2.33 1.73 1.89 1.01 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 1.67 1.00 2.33 1.41 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 2.78 1.86 2.78 1.56 
Transportation Time 4.56 1.33 5.44 1.33 
Timeliness of Information sharing 5.23 1.41 5.67 1.41 
Accuracy of Information sharing 5.67 1.10 5.89 1.05 
Transportation Cost 5.41 1.14 6.11 2.11 
Financial problems 
Core elements of CSCT system 
Consequence severity (CS) Consequence probability (CP) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Available Infrastructure Capacity 0.84 0.64 1.58 0.95 
Available Transporter Capacity 5.04 1.73 4.67 1.41 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) 3.23 1.41 3.44 1.67 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) 3.47 1.36 3.44 1.99 
Transportation Time 4.78 1.22 4.33 1.73 
Timeliness of Information sharing 3.89 0.98 3.76 1.31 
Accuracy of Information sharing 3.66 1.47 4.11 1.45 
Transportation Cost 5.59 1.59 5.44 1.34 
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cause some inconvenience with minor impacts to the infrastructure capacity (mean value: 0.84) and 
result in major disruptions to the flow of material movement due to the reduction of available 
transporter capacity (mean value: 5.04) as shown in Table 5.6. Meanwhile, the consequence 
probability (CP) was investigated to explore the probability of the consequence given the hazardous 
event occurring. The obtained results indicate that the CSCT system rarely suffers the available 
infrastructure capacity damage (mean value: 1.58), whilst the available transporter capacity damage is 
about an even chance of occurring with the mean value of 4.67.  
 
7.4 RISK SCENARIO SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
A hazardous event can either trigger a low or high impact on the system performance for different 
probabilities. It is regarded as a condition for the hazardous event occurring at the indicated 
consequence severity. Due to the lack of accurate industry-specific data, the expert elicitation is a 
proven methodology to source the data in risk management domain. The questionnaire was designed to 
facilitate the respondents to give the numeric number to represent the corresponding abstractive 
category. The analyses of gathered data were carried out prior to being inserted into the developed SD 
model to simulate the CSCT operations. The collected data from the risk experts and analysts was 
described in a previous section (shown in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6), which comprised the input values 
in the proposed CSCT model to simulate the system performance under different risk scenarios. 
 
7.4.1 Base case behaviour 
An SD simulation begins with running the developed model under a specified scenario, so that the 
initial value of each variable (such as: simulation period; downstream order; transporter capacity; and 
infrastructure capacity) must be defined at the outset. In this research, the simulation period was set 
as 365 days, and the time-step for simulation was set as 1 day. A number of assumptions were made 
in the definition of the established scenario. In reality, customer demand is uncertain and difficult to 
forecast accurately (Barilas and Gunduz, 2011). Therefore, the downstream order was assumed to be 
placed every day and follow a normal distribution with a minimum of 50 units, and a maximum of 
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100 units, with a mean of 85 units, and a standard deviation of 20 units. The volume of products in 
transit was determined by the capacity of the transporter and infrastructure. In view of the regulations 
and policies governing the transportation operations, it was assumed that the volume of products in 
shipment should not exceed infrastructure capacity in the proposed model. The transporter capacity 
was set at 400 units in total, and the infrastructure capacity was set at 150 units per day. The CSCT 
system performance under these base operating conditions is shown in Figure 7.5.  
 
Downstream orders Inventory level 
  
Backlogged orders Transporation capacity used 
  
Order fulfilment rate Transportation cost 
  
Figure 7.5. Base system performance of developed CSCT 
 
Downstream Order
100
75
50
25
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
0 73 146 219 292 365
Time (Day)
U
n
it
s/
D
ay
Downstream Order : Normal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Inventory Level
200
150
100
50
0
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
0 73 146 219 292 365
Time (Day)
U
n
it
s
Inventory Level : Normal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Backlogged order
20
15
10
5
0
1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1
1
1
0 73 146 219 292 365
Time (Day)
U
n
it
s
Backlogged order : Normal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Transportation Capacity Used
100
75
50
25
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0 73 146 219 292 365
Time (Day)
U
n
it
s
Transportation Capacity Used : Normal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Order Fulfilment Rate
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
1
1
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
0 73 146 219 292 365
Time (Day)
D
m
n
l
Order Fulfilment Rate : Normal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Transportation Cost
10,000
7,500
5,000
2,500
0
1
1
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 73 146 219 292 365
Time (Day)
£
/D
ay
Transportation Cost : Normal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  
194 
 
In accordance with the system design, the downstream order was generated as a probabilistic input 
based on the set policy, which fluctuated between 50 units per day and 100 units per day. Following 
the receipt of customer orders, the upstream supplier provided the required volume of products to the 
transporter on time. The inventory comprised the balance of the volume received and volume shipped 
by the transporter, which fluctuated between 50 units and 110 units. The simulation produced some 
late deliveries due to a lag in transportation capacity. In this circumstance, the order fulfilment rate 
was estimated to rise and fall between 0.78 and 1.00 during the simulation period. This initial system 
performance was set as the baseline for benchmarking a series of system performance involving a 
variety of risk scenarios. 
 
7.4.2 Risk scenarios simulation and analysis 
It has been indicated that SD is a scenario-based method and can be used to investigate the impact of 
parameter changes on system behaviour over time (Yeo, Pak and Yang, 2013). The disturbance is 
amplified or self-corrected along the existing information feedback loops in the developed system, 
thus the system behaviour appears to be dynamic. Through comparison with a direct expert judgement, 
it provides a method of quantitatively estimating the problematic performance as the consequence of 
the system changes in response to different risk scenarios. Thus, it helps analysts to understand how 
the CSCT system will perform in different risk scenarios, and estimate the possible risk effects 
associated with these scenarios on system thinking.  
 
Following the application of the SD modelling and simulation, the independent risks were 
investigated to evaluate the distinct risk effects in the system level. The experts were asked to give the 
input values to each risk scenario regarding the probability and consequence severity. Using the 
developed risk sub-model (shown in Figure 5.18) generated the hazardous events and their 
consequence severity following the specific distributions, according to the particular features of the 
risk. Fourteen risk scenarios were established and experts were asked to assign input values to each 
risk scenario regarding the probability and consequence severity. Inserting the obtained LO, CS and 
CP (shown in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6) into the developed model simulates time-dependent CSCT 
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system performance. Table 7.7 presents the system performance with the maximum, the minimum 
and the average values in the risk scenarios during the simulation period.  
Table 7.7. The descriptions of SD simulation results of created risk scenarios 
 Transportation 
capacity 
(units) 
Transportation 
time 
(Day) 
Inventory level 
 
(units) 
Order fulfilment 
rate (%) 
(dmnl) 
Transportatio
n cost 
($) 
Based value Max 90.00 Max 2.00 Max 108.67 Max 100.00 Max 8746 
Min 90.00 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 90.00 Ave 2.00 Ave 79.62 Ave 96.20 Ave 8235 
Hazardous nature of 
materials 
Max 90.00 Max 4.18 Max 132.81 Max 100.00 Max 8874 
Min 63.88 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.34 Ave 2.07 Ave 87.43 Ave 94.78 Ave 8356 
Breakdown in the core 
operations 
Max 90.00 Max 4.60 Max 320.74 Max 100.00 Max 9340 
Min 7.92 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 88.29 Ave 2.14 Ave 96.03 Ave 82.10 Ave 8487 
Improper service 
provider selection 
Max 90.00 Max 3.00 Max 139.63 Max 100.00 Max 9029 
Min 70.02 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.59 Ave 2.03 Ave 80.76 Ave 94.60 Ave 8320 
Improper 
transportation route 
selection 
Max 90.00 Max 3.40 Max 139.63 Max 100.00 Max 9076 
Min 70.02 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.64 Ave 2.04 Ave 80.71 Ave 94.90 Ave 8307 
Inadequate 
transportation 
capacity 
Max 90.00 Max 3.94 Max 123.70 Max 100.00 Max 8905 
Min 62.20 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.63 Ave 2.16 Ave 80.34 Ave 95.00 Ave 8291 
High level of process 
variation 
Max 90.00 Max 2.91 Max 125.68 Max 100.00 Max 8980 
Min 76.99 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.79 Ave 2.03 Ave 80.09 Ave 95.40 Ave 8281 
Complexity of product 
types 
Max 90.00 Max 3.00 Max 125.68 Max 100.00 Max 8897 
Min 75.60 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.81 Ave 2.04 Ave 80.07 Ave 95.30 Ave 8254 
Lack of/inappropriate 
inventory 
management 
Max 90.00 Max 3.00 Max 131.71 Max 100.00 Max 9039 
Min 73.98 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.72 Ave 2.03 Ave 80.33 Ave 94.90 Ave 8306 
Lack of/inappropriate 
container management 
Max 90.00 Max 2.73 Max 131.71 Max 100.00 Max 8927 
Min 73.98 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.71 Ave 2.02 Ave 80.35 Ave 94.80 Ave 8384 
Lack of qualified 
Labour 
Max 90.00 Max 2.91 Max 123.70 Max 100.00 Max 8963 
Min 71.10 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.75 Ave 2.03 Ave 80.12 Ave 95.40 Ave 8273 
The challenge of 
technology innovation 
Max 90.00 Max 2.44 Max 123.70 Max 100.00 Max 8880 
Min 77.98 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.84 Ave 2.01 Ave 79.96 Ave 95.70 Ave 8244 
Information sharing 
delay 
Max 90.00 Max 2.58 Max 116.68 Max 100.00 Max 8860 
Min 81.99 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.93 Ave 2.02 Ave 79.75 Ave 95.89 Ave 8325 
Information sharing 
inaccuracy 
Max 90.00 Max 2.82 Max 118.66 Max 100.00 Max 8877 
Min 80.51 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.92 Ave 2.04 Ave 79.79 Ave 95.70 Ave 8344 
Financial problems Max 90.00 Max 2.91 Max 121.63 Max 100.00 Max 8877 
Min 72.00 Min 2.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 Min 0.00 
Ave 89.86 Ave 2.02 Ave 79.86 Ave 95.79 Ave 8342 
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In order to provide meaningful insights, Table 7.8 extracts the results from Table 7.7 that depicts the 
comparison of the system performance of each risk scenario with the base value. It can be calculated 
by the equation: 
 Result = (Risk scenarios simulation result-Base value)/Base value Eq. 7.2 
 
For instance, the average of transportation capacity is 89.34 tons in the risk scenario of “Hazardous 
natural of materials”, while the initial value is 90.00 tons. Therefore, the comparison of the 
transportation capacity in this risk scenario with the base value is -0.73%. Through evaluating the 
variations in system behaviour, it provides quantitative results to find out the significant risks in the 
complex CSCT system. 
 
Table 7.8. The comparisons of the risk scenarios simulation results with the base system performance 
 Transportation 
capacity 
Transportation 
time 
Inventory 
level 
Order 
fulfilment rate 
Transportation 
cost 
Hazardous nature of 
materials 
-0.73% 3.5% 9.8% -1.47% 1.47% 
Breakdown in the core 
operations 
-1.90% 7.00% 20.61% -14.65% 3.06% 
Improper service 
provider selection 
-0.46% 1.5% 1.43% -1.66% 1.03% 
Improper transportation 
route selection 
-0.40% 1.9% 1.37% -1.35% 0.87% 
Inadequate 
transportation capacity 
-0.41% 8.05% 0.90% -1.25% 0.68% 
High level of process 
variation 
-0.23% 1.55% 0.59% -0.83% 0.56% 
Complexity of product 
types 
-0.21% 2.00% 0.57% -0.94% 0.23% 
Lack of/inappropriate 
inventory management 
-0.31% 1.50% 0.89% -1.35% 0.86% 
Lack of/inappropriate 
container management 
-0.32% 1.05% 0.92% -1.45% 1.81% 
Lack of qualified 
Labour 
-0.28% 1.35% 0.63% -0.83% 0.46% 
The challenge of 
technology innovation 
-0.18% 0.40% 0.43% -0.52% 0.11% 
Information sharing 
delay 
-0.08% 0.95% 0.16% -0.32% 1.09% 
Information sharing 
inaccuracy 
-0.09% 1.85% 0.21% -0.52% 1.32% 
Financial problems 
-0.16% 1.10% 0.30% -0.43% 1.30% 
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In the risk scenario of breakdown in core operations, there was an estimated a 1.90% decrease in the 
average transportation capacity and a sharp increase of transportation time due to the occurrence of 
hazardous event. Barlas and Gunduz (2011) and Liu and Papageorgiou (2013) suggested that the 
changes of the capacity and an increase of lead-time will cause the oscillations in inventory level 
along the supply chain. The SD simulation results confirmed these effects, with the average inventory 
level increasing approximately 1.2 times compared with the initial value. The transporter is unable to 
fully satisfy the customer requirements, so that the developed CSCT system presents a lower order 
fulfilment rate. The average order fulfilment rate fell, by 14.65% during the simulation period. 
Similarly, the effects of the other risks are listed in Table 7.8, which provides quantitative results to 
evaluate the risks in the complex CSCT system. It indicates that the major risk drivers in the 
developed CSCT model are the risks of hazardous nature of materials, breakdown in the core 
operations, improper service provider selection, improper transportation route selection, lack 
of/inappropriate inventory management, lack of/inappropriate container management and 
information sharing inaccuracy.  
 
7.5 RISK REDUCTION SCENARIOS SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
Ensuring that a particular risk reduction approach does indeed support CSCRM often requires a 
formal modelling of forecasting the outcomes of a particular risk reduction decision. It is worthwhile 
simulating the system operations to explore the potential effects of risk reduction methods on the 
changes of system behaviours (Li et al., 2015). The SD model can be modified both in the design and 
operations phases based on the proposed reduction measures, which is able to help the decision 
makers to estimate risk reduction outcomes under different scenarios.  
 
7.5.1 Applying general risk reduction method to manage the risks 
It is indicated that SD based risk management decision-making processes do not require a decision-
maker directly assessing different risks and providing the arbitrary decisions based on the past 
experience or limited historical data (Yeo, Pak and Yang, 2013). Instead, the expert just proposes a 
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reduction measure, and then the whole SD approach (shown in Figure 3.6) should be iterated to 
investigate the possibility of the risk reduction outcomes. In this case, the application of SD addresses 
the complex interactions and the dynamic feedback effects between the CSC system performance and 
implemented risk reduction methods.  
 
The results of risk analysis outlined in Table 7.8 shows that the risk of “Breakdown in the core 
operations” is the most serious risk in the CSCT system. Insufficient transportation capacity 
obstructed the performance of the transportation system under the challenge of the hazardous events. 
The inventory accumulated to a high level and the average order fulfilment rate decreased by 15%. 
The obtained system performance was set as a baseline for benchmarking the outcomes of risk 
reduction measures. In this section, two potential risk reduction approaches were suggested by the 
experts in response to the undesired risk effects: increasing transportation equipment capacity and 
increasing transportation equipment number. The conditions of the proposed cases are presented in 
Table 7.9.  
 
Table 7.9. Case study conditions of suggested risk reduction methods 
Case study Variable value set Description 
Case 1: Effect of transportation 
equipment capacity increase 
Current situation 
Capacity increase 
20 Units/device 
Degree of increase: 5%, 10%, 15% and 
20% of current situation 
Case 2: Effect of transportation 
equipment number increase 
Current situation 
Number increase 
20 devices 
Degree of increase: 5%, 10%, 15% and 
20% of current situation 
 
It is particularly innovative that not only the model structure but also the variables‟ value of the 
developed SD model can be modified based on the suggested risk reduction measures. The effects of 
the implemented risk reduction methods are obtained through comparing the system behaviours under 
different scenarios. In each case, the effects were simulated in four different scenarios - 5%, 10%, 15% 
and 20% increase of the exogenous parameter values were inserted to assess the performance of the 
built CSC system. It should be noted that a range of variations is widely used to test the performance of 
the implemented risk reduction approach in the real world (Bouloiz et al., 2013).  
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The results of risk reduction scenarios can be used to understand the effects of implemented risk 
reduction methods on system performance. Advantageous risk reduction decisions can be obtained by 
comparing system performance under different scenarios. In order to provide meaningful insights, 
Table 7.10 extracts the simulation results of 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% increases in the parameter values 
that depict the comparisons of the system performances of each risk reduction scenario. 
 
Table 7.10. Effects of implemented risk reduction methods 
Transportation equipment capacity increase 
Degree of increase 
Base value 5% 10% 15% 20% 
Average inventory level (units) 85.62 83.95 82.99 82.35 82.02 
Average order fulfilment rate (dmnl) 81.22% 82.78% 83.67% 84.32% 84.64% 
Average transportation cost ($) 9020 8823 8714 8636 8596 
 
Transportation equipment number increase 
Degree of increase 
Base value 5% 10% 15% 20% 
Average inventory level (units) 85.62 84.15 83.39 82.32 82.14 
Average order fulfilment rate (dmnl) 81.22% 82.61% 83.49% 84.35% 84.47% 
Average transportation cost ($) 9020 8864 8738 8632 8616 
 
The improvement of transportation capacity built the robustness of CSCT system, whereas the 
increase of transportation equipment number improved the flexibility of the transportation system. It 
was found that both of the implemented methods could significantly improve the system performance 
in terms of the inventory level, order fulfilment ability and transportation cost. The highlighted system 
behaviour indicated the preferable risk reduction approaches in the designed scenarios that can lead to 
a better system performance. The method of increasing transportation capacity performed better in the 
scenario of 5%, 10% and 20%. For instance, it could decrease 1.99% of the average inventory level, 
improve the average order fulfilment rate from 81.22% to 82.78%, and cut the transportation cost by 
$197 per shipment during the simulation period in the scenario of a 5% increase. However, the 
approach of increasing transportation equipment numbers offered a better performance in the scenario 
of a 15% increase. It showed that the average inventory level decreased to 82.32 units, which had 0.03 
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units lower than the first risk reduction method. Meanwhile, the average order fulfilment rate 
increased to 84.35% and the average transportation cost decreased to $8632 per shipment in 365 days. 
The multiple scenario simulations allow quantifying the CSCT performance for diverse risk reduction 
actions. It takes into account the complex interactions and dynamic feedback effects among the built 
system, which will significantly affect the outcomes of the risk reduction methods. The SD method 
serves as a decision supportive tool for continuously improving the system performance and 
optimising risk reduction in CSCRM. 
 
7.5.2 Applying sensitivity analysis to manage the risks 
The developed SD model was believed to be capable of representing the changes in the behavioural 
pattern of the CSCT system. It observes that a small change caused by a risk reduction measure could 
lead to a significant variation in the system behaviours. A set of sensitivity analyses with different 
parameter distributions was conducted to explore the sensitive variables in the developed model, so as 
to suggest the beneficial risk reduction methods. In the developed system, there were six exogenous 
parameters, which governed the changes of interrelated variables. These identified variables were set 
as the input parameters performing with the assumption that the parameter values were uniformly 
distributed within ± 50% range of the base value, as shown in Table 7.11. 
 
Table 7.11. Parameter distribution setting in risk reduction 
Parameter Name Model Value Range Distribution 
Normal Infrastructure Capacity 200 [100-300] Random uniform 
Normal Transportation Time  2 [1-3] Random uniform 
Required Labour per Equipment 2 [1-3] Random uniform 
Total Number of Labour 40 [20-60] Random uniform 
Total Number of Equipment 20 [10-30] Random uniform 
Capacity per Equipment 20 [10-30] Random uniform 
 
As described, integrating sensitivity analysis with SD simulation offers a method to explore whether a 
small disturbance of a designed variable brings significant variation in the system behaviours. The 
simulation results delivery a tolerance interval of the system outputs based upon all simulation runs. 
Through evaluating the range of obtained outcomes, the sensitive variables are practically addressed 
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which suggest the potential targets of the risk reduction approach. In the developed model, the 
sensitivity of six exogenous parameters was investigated following the uniform distribution within ± 
50% range of the base values. The simulation outcomes are given in Table 7.12. 
 
Table 7.12. The sensitivity analysis outcomes of concerned variables 
Parameter Name Inventory Level 
Order Fulfilment 
rate 
Transportation 
cost 
Normal Infrastructure Capacity [85.62] [81.22%] [9020] 
Normal Transportation Time  [81.97-2900] [3.42%-85.72%] [8588-94349] 
Required Labour per Equipment [85.62-5376] [3.24%-81.22%] [9020-163121] 
Total Number of Labour [85.62-7980] [2.53%-81.22%] [9020-235627] 
Total Number of Equipment [85.62-7980] [2.53%-81.22%] [9020-235627] 
Capacity per Equipment [81.76-6743] [2.66%-84.98%] [8553-201016] 
 
It is interesting to observe that the variables of “Normal transportation time”, “Required labour per 
equipment”, “Total number of labour”, “Total number of equipment”, and “Capacity per equipment” 
are sensitive to the developed system. In order to respond to and recover from the undesired risk 
impacts, the risk reduction methods can be implemented to modify the identified sensitive variables, 
so as to achieve the research objectives. In particular, the highlighted methods of reduction of the 
transportation time and the improvement of equipment capacity were more sensitive than others. For 
instance, the reduction of the transportation time can improve the order fulfilment rate from 81.22% to 
85.72% and reduce the transportation cost from 9020 
 
Therefore, the amending of these variables could lead to the better results. Meanwhile, it was found 
that the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis coincided with the described simulation results of using 
general risk reduction methods to manage the risks in CSCT system (shown in Table 7.5). The 
variations of “Capacity per equipment” lead to larger changes of the system behaviours, which 
indicate that the system is more sensitive to the method of the “Capacity per equipment” optimisation. 
 
The combining of the sensitivity analysis with the developed SD system helps to explore how the 
uncertainty in the output of the developed system can be apportioned to different sources of inputs. It 
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offers the system developers a convenient method to investigate the potential risk reduction solution 
without relying on the expert knowledge or limited historical data. However, the model structure 
cannot be changed or modified in the proposed approach, so that the suggested variables whose value 
can be modified belong to the developed system. In this circumstance, the observed system 
behaviours establishes upon the developed model structure and causal relations to indicate the optimal 
risk reduction decisions. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
Generally, the occurrence of the hazardous event will interrupt the flow of the CSCT operations and 
result in various negative effects. To address the risk management issue, both researchers and 
practitioners have adopted a wide range of methods to identify, analyse and manage the risks inherent 
in or surrounding a CSCT network. However, there remains a lack of the practical methodology that 
takes into consideration the complex interactions and the dynamic feedback effects among the 
developed models or systems. Instead of assessing the risks based on the expert knowledge or 
historical data, this study introduces a systematic methodology for the quantitatively analysing the 
risks in a CSCT system. It maps the risks through addressing the dynamic effects caused by the 
hazardous events, which combines the modelling approach for the quantification of the system 
performance with an interactive procedure. An in-depth investigation into the connections between 
the risk exposures and the CSCT system performances helps the analysts to assess different risk 
scenarios to find out the significant risks that should be further reduced. An SD based CSCRM 
method provides a transparent decision support tool to reveal the gap between the expectation and the 
real-time performance. In particular, not only the structure of the developed model but also the 
inserted values of the variables can be modified based on the risk reduction design, so that the 
improvement in the system behaviours can be addressed to indicate the best risk management solution.  
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CHAPTER 8  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Summary 
This chapter summarises the research findings on the hazard identification, risk analysis and risk 
reduction in all previous chapters. It shows that the proposed SD-based CSCRM offers the decision 
makers and the operators an insight into the risk affected CSC operations and suggests the 
advantageous CSCRM packages. The limitations of the proposed research are outlined and the 
opportunities arising from the developed methods are suggested for the future improvements and 
applications. 
 
8.1 Conclusion and Contribution of the Research 
Complexities and globalisation pose significant challenges for the safety and efficiency of CSC 
operations. The risks arising from the uncertainties and disruptions among the internal system and the 
surrounding environment appear in a huge variety of forms, which are not only specific to the 
hazardous characteristics of chemical substances, but also the part of global CSC risk landscape in the 
economy, geopolitics, culture, regulations, technology and environment aspects. Both academics and 
industrial participants appreciate the need to improve the safety and reliability of the CSC, to prepare 
for, respond to and recover from risks. However, little has been done to address the dynamic 
interactive relations among the variables influencing the system operations (Fernandes, Barbosa-
Póvoa and Relvas, 2011). Indeed, the feedback effects emerging from the ignored causal relations 
governing the system behaviour change over time, which could significantly affect the risk 
management results (Leveson, 2004).  
 
Following the generated research questions, the studies are carried out to provide an integrated 
method by using both qualitative and quantitative techniques to identify the hazards, analyse their 
associated the risks and reduce the concerned risks in the supply chain level. Specifically, a novel 
framework is developed for systematically identifying the CSC hazards, analysing and reducing the 
associated risks on system thinking. A combination of the qualitative and quantitative methods has 
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been employed to enhance the practice of risk modelling and simulation. It offers a methodological 
approach to deal with the existing causal relations and feedback effects between the CSC system and 
its associated risk scenarios. Instead of assessing the risks based on arbitrary decisions, the SD method 
addresses the risk effects in a dynamic system and screens out the significant hazards. Furthermore, 
the risk reduction methods are explored through combining the modelling approaches for the 
quantification of the system performance with an interactive risk reduction procedure. It enables the 
estimation of the risk reduction outcomes, which supports the CSCRM decisions. 
 
To achieve the set objectives, the applied methods and research outcomes can be concluded as follows: 
1) Providing a novel risk management framework to sequentially capture, assess and manage the 
risks within a changeable system (Chapter 3). 
2) Conducting literature review and questionnaire survey to systematically identify the hazards 
and decompose their associated risks in the CSCs (Chapter 4). 
3) Developing conceptual SD models to formalise the causal relations among the system 
boundaries, so as to address how the CSC operations could be affected by the risks (Chapter 
5). 
4) Developing a set of stories to deal with the distinct CSC risks within the support of the 
combination of participatory SD modelling and scenario analysis. Inserting the obtained risk 
data into the developed models simulates the time-dependent risk effects in various scenarios 
and explores the possible risk reduction measures (Chapter 6). 
5) Conducting a case study to test the provided CSCRM method and to bridge the gap between 
the theory and the practice (Chapter 7).   
 
In CSCRM research, any myopic decisions may be suboptimal due to the complex and dynamic 
interactions in the CSC. One of the key contributions of the thesis is adapting the system thinking in 
CSC risk modelling and simulation to sequentially identify the CSC hazards, assess and reduce their 
associated risks within a changeable system. 
 
  
205 
 
In the CSC, the risks are the threats in terms of some unpleasant things which appear in a huge variety 
of forms and impact on diverse parts of the CSC. The invisibility of the risks is one of the most 
challenging issues in CSCRM, it is therefore essential to comprehensively identify hazards existing in 
CSC network. Even though there is a substantial amount of literature dealing with CSCRM, the 
attention on systematic hazard identification and classification from an industrious perspective is 
fairly limited. To bridge this gap, the study starts with the literature review to address the CSC risks 
(Chapter 2), and then extends to the general SC risks to enrich the captured hazards (Chapter 4). To 
substantiate and describe the risks within the CSC, it is desirable to provide a distinct decomposition 
method to classify unstructured hazards into nine categorises: supply risks, operational risks, demand 
risks, security risks, political risks, policy risks, macroeconomic risks and natural environment risks. 
Based on the addressed risks, a questionnaire is developed to ensure the feasibility of the provided 
risk classification method and to address the importance of identified hazards to the CSC. An 
interesting insight is that the internal vulnerability and those risks arising from the internal supply 
chain network attract more attention than the risks existing in the surrounding environment from a 
practical viewpoint. The questionnaire respondents regard the supply risks, operational risks, demand 
risks, strategic risks and natural environment risks as the most important ones. Furthermore, the 
preceding discussion validates the identified hazards and their associated risk classification method. 
To broadly outline the sources CSC risks, a model is developed in a hierarchical structure. 
 
In risk analysis stage, various methods and different techniques were applied to accommodate the 
need to analyse and evaluate the risks in the previous research. However, little has been done to 
address the dynamic interactive relations among the variables using the all kinds of data, which could 
influence the system operations and risk management outcomes. It is challenging to provide a novel 
CSC risk analysis method employing both qualitative and quantitative data/information to manage 
changeable CSC risks taking into consideration the complex interactions between the hazardous 
events and their associated changes of system behaviour. It is particularly noteworthy that this study 
introduces a systematic methodology for the assessment of risk scenarios in the CSCs instead of 
analysing and reducing the risks based on the expert knowledge or limited historical data. The 
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integration of the SD method in the CSCRM is an intermediate platform between widely used 
mathematical programming and empirical study, so that both qualitative and quantitative data can be 
applied in the proposed research. In the developed SD model, it not only represents the structure of 
CSC but also describes the causal relations between the CSC system and hazardous events. In risk 
scenarios, each hazardous event affects the balanced system and causes unexpected changes in system 
behaviours. The proposed method addresses the risks through evaluating the variation in the system 
performance produced by varying the risk inputs.  
 
Risk reduction measures aim at dealing with the certain risks to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the system in different operating environment. It is significant to highlight that the 
provided SD based CSCRM method can be used to suggest the rational risk reduction decisions. 
Because of the flexibility and modification capability of the developed SD models, it is believed that 
the provided reduction method of iterating SD modelling procedures and conducting sensitivity 
analysis methods compensate the absence of the literature of risk reduction method in the context of 
CSCRM. The whole SD modelling and simulation approaches can be iterated to analyse the system 
performance in different scenarios by amending the model structure, modifying the defined equations, 
and changing the inserted value of created variables. Therefore, the outcomes of risk reduction 
approaches are explored to ensure that the implemented measures indeed support CSCRM.  
 
Additionally, the application of the SD-based CSCRM method is demonstrated to test the 
experimental modelling set up for its viability and for bridging the gap between the theory and the 
practice. Instead of directly assessing the risks and providing the arbitrary decisions, the incorporation 
of SD into CSCRM gives an insight into the risk affected CSCT operations, especially with the 
consideration of time-dependent CSCT system behaviours in different operational conditions. 
Therefore, it is beneficial to transform the risk input into the variation of system behaviours in the 
developed CSCT system in order to find out the signification risks in the proposed case. The risk 
reduction activities are carried out on the basis of the flexibility of the model modification to enhance 
the practice in risk reduction. In the study, the proposed models and method are examined in a 
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detailed practical analysis. It adds detail to previously presented methods and gives a reference to 
investigate new development directions for the application of the developed SD-based CSCRM. 
 
8.2 Limitations of Research and Future Research 
The research has achieved its aim of providing an integrated framework and an analytical method to 
manage the risks in the dynamic CSC network. However, the complexity of the SD model that the 
researcher seeks to develop, and the application of the provided method are limited in some 
circumstances, which may need in further investigation. The limitations of this research are identified 
as: 
1) In order to restrict the scope of the peer-reviewed journals, the literature review only focuses 
on the development in the past fifteen years. There are many articles related to CI or CSC 
published during 1985 – 2000, so that the restriction on the year of publication may lead to 
the deficiency of some of the quality journals. It would be useful if more literature could be 
reviewed, especially in the hazard identification stage. 
 
2) In this study, the developed CSC risk taxonomic diagram incorporates the general risk issues 
due to insufficient research in the CSC hazard identification aspect. It would be useful if more 
specific hazards from the industrial perspective could be identified and validated so as to 
strengthen the knowledge base in hazard identification and direct further risk assessment and 
risk reduction studies. 
 
3) The questionnaire survey is used to address the hazardous events in three risk attributes due to 
incomplete data, but it is acknowledged that both the size of the sampling population and the 
subjective nature of the responses could be a source of bias. There is a requirement for a 
future comparative study to demonstrate the proposed method and verify the obtained risk 
data. 
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4) The degree of the complexity of the SD model that the researcher seeks to investigate 
influences the outcomes of risk analysis and risk reduction, because there is an 
interrelationship between the level of specification of the created model and the level of 
accuracy of the risk management outcomes. It would be useful if the complexity of the 
developed model could be improved to represent more precise system behaviours and address 
more accurate risk effects in the CSCRM research. 
 
5) Scenario simulation is conducted to assess and reduce the concerned risks in the research. 
However, the current study does not address all the identified hazards due to the time 
constraints. It would be useful if more scenarios could be generated to deal with distinct CSC 
risks on system thinking. 
 
6) A reputable specialty chemical transportation service provider is used to demonstrate the 
proposed CSCRM method. It adapted the conceptual CSCT sub-model to simulate the CSCT 
operations, as well predict the dynamic behaviours as the parameters change in different risk 
scenarios. It would be useful if the developed SD models and proposed SD-based CSCRM 
method could be tested in more case studies to demonstrate the applicability in various risk 
aspects and different industries. 
 
While this study has made significant contributions to academic and industrial areas, additional 
research seems to be needed to deal with the limitations described above. The current research can be 
extended on the following aspects: 
 Due to the lack of accurate industry-specific data, expert intervention is applied for generating 
risk input to estimate the risk effects in the methodology. In the research, the target 
respondents are selected from the academia and industry in the UK and China. A future 
comparative study needs to be conducted using a more extensive data source to verify the 
generated risks attributes and examine the CSCRM results. 
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 The SD method is employed to conceptualise and analyse the CSC risks on system thinking. 
The generalised causal relations describe the changes of system behaviours arising from the 
risks. Future work may be needed to develop specific SD modules with particular designs for 
investigating certain kinds of risks, so as to achieve a higher reliability of the CSCRM 
decisions. 
 
 Before taking actions to reduce a certain risk, the benefits and investments associated with the 
CSCRM decisions should be forecasted, so that the substantive investigation is required to 
practically analyse the risk reduction outcomes, especially in the financial aspect. In future, 
the cost and benefit analysis can be integrated into the provided SD-based CSCRM method to 
explore the benefits of the implemented risk reduction methods in different operational 
conditions. The new model can be used to more faithfully suggest an optimised CSCRM 
decision.  
 
 The implemented risk reduction solution could be the source of other risks due to the 
interactions among the developed system, so that any research focusing on a specific risk may 
be suboptimal. Another possible area for future research is to provide a structural method to 
monitor the time-dependent system behaviours using the developed SD models. It ensures 
that the generation of the new risks with the risk reduction measures can be observed via 
simulation in a dynamic CSC system. 
 
 The provided method can be applied to investigate the various risks in terms of policy, human, 
and other aspects and suggest the advantageous CSCRM decisions. Furthermore, the 
application of an SD-based CSCRM method and developed SD models needs to be 
generalised to the supply chain context, so as to provide a flexible and rigorous risk 
management tool in various industries. 
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Alan Kay indicates that “The best way to predict your future is to invent it” (1971). Future research in 
SCRM from an industrial perspective is a broad domain. In the competitive and uncertain 
environment, novel frameworks, approaches, techniques and strategies are expected to build the 
robustness of the CSC network and improve the resilience in times of challenges.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix One  
 
Risk Management of the Transportation Process in the Chemical Supply 
Chain Questionnaire (Part A) 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
My name is Chaoyu Li; I am currently pursuing a PhD degree at the Liverpool Logistics Offshore and 
Marine Research Institute (LOOM) in Liverpool John Moores University. My research topic is “Risk 
Modelling and Simulation of the Chemical Supply Chain using System Dynamics Approach”, which 
intends to provide a novel, systematic and structured approach to conduct hazard identification, risk 
analysis, risk evaluation and risk reduction in chemical supply chain. The purpose of the 
questionnaire to examine the identified hazards involved in the transportation operations of the 
chemical supply chain.  
 
I am writing to elicit your opinion as an executive in the transportation process of the chemical 
supply chain with expert knowledge on hazard identification. Your participation is voluntary; 
however, your assistance would be greatly appreciated in making this a meaningful questionnaire. 
The information gathered in this survey will be treated in the strictest confidence, as this has always 
been the policy of the Liverpool John Moores University. This survey will take you about 10-15 
minutes.  This questionnaire is anonymous, thus your response can not be attributed to you or your 
company. 
 
If you have any questions about this research please contact me at +44 (0) 759 334 1528, or by email 
C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk or my supervisor, Dr. Jun Ren, at +44 (0) 151 231 2236, or by email 
j.ren@ljmu.ac.uk.  
 
Please accept my thanks for your anticipated co-operation. If you wish to receive a copy of the 
research results, please email me at C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk (regardless of whether you participate or 
not). 
 
Yours faithfully,  
 
Chaoyu Li,  
PhD Candidate,  
 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Tel: +44-(0)759 334 1528 
Email: C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk 
Room 121, James Parsons Building  
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
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Section A: Respondent Profile  
We would like to ask you about how your research or business involves chemical supply chain 
transportation operations.  
1. What is the type of your organisation? 
Goods Provider  
(e.g. Manufacturing)   
Service Provider  
(e.g. Distribution, Warehousing)   
Infrastructure Provider 
(e.g. Port) 
Other 
    
 
2. What types of transportation methods are you involved in? We are thinking particularly of 
four transportation methods (please tick all that apply): 
 Road transportation - Involving the transport of chemical substances on roads. 
 Rail transportation - Involving the transport of chemical substances through train routes. 
 Air transportation - Involving the transport of chemical substances through freight flights. 
 Waterborne transportation - Involving the transport of chemical substances by ship. 
Road Transport   Rail Transport   Air Transport Waterway Transport 
    
 
3. What is your organisation‟s gross revenue? 
 $0-$1M   $1M-$5M   $5M-$10M   $10M-$20M   >$20M 
 
4. What is your job title? 
             
____________________________________________________________________________ 
5. What is your research area or related to the professional role? 
      
____________________________________________________________________________ 
6. For how many years have you worked in the chemical industry or chemical supply chain? 
 1-5 years   6-10 years   11-15 years   16-20 years   >20 years 
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Based on our research, the propose categorising the risks in chemical supply chain into nine 
categories: supply risks, operational risks, demand risks, strategic risks, security risks, 
macroeconomic risks, political risks, natural environment risks and policy risks (see the figure below 
for a schematic of where these risks are focused). The following questions are related to the 
Identified Hazards in the chemical supply chain. 
Security risks
Strategy risks
Political risks
Macroeconomic risks
Natural environment risks
Policy risks
Chemical Supply Chain
External Environment
 
Information 
flow
 
 
Material 
flow
 
 
Demand risks
 
 
Supply risks 
 
Focal Firm
 
...
 
Customer
Ultimate 
Customer
 
Operational 
risks 
 
 
Information 
flow
 
 
...
 
SupplierInitial Supplier
 
Material 
flow
 
 
 
Section B: Supply risks refer to the potential or actual disturbances surrounding the supply procedure 
in supply chain operations. From detailed synthesis of the literature in this discipline, the components 
of supply risks are listed below. For the identified supply risks in the chemical supply chain, what is 
the importance do you think to transportation operations, and thus analyse the risks in transportation? 
(1=Extremely Unimportant; 2=Very Unimportant; 3= Minor Unimportant; 4= Moderate; 5=Minor 
Important, 6=Very Important, 7=Extremely Important) 
Identified Hazards How important is this hazard to 
transportation?  
Supply risks Supply market uncertainty   □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
High sourcing cost □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Supply activities disruptions □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Low supplier reliability □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Low supplier flexibility □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Complexity of material types □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Unavailability of materials □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Low material quality □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Lack of supply process monitoring □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Please add that any 
other risks should be 
considered?  
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
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Section C: Operational risks refer to the specialized operational features in the internal supply chain 
that may cause production, transportation or services delay. Through a detailed synthesis of the 
literature in this discipline, the components of operational risks are listed below. For the identified 
operational risks in the chemical supply chain, what is the importance do you think to transportation 
operation to analyse the risks in transportation? 
(1=Extremely Unimportant; 2=Very Unimportant; 3= Minor Unimportant; 4= Moderate; 5=Minor 
Important, 6=Very Important, 7=Extremely Important) 
Identified Hazards How important is this hazard 
to transportation?  
Operational 
risks 
Hazardous nature of materials   □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Breakdown in core operations □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Improper operational procedure selection □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Inadequate process capacity □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
High level of process variation □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Complexity of  product types □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Lack of/inappropriate inventory management □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Lack of/inappropriate container management □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Problem of product quality □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Lack of qualified staffs □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Technology innovation □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Information sharing delay □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Information sharing inaccuracy □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Financial problems □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Please add that 
any other risks 
should be 
considered? 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
Section D: Demand risks are specific to the possibility of unexpected changes in the downstream of 
the supply chain. After detailed synthesis of the literature, the components of demand risks are listed 
below. For the identified demand risks in the chemical supply chain, what is the importance do you 
think to transportation operations, thus analysing the risks in transportation? 
(1=Extremely Unimportant; 2=Very Unimportant; 3= Minor Unimportant; 4= Moderate; 5=Minor 
Important, 6=Very Important, 7=Extremely Important) 
Identified Hazards How important is this hazard 
to transportation?  
Demand risks Demand uncertainty □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Customer requirement changes □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Forecasting errors □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Product substitution □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Competition changes □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Please add that any 
other risks should 
be considered? 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
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Section E: Strategic risks represent the risks related to the supply chain strategic characteristics that 
the strategic actions influence the whole supply chain context.  Through a detailed synthesis of the 
literature in this discipline, the components of strategic risks are listed below. For the identified 
strategic risks in the chemical supply chain, what is the importance do you think to the transportation 
operations? 
(1=Extremely Unimportant; 2=Very Unimportant; 3= Minor Unimportant; 4= Moderate; 5=Minor 
Important, 6=Very Important, 7=Extremely Important) 
Identified Hazards How important is this hazard 
to transportation?  
Strategic risks Improper supply chain network design □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Lack of information sharing  □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Lack of partner relationship management □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Location selection of facilities □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Improper supply chain strategy selection □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Please add that any 
other risks should 
be considered? 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
Section F: Security risks refer to third party elements that surround the internal or external 
environment and intend to steal proprietary, data or knowledge, or interrupt supply chain operations. 
After detailed synthesis of the literature in this discipline, the components of security risks are listed 
below. For the identified security risks of the chemical supply chain, what is the importance do you 
think to transportation operations? 
(1=Extremely Unimportant; 2=Very Unimportant; 3= Minor Unimportant; 4= Moderate; 5=Minor 
Important, 6=Very Important, 7=Extremely Important) 
Identified Hazards How important is this hazard 
to transportation?  
Security risks Information system security problems □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Infrastructure security problems □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Transportation security problems □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Labour strikes □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Criminal acts □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Terrorism □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Please add that any 
other risks should be 
considered? 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
Section G: Macroeconomic risks are a broad term referring to the economic fluctuations in the 
economic activity and price changes. Through a detailed synthesis of the literature in this area, the 
components of macroeconomic risks are listed below. For the identified macroeconomic risks of the 
chemical supply chain, what is the importance do you think to transportation operations? 
  
238 
 
(1=Extremely Unimportant; 2=Very Unimportant; 3= Minor Unimportant; 4= Moderate; 5=Minor 
Important, 6=Very Important, 7=Extremely Important) 
Identified Hazards How important is this hazard 
to transportation?  
Macroeconomic 
risks 
Economy fluctuation □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Financial crisis □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Price fluctuation  □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Inflation □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Exchange rate arbitrages □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Please add that any 
other risks should 
be considered? 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
Section H: Political risks refer to the uncertainty and instability when major change happens in 
political regimes. From a detailed synthesis of the literature in this discipline, the components of 
political risks are listed below. For the identified political risks of the chemical supply chain, what is 
the importance do you think to transportation operations? 
(1=Extremely Unimportant; 2=Very Unimportant; 3= Minor Unimportant; 4= Moderate; 5=Minor 
Important, 6=Very Important, 7=Extremely Important) 
Identified Hazards How important is this hazard 
to transportation?  
Political risks Government instability □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Revolution □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
War □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Government attitude □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Please add that any 
other risks should be 
considered? 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
Section I: Natural environment risks include the various natural phenomena that could impair 
supply chain operations in the affected region. After detailed synthesis of the literature, the 
components of natural environment risks are listed below. For the identified natural environment risks 
of the chemical supply chain, what is the importance do you think to transportation operations? 
(1=Extremely Unimportant; 2=Very Unimportant; 3= Minor Unimportant; 4= Moderate; 5=Minor 
Important, 6=Very Important, 7=Extremely Important) 
Identified Hazards How important is this hazard 
to transportation?  
Natural environment 
risks 
Natural disaster □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Infectious disease □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Weather risk □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Please add that any 
other risks should be 
considered? 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
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Section J: Policy risks refer to the uncertainty and instability of the policies, laws, regulations and 
other available policy materials. From a detailed synthesis of the literature in this area, the 
components of policy risks are listed below. For the identified policy risks of the chemical supply 
chain, what is the importance do you think that impact transportation operations? 
(1=Extremely Unimportant; 2=Very Unimportant; 3= Minor Unimportant; 4= Moderate; 5=Minor 
Important, 6=Very Important, 7=Extremely Important) 
Identified Hazards How important is this hazard 
to transportation?  
Policy risks Changes in legislation/ regulations/ policies □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
The requirement of environment protection  □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Stakeholders‟/society‟s attitudes □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
Please add that 
any other risks 
should be 
considered? 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR YOUR KIND PARTICIPATION IN THIS SURVEY. 
YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. 
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化工供应链中运输过程的风险管理 
调查问卷 (第一部分) 
尊敬的专家： 
 
         您好！我是英国利物浦约翰莫尔斯大学(LJMU)利物浦物流和海洋研究所的一名博士研究生，
名叫李超宇。LJMU与武汉理工大学共同参加欧盟第七框架计划“玛丽居里行动计划”中的《风
险评估与决策科学》研究项目。作为此欧盟项目的参与者，我希望能提出一种全新的、系统化
与结构化的方法对化工供应链进行风险识别、评估以及控制的研究。目前，我正在武汉理工大
学开展交流研究工作，希望借此机会通过此次问卷调查得到化工供应链在运输过程中的一些风
险指标信息，为今后的研究提供宝贵的数据支持。 
 
         需要提出的是，本次问卷调查采取自愿形式。我们非常感激您在问卷填写中给予的帮助。
本次调查的信息将会完全保密，这也是利物浦约翰摩尔斯大学一直以来所严格要求的。本次调
查需要10到15分钟的时间。 
 
        如果您有任何疑问，请通过电话 +44 (0) 759 334 1528、 +86 186 0606 3710或电子邮件
C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk 联系我。您也可以通过电话 +44 (0) 151 231 2236 或电子邮件
J.Ren@ljmu.ac.uk联系我的导师Jun Ren博士。 
 
       请接受我们由衷的感激。如果您想知道调查的最终结果，请通过电子邮件 
C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk与我联系。 
 
李超宇 
博士研究生 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Tel: +44-(0)759 334 1528; +86-186 0606 3710 
Email: C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk 
Room 121, James Parsons Building  
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
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第一部分：基本情况 
下列问题是针对您以及您所在的企业或公司，请根据您以及您所在的企业或公司的实际情况进
行选择。 
1. 您所在机构的在化工供应链中扮演的角色是？ 
货物供应方 
如：工厂  
服务提供方 
如：配送、存储 
基础设施提供方 
如：港口 
其它 
    
 
2. 您所在的企业在运营过程中是否曾经遭遇过危害事件？ 后果是否严重？ 
没有   有，后果不严重   有，后果严重 
3. 您所在的企业有没有对雇员和管理人员进行过风险管理培训？ 
专门进行过   有，但是附带性的   没有 
4. 针对供应链风险管理，要系统掌握风险管理方面的知识，您认为最需要解决的问题是
什么？ 
如何对供应链风险进行系统的识别和分析     掌握针对供应链风险的管理措施 
专门成立供应链风险管理部门                           公司领导的重视程度 
其它（请说明） 
5. 您的职位是？ 
             ____________________________________________________________________________ 
6. 您所从事的研究领域或专业领域是？ 
      ____________________________________________________________________________ 
7. 您在化工行业或化工供应链行业中工作了多久？ 
 1-5 年      6-10 年      11-15 年      16-20 年      >20 年 
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在前期的研究中，我们将化工供应链的风险分为 9 类：供应风险、企业内营运风险、需求风险、
战略风险、安全风险、政治风险、自然环境风险和政策风险。接下来的问题是针对化工供应链
中的相关的风险进行识别。 
安全风险
战略风险
政治风险
宏观经济风险
自然环境风险
政策风险
化工供应链
外部环境
信息流
物流
需求风险供应风险
本企业
 
...
 
顾客 最终顾客
企业内营运
风险
信息流
 
...
 
供应商初始供应商
物流
 
 
第二部分：供应风险是指围绕供应链运营中的供应过程的潜在的和实际的风险。经过多方面的
综合考虑分析，我们认为供应风险大致有以下几种（见下表）。为帮助辨识这些风险，您认为
在化工供应链中，这些风险各自的重要性得分是？ 
（1 完全不重要，2 不重要，3 不是很重要，4 一般重要，5 比较重要，6 很重要，7 十分重要） 
辨识出的风险因素 风险因素对化工供应链的影响
程度 
供应风险 供应市场的不确定   □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
高采购成本 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
供应行为中断 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
供应方可靠性低 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
供应方灵活性低 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
货物种类繁多 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
材料短缺 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
材料质量低 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
缺乏对供应过程的监控 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
您是否认为还
有其它因素？ 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
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第三部分：根据供应链中企业内可能导致产品或服务延迟的运营特征考虑其企业内营运风险。
经过多方面的综合考虑，我们认为企业内营运风险大致有以下几种（见下表）。为帮助辨识这
些风险，您认为在化工供应链中，这些风险的各自的重要性得分是？ 
（1 完全不重要，2 不重要，3 不是很重要，4 一般重要，5 比较重要，6 很重要，7 十分重要） 
辨识出的风险因素 风险因素对化工供应链的影响
程度 
企业内营运风
险 
货物具有易燃易爆等危险性质   □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
服务商选择不当  □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
运营方法选择不当 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
企业内主要设备失效或发生故障 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
企业供应／生产／运输能力不足 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
运营过程复杂多变 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
货物种类复杂 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
库存管理缺乏/不当 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
容器管理缺乏/不当 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
合格的工作人员缺乏 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
技术革新的挑战 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
供应链信息共享水平低 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
供应链信息共享延误／不准确 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
企业内财务问题 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
您是否认为还
有其它因素？ 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
第四部分：需求风险是指供应链下游中不可预知的变化所导致的风险。经过多方面的综合考虑，
我们认为需求风险大致有以下几种（见下表）。为帮助辨识这些风险，您认为在化工供应链中，
这些风险的各自的重要性得分是？ 
（1 完全不重要，2 不重要，3 不是很重要，4 一般重要，5 比较重要，6 很重要，7 十分重要） 
辨识出的风险因素 风险因素对化工供应链的影响
程度 
需求风险 需求的不确定性 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
顾客要求的变化 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
预测错误 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
可替代产品 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
竞争的变化 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
您是否认为还
有其它因素？ 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
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第五部分：战略行为影响整个供应链体系，战略风险可根据其战略特征得到。经过多方面的综
合考虑，我们认为战略风险大致有以下几种（见下表）。为帮助辨识这些风险，您认为在化工
供应链中，这些风险的各自的重要性得分是？ 
（1 完全不重要，2 不重要，3 不是很重要，4 一般重要，5 比较重要，6 很重要，7 十分重要） 
辨识出的风险因素 风险因素对化工供应链的影
响程度 
战略风险 供应网络设计不完善 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
共享信息缺乏 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
合作伙伴管理缺乏 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
位置选择不合理 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
供应链策略选择不完善 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
您是否认为还
有其它因素？ 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
第六部分：安全风险是指由于第三方盗取物品、数据、知识或中断供应链运营而产生的风险。
经过多方面的综合考虑，我们认为安全风险大致有以下几种（见下表）。为帮助辨识这些风险，
您认为在化工供应链中，这些风险的各自的重要性得分是？ 
（1 完全不重要，2 不重要，3 不是很重要，4 一般重要，5 比较重要，6 很重要，7 十分重要） 
辨识出的风险因素 风险因素对化工供应链的影
响程度 
安全风险 信息系统安保问题 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
基础设施安保问题 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
运输安保问题 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
罢工 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
犯罪 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
恐怖主义 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
您是否认为还有其
它因素？ 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
245 
 
第七部分：宏观经济风险是在经济波动和价格调整中对经济活动的影响。经过多方面的综合考
虑，我们认为宏观经济风险大致有以下几种（见下表）。为帮助辨识这些风险，您认为在化工
供应链中，这些风险的各自的重要性得分是？ 
（1 完全不重要，2 不重要，3 不是很重要，4 一般重要，5 比较重要，6 很重要，7 十分重要） 
辨识出的风险因素 风险因素对化工供应链的影
响程度 
宏观经济风险 经济波动 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
经济危机 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
价格波动 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
通货膨胀 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
汇率套利交易 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
您是否认为还有
其它因素？ 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
第八部分：政治风险是指主要政治体系改变的不确定性和不稳定性。经过多方面的综合考虑，
我们认为政治风险大致有以下几种（见下表）。为帮助辨识这些风险，您认为在化工供应链中，
这些风险的各自的重要性得分是？（如过以下问题有欠妥或不方便回答之处，请您跳过） 
（1 完全不重要，2 不重要，3 不是很重要，4 一般重要，5 比较重要，6 很重要，7 十分重要） 
辨识出的风险因素 风险因素对化工供应链的影响
程度 
政治风险 政府不稳定性 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
革命 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
战争 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
执政理念的冲突或改变 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
您是否认为还
有其它因素？ 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
第九部分：自然环境风险主要是指自然现象在其影响区域对供应链运营的损害。经过多方面的
综合考虑，我们认为自然环境风险大致有以下几种（见下表）。为帮助辨识这些风险，您认为
在化工供应链中，这些风险的各自的重要性得分是？ 
（1 完全不重要，2 不重要，3 不是很重要，4 一般重要，5 比较重要，6 很重要，7 十分重要） 
辨识出的风险因素 风险因素对化工供应链的影响
程度 
自然环境风险 自然灾害 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
传染病 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
天气风险 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
您是否认为还
有其它因素？ 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
  
246 
 
第十部分：政策风险是指由税务政策，法律，规定和现有的政策条文引起的不确定性和不稳定
性。经过多方面的综合考虑，我们认为政策风险大致有以下几种（见下表）。为帮助辨识这些
风险，您认为在化工供应链中，这些风险的各自的重要性得分是？ 
（1 完全不重要，2 不重要，3 不是很重要，4 一般重要，5 比较重要，6 很重要，7 十分重要） 
辨识出的风险因素 风险因素对化工供应链的影
响程度 
政策风险 政策，法律，法规的改变 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
社会对环境保护的要求 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
利益相关人的态度 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
您是否认为还
有其它因素？ 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 □ 1   □ 2   □ 3   □ 4   □ 5   □ 6   □ 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
再次感谢您在此次调查中提供的帮助。 
您的回答将会被保密。 
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Appendix Two 
 
Risk Management of the Transportation Process in the Chemical Supply 
Chain Questionnaire (Part B) 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
My name is Chaoyu Li; I am currently pursuing a PhD degree at the Liverpool Logistics Offshore and 
Marine Research Institute (LOOM) in Liverpool John Moores University. My research topic is “Risk 
Modelling and Simulation of the Chemical Supply Chain using System Dynamics Approach”, which 
intends to provide a novel, systematic and structured approach to conduct hazard identification, risk 
analysis, risk evaluation and risk reduction in the chemical supply chain.  
 
The purposes of the questionnaire are: 
1. To examine the likelihood of the identified operational hazards that influence transportation 
operations in the chemical supply chain.  
2. To analyse the interaction sites of the hazards in the transportation process and investigate 
the consequence severity and consequence probability of these hazards. 
I am writing to elicit your opinion as an executive in the chemical supply chain with expert 
knowledge on risk management. Your participation is voluntary; however, your assistance would be 
greatly appreciated in making this a meaningful questionnaire. The information gathered in this 
survey will be treated in the strictest confidence, as this has always been the policy of the Liverpool 
John Moores University. This survey will take you about 15-20 minutes. This questionnaire is 
anonymous, thus your response can not be attributed to you or your company. 
 
If you have any questions about this research please contact me at +44 (0) 759 334 1528, or by email 
C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk or my supervisor, Dr. Jun Ren, at +44 (0) 151 231 2236, or by email 
j.ren@ljmu.ac.uk.  
 
Please accept my thanks for your anticipated co-operation. If you wish to receive a copy of the 
research results, please email me at C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk (regardless of whether you participate or 
not). 
 
Yours faithfully,  
 
Chaoyu Li,  
PhD Candidate,  
 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Tel: +44-(0)759 334 1528 
Email: C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk 
Room 121, James Parsons Building  
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
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Section A: Respondent Profile  
We would like to ask you about how your research or business involves chemical supply chain 
transportation operations.  
1. What is the type of your organisation? 
Goods Provider  
(e.g. Manufacturing)   
Service Provider  
(e.g. Distribution, Warehousing)   
Infrastructure Provider 
(e.g. Port) 
Other 
    
 
2. What types of transportation methods are you involved in? We are thinking particularly of 
four transportation methods (please tick all that apply): 
 Road transportation - Involving the transport of chemical substances on roads. 
 Rail transportation - Involving the transport of chemical substances through train routes. 
 Air transportation - Involving the transport of chemical substances through freight flights. 
 Waterborne transportation - Involving the transport of chemical substances by ship. 
Road Transport   Rail Transport   Air Transport Waterway Transport 
    
 
3. What is your organisation‟s gross revenue? 
 $0-$1M   $1M-$5M   $5M-$10M   $10M-$20M   >$20M 
 
4. What is your job title? 
             
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. What is your research area or related to the professional role? 
      
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For how many years have you worked in the chemical industry or chemical supply chain? 
 1-5 years   6-10 years   11-15 years   16-20 years   >20 years 
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Section B: The following questions are related to the Operational Risks associated with Transportation Operations in the chemical supply chain. 
According to your experience and opinion about the degree of the Occurrence Likelihood of a hazardous event, please fill the appropriate score in each of 
the following:  
(The occurrence likelihood of a hazardous event refers to the frequency of the hazardous event occurring in a certain time period, which interrupts 
transportation operations in the chemical supply chain) 
Identified Hazards in Chemical Supply Chain 
No Source of operational hazards Likelihood of Occurrence  
1 Hazard nature of materials □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 How likely is it that the hazardous event will occur? 
 
0= Rare: Has never or rarely happened  
1= Very Low: Only likely to happen within 2-3 years 
3= Low: May occur within one year 
5= Medium: Likely to happen at some point within a few 
months 
7= High: Circumstances frequently encountered on a monthly 
basis 
9= Very High: Circumstances frequently encountered almost 
daily 
2 Breakdown in core operations □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
3 Improper operational procedure selection □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
4 Inadequate process capacity □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
5 High level of process variation □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
6 Complexity of product types □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
7 Lack of/inappropriate inventory management □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
8 Lack of/inappropriate container management □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
9 Problem of product quality □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
10 Lack of qualified staffs □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
11 Technology innovation □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
12 Information sharing delay □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
13 Information sharing inaccuracy □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
14 Financial problems □ 0     □ 1     □ 3     □ 5     □ 7    □ 9 
Comments: 
  
Examples:  
If Breakdown in core operations has rarely happened in years then please tick 0. 
If Breakdown in core operations has frequently happened and could be encountered monthly then 
please tick 7. 
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Section C: Through impacting on the core activities of transportation operations, both actual and potential risks influence supply chain operations. The 
following questions are related to the Risks associated with the Core Elements of transportation operations. According to your experience and opinion about 
the degree of Consequence Severity and Consequence Probability, please tick the appropriate score in each of the following: 
(Consequence Severity refers to the magnitude of possible consequences caused by the hazardous event; Consequence Probability refers to the probability 
of the consequence given the hazardous event occurred) 
Consequence Severity and Consequence Probability Analysis 
 Core Elements Consequence severity  Consequence probability What is the severity level of the impact on the 
core elements of the transportation process? 
 
0= Negligible: An insignificant effect on this 
core activity 
1= Minor: Causing some inconvenience with 
minor impacts 
3= Moderate: Causing some disruption with 
medium  impacts 
5= Major: Causing major disruptions to 
transportation operations 
7= Critical: Causing failure of transportation 
operations 
9= Catastrophic: Causing complete and 
irrecoverable failure of transportation 
operations 
 
What is the consequence probability of the 
risk impact on the core activities of the 
transportation process? 
0= Impossible: Will never occur 
1= Rare: Rarely to occur 
3= Low: Unlikely to occur 
5= Medium: About an even chance of 
occurring 
7= High: Likely to occur 
9= Definite: Definitely will occur 
H
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Comments: 
  
Examples: 
 
If Hazard nature of materials has an insignificant effect on the available 
infrastructure capacity, then please tick 0. 
 
If the consequence probability of Hazard nature of materials impacting 
on the available infrastructure capacity will never happen then please 
tick 0. 
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Consequence Severity and Consequence Probability Analysis 
 Core Elements Consequence severity  Consequence probability  
What is the severity level of the impact on the 
core elements of the transportation process? 
 
0= Negligible: An insignificant effect on this 
core activity 
1= Minor: Causing some inconvenience with 
minor impacts 
3= Moderate: Causing some disruption with 
medium  impacts 
5= Major: Causing major disruptions to 
transportation operations 
7= Critical: Causing failure of transportation 
operations 
9= Catastrophic: Causing complete and 
irrecoverable failure of transportation 
operations 
 
What is the consequence probability of the 
risk impact on the core activities of the 
transportation process? 
 
0= Impossible: Will never occur 
1= Rare: Rarely to occur 
3= Low: Unlikely to occur 
5= Medium: About an even chance of 
occurring 
7= High: Likely to occur 
9= Definite: Definitely will occur 
B
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
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  Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9  □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Comments: 
  
Examples: 
 
If Breakdown in core operations has an insignificant effect on the 
available infrastructure capacity, then please tick 0. 
 
If the consequence probability of Breakdown in core operations 
impacting on the available infrastructure capacity will never happen 
then please tick 0. 
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Consequence Severity and Consequence Probability Analysis  
 Core Elements Consequence severity  Consequence probability  
What is the severity level of the impact on the 
core elements of the transportation process? 
 
0= Negligible: An insignificant effect on this 
core activity 
1= Minor: Causing some inconvenience with 
minor impacts 
3= Moderate: Causing some disruption with 
medium  impacts 
5= Major: Causing major disruptions to 
transportation operations 
7= Critical: Causing failure of transportation 
operations 
9= Catastrophic: Causing complete and 
irrecoverable failure of transportation 
operations 
 
What is the consequence probability of the 
risk impact on the core activities of the 
transportation process? 
 
0= Impossible: Will never occur 
1= Rare: Rarely to occur 
3= Low: Unlikely to occur 
5= Medium: About an even chance of 
occurring 
7= High: Likely to occur 
9= Definite: Definitely will occur 
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9  □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Comments: 
  
Examples: 
 
If Inadequate process capacity has an insignificant effect on the 
available infrastructure capacity, then please tick 0. 
 
If the consequence probability of Inadequate process capacity 
impacting on the available infrastructure capacity will never happen 
then please tick 0. 
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Consequence Severity and Consequence Probability Analysis  
 Core Elements Consequence severity  Consequence probability  
What is the severity level of the impact on the 
core elements of the transportation process? 
 
0= Negligible: An insignificant effect on this 
core activity 
1= Minor: Causing some inconvenience with 
minor impacts 
3= Moderate: Causing some disruption with 
medium  impacts 
5= Major: Causing major disruptions to 
transportation operations 
7= Critical: Causing failure of transportation 
operations 
9= Catastrophic: Causing complete and 
irrecoverable failure of transportation 
operations 
 
What is the consequence probability of the 
risk impact on the core activities of the 
transportation process? 
 
0= Impossible: Will never occur 
1= Rare: Rarely to occur 
3= Low: Unlikely to occur 
5= Medium: About an even chance of 
occurring 
7= High: Likely to occur 
9= Definite: Definitely will occur 
C
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9  □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Comments: 
  
Examples: 
 
If Complexity of products‟ types has an insignificant effect on the 
available infrastructure capacity, then please tick 0. 
 
If the consequence probability of Complexity of products‟ types 
impacting on the available infrastructure capacity will never happen 
then please tick 0. 
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Consequence Severity and Consequence Probability Analysis  
 Core Elements Consequence severity  Consequence probability  
What is the severity level of the impact on the 
core elements of the transportation process? 
 
0= Negligible: An insignificant effect on this 
core activity 
1= Minor: Causing some inconvenience with 
minor impacts 
3= Moderate: Causing some disruption with 
medium  impacts 
5= Major: Causing major disruptions to 
transportation operations 
7= Critical: Causing failure of transportation 
operations 
9= Catastrophic: Causing complete and 
irrecoverable failure of transportation 
operations 
 
What is the consequence probability of the 
risk impact on the core activities of the 
transportation process? 
 
0= Impossible: Will never occur 
1= Rare: Rarely to occur 
3= Low: Unlikely to occur 
5= Medium: About an even chance of 
occurring 
7= High: Likely to occur 
9= Definite: Definitely will occur 
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9  □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Comments: 
  
Examples: 
 
If Lack of/inappropriate container management has an insignificant 
effect on the available infrastructure capacity, then please tick 0. 
 
If the consequence probability of Lack of/inappropriate container 
management impacting on the available infrastructure capacity will 
never happen then please tick 0. 
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Consequence Severity and Consequence Probability Analysis  
 Core Elements Consequence severity  Consequence probability  
What is the severity level of the impact on the 
core elements of the transportation process? 
 
0= Negligible: An insignificant effect on this 
core activity 
1= Minor: Causing some inconvenience with 
minor impacts 
3= Moderate: Causing some disruption with 
medium  impacts 
5= Major: Causing major disruptions to 
transportation operations 
7= Critical: Causing failure of transportation 
operations 
9= Catastrophic: Causing complete and 
irrecoverable failure of transportation 
operations 
 
What is the consequence probability of the 
risk impact on the core activities of the 
transportation process? 
 
0= Impossible: Will never occur 
1= Rare: Rarely to occur 
3= Low: Unlikely to occur 
5= Medium: About an even chance of 
occurring 
7= High: Likely to occur 
9= Definite: Definitely will occur 
L
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9  □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Comments: 
  
Examples: 
 
If Lack of qualified labours has an insignificant effect on the available 
infrastructure capacity, then please tick 0. 
 
If the consequence probability of Lack of qualified labours impacting 
on the available infrastructure capacity will never happen then please 
tick 0. 
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Consequence Severity and Consequence Probability Analysis  
 Core Elements Consequence severity  Consequence probability  
What is the severity level of the impact on the 
core elements of the transportation process? 
 
0= Negligible: An insignificant effect on this 
core activity 
1= Minor: Causing some inconvenience with 
minor impacts 
3= Moderate: Causing some disruption with 
medium  impacts 
5= Major: Causing major disruptions to 
transportation operations 
7= Critical: Causing failure of transportation 
operations 
9= Catastrophic: Causing complete and 
irrecoverable failure of transportation 
operations 
 
What is the consequence probability of the 
risk impact on the core activities of the 
transportation process? 
 
0= Impossible: Will never occur 
1= Rare: Rarely to occur 
3= Low: Unlikely to occur 
5= Medium: About an even chance of 
occurring 
7= High: Likely to occur 
9= Definite: Definitely will occur 
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9  □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Comments: 
  
Examples: 
 
If Information sharing delay has an insignificant effect on the available 
infrastructure capacity, then please tick 0. 
 
If the consequence probability of Information sharing delay impacting 
on the available infrastructure capacity will never happen then please 
tick 0. 
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Consequence Severity and Consequence Probability Analysis  
 Core Elements Consequence severity  Consequence probability  
What is the severity level of the impact on the 
core elements of the transportation process? 
 
0= Negligible: An insignificant effect on this 
core activity 
1= Minor: Causing some inconvenience with 
minor impacts 
3= Moderate: Causing some disruption with 
medium  impacts 
5= Major: Causing major disruptions to 
transportation operations 
7= Critical: Causing failure of transportation 
operations 
9= Catastrophic: Causing complete and 
irrecoverable failure of transportation 
operations 
 
What is the consequence probability of the 
risk impact on the core activities of the 
transportation process? 
 
0= Impossible: Will never occur 
1= Rare: Rarely to occur 
3= Low: Unlikely to occur 
5= Medium: About an even chance of 
occurring 
7= High: Likely to occur 
9= Definite: Definitely will occur 
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Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
 
P
le
as
e 
al
l 
an
o
th
er
 r
is
k
s 
sh
o
u
ld
 b
e 
co
n
si
d
er
ed
 
 
Available Infrastructure Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9  □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Available Vehicle Capacity □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quality) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transported Object Damage (Quantity) □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Time □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Timeliness of Information  sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Accuracy of Information sharing □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Transportation Cost □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7   □ 9 
Comments: 
  
Examples: 
If a Financial problem has an insignificant effect on the available 
infrastructure capacity, then please tick 0. 
If the consequence probability of Financial problems impacting on the 
available infrastructure capacity will never happen then please tick 0. 
 
 
 
THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR YOUR KIND PARTICIPATION IN THIS SURVEY. 
YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL.
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化工供应链中运输过程的风险管理 
调查问卷 (第二部分) 
尊敬的专家： 
 
         您好！我是英国利物浦约翰莫尔斯大学(LJMU)利物浦物流和海洋研究所的一名博士研究生，
名叫李超宇。LJMU与武汉理工大学共同参加欧盟第七框架计划“玛丽居里行动计划”中的《风
险评估与决策科学》研究项目。作为此欧盟项目的参与者，我希望能提出一种全新的、系统化
与结构化的方法对化工供应链进行风险识别、评估以及控制的研究。目前，我正在武汉理工大
学开展交流研究工作，希望借此机会通过此次问卷调查得到化工供应链在运输过程中的一些风
险指标信息，为今后的研究提供宝贵的数据支持。 
 
本次调查问卷的目的是： 
1. 针对已经识别出存在于化工供应链运输过程中的企业内营运风险，根据专家的经验与
看法评价其发生于运输过程中的概率。 
2. 企业内营运风险作用于供应链运输过程中的节点，评价带来危害的后果以及产生此后
果的可能性。 
 
  需要提出的是，本次问卷调查采取自愿形式。我们非常感激您在问卷填写中给予的帮助。
本次调查的信息将会完全保密，这也是利物浦约翰摩尔斯大学一直以来所严格要求的。本次调
查需要15到20分钟的时间。 
 
         如果您有任何疑问，请通过电话 +44 (0) 759 334 1528, +86 186 0606 3710或电子邮件
C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk 联系我。您也可以通过电话 +44 (0) 151 231 2236 或电子邮件
J.Ren@ljmu.ac.uk联系我的导师Jun Ren博士。 
 
         请接受我们由衷的感激。如果您想知道调查的最终结果，请通过电子邮件
C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk和我联系。 
 
李超宇 
博士研究生,  
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Tel: +44-(0)759 334 1528; +86-186 0606 3710 
Email: C.Li@2012.ljmu.ac.uk 
Room 121, James Parsons Building  
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
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第一部分：基本情况 
下列问题是针对您以及您所在的企业或公司，请根据您以及您所在的企业或公司的实际情况进
行选择。 
1. 您所在机构的在化工供应链中扮演的角色是？ 
货物供应方 
如：工厂  
服务提供方 
如：配送，存储 
基础设施提供方 
如：港口 
其它 
    
 
2. 以下四个运输方式中，您涉及到哪些运输方式？（可多项） 
道路运输 铁路运输 航空运输 水路运输 管道运输 其他 
      
 
3. 您所在的企业是否曾经遭遇过危害事件？ 后果是否严重？ 
没有   有，后果不严重   有，后果严重 
4. 您所在的企业有没有对雇员和管理人员进行过风险管理培训？ 
专门进行过   有，但是附带性的   没有 
5. 针对供应链风险管理，要系统掌握风险管理方面的知识，您认为最需要解决的问题是
什么？ 
如何对供应链风险进行系统的识别和分析     掌握针对供应链风险的管理措施 
专门成立供应链风险管理部门                           公司领导的重视程度 
其它（请说明） 
 
6. 您的职位是？ 
             ____________________________________________________________________________ 
7. 您所从事的研究领域或专业领域是？ 
      ____________________________________________________________________________ 
8. 您在化工行业或化工供应链行业中工作了多久？ 
 1-5 年      6-10 年      11-15 年      16-20 年      >20 年 
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第二部分：以下问题是根据与化工供应链运输过程相关的企业内营运危害事件进行设计的。根据您的专业经验与看法，请分别对危害事件影响运
输过程的可能性程度在相应分值的方框内打勾。 
（危害事件发生的可能性指危害事件在特定时间内发生可能影响运输操作的频率） 
化工供应链运输过程危害事件分析 
序
号 
已识别出的企业内营运危害事件 危害事件影响运输过程的可能性 
(极少发生——非常高) 
 
1 被运输货物具有易燃易爆等危险性质 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9  
危害事件发生的可能性？ 
 
0= 极少发生：从未或者很难发生 
1= 很低：两三年内会发生一次 
3= 低：可能每年发生一次 
5= 中等：有时候每几个月会发生一次 
7= 高：可能每个月都会发生 
9= 非常高：可能每天都会频繁的发生 
2 化工供应链运输服务商选择不当  □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
3 化工供应链节点间运输线路选择不当 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
4 运输过程中主要设备失效或发生故障 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
5 运输能力不足 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
6 运输过程复杂多变 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
7 被运输货物种类复杂 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
8 库存管理缺乏/不当 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
9 容器管理缺乏/不当 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
10 合格的工作人员缺乏 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
11 技术革新的挑战 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
12 供应链信息共享水平低 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
13 供应链信息共享延误／不准确 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
14 运输服务提供商财务问题 □ 0      □ 1      □ 3      □ 5      □ 7     □ 9 
备注：  
例子： 
如果核心操作部分故障好几年都不可能发生，请选择 0 
如何核心操作部分故障频繁发生甚至每个月都会发生请选择 7 
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第三部分：实际与潜在的危害事件都可能通过影响运输操作中的核心活动进而影响整个运输过程的。基于前期研究，我们认为运输过程中的核心
活动包括：可用的基础设施能力、可用的运输工具运输能力、运输对象质量损坏、运输对象数量损坏、运输时间增加、信息共享实效性降低、信
息共享准确性下降、运输成本增加。以下问题是根据识别出的危害事件与运输过程的核心活动设计的。 危害事件作用于运输过程的核心活动并产
生一定的后果，根据您的专业经验与看法，请您对此后果的严重性与产生此后果的可能性在相应分值的方框中打勾。 
（后果的严重性是根据危害事件导致可能后果的等级确定的，产生此后果的可能性则根据灾害发生后该后果发生的概率确定的） 
危害事件作用于运输过程中的核心元素所导致的后果严重程度和出现此后果的可能性分析 
危害事件 运输过程的核心元素 后果的严重性 
（可忽略 ——灾难） 
 出现此后果的可能性 
（不可能——极高） 
危害事件发生并且影响运输过程核心元
素的后果是什么？ 
 
0= 可忽略：对此核心活动的影响不重要 
1= 较小：对此核心活动带来轻微影响 
3= 中等： 对此核心活动带来中等的影响 
5= 较大：对此核心活动带来较大的影响 
7= 严重：导致运输过程失败 
9= 灾难：对运输过程带来灾难性的影响 
 
危害事件发生并且产生此影响运输过程
核心元素的后果的可能性是什么？ 
 
0= 不可能：从未发生 
1= 极少发生：很难发生 
3= 低：不是很可能发生 
5= 中等：有一定的可能发生 
7= 高：很可能发生 
9= 极高：一定发生 
 
1. 被运输货
物具有易燃
易爆等危险
性质 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 □ 0   □ 1   □ 3   □ 5   □ 7  □ 9 
备注： 
  
例子： 
后果的严重性： 
如果危害事件 （1）被运输货物具有易燃易爆等危险性质对于
可用的基础设施能力降低的影响较小，那么请选择 1。 
 
出现此后果的可能性： 
如果危害事件（1）被运输货物具有易燃易爆等危险性质对于
可用的基础设施能力降低的影响较小，但发生的可能性高，
那么请选择 7。 
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危害事件作用于运输过程中的核心元素所导致的后果严重程度和出现此后果的可能性分析 
危害事件 运输过程的核心元素 后果的严重性 
（可忽略 ——灾难） 
 出现此后果的可能性 
（不可能——极高） 
 
危害事件发生并且影响运输过程核心元素
的后果是什么？ 
 
0= 可忽略：对此核心活动的影响不重要 
1= 较小：对此核心活动带来轻微影响 
3= 中等： 对此核心活动带来中等的影响 
5= 较大：对此核心活动带来较大的影响 
7= 严重：导致运输过程失败 
9= 灾难：对运输过程带来灾难性的影响 
 
危害事件发生并且产生此影响运输过程核
心元素的后果的可能性是什么？ 
 
0= 不可能：从未发生 
1= 极少发生：很难发生 
3= 低：不是很可能发生 
5= 中等：有一定的可能发生 
7= 高：很可能发生 
9= 极高：一定发生 
 
2. 化工供应
链运输服务
商选择不当 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
 
3. 化工供应链
节点间运输
线路选择不
当 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9  □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
备注： 例子： 
后果的严重性： 
如果危害事件（2）化工供应链运输服务商选择不当对于可用
的基础设施能力降低的影响较小，那么请选择 1。 
出现此后果的可能性： 
如果危害事件（2）化工供应链运输服务商选择不当对于可用
的基础设施能力降低的影响较小，但发生的可能性高，那么请
选择 7。 
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危害事件作用于运输过程中的核心元素所导致的后果严重程度和出现此后果的可能性分析 
危害事件 运输过程的核心元素 后果的严重性 
（可忽略 ——灾难） 
 出现此后果的可能性 
（不可能——极高） 
 
危害事件发生并且影响运输过程核心元素
的后果是什么？ 
 
0= 可忽略：对此核心活动的影响不重要 
1= 较小：对此核心活动带来轻微影响 
3= 中等： 对此核心活动带来中等的影响 
5= 较大：对此核心活动带来较大的影响 
7= 严重：导致运输过程失败 
9= 灾难：对运输过程带来灾难性的影响 
 
危害事件发生并且产生此影响运输过程核
心元素的后果的可能性是什么？ 
 
0= 不可能：从未发生 
1= 极少发生：很难发生 
3= 低：不是很可能发生 
5= 中等：有一定的可能发生 
7= 高：很可能发生 
9= 极高：一定发生 
 
4. 运输过程
中主要设备
失效或发生
故障 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
 
5. 运输能力不
足 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9  □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
备注： 例子： 
后果的严重性： 
如果危害事件（4）运输过程中主要设备失效或发生故障对于
可用的基础设施能力降低的影响较小，那么请选择 1。 
出现此后果的可能性： 
如果危害事件（4）运输过程中主要设备失效或发生故障对于
可用的基础设施能力降低的影响较小，但发生的可能性高，那
么请选择 7。 
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危害事件作用于运输过程中的核心元素所导致的后果严重程度和出现此后果的可能性分析 
危害事件 运输过程的核心元素 后果的严重性 
（可忽略 ——灾难） 
 出现此后果的可能性 
（不可能——极高） 
 
危害事件发生并且影响运输过程核心元素
的后果是什么？ 
 
0= 可忽略：对此核心活动的影响不重要 
1= 较小：对此核心活动带来轻微影响 
3= 中等： 对此核心活动带来中等的影响 
5= 较大：对此核心活动带来较大的影响 
7= 严重：导致运输过程失败 
9= 灾难：对运输过程带来灾难性的影响 
 
危害事件发生并且产生此影响运输过程核
心元素的后果的可能性是什么？ 
 
0= 不可能：从未发生 
1= 极少发生：很难发生 
3= 低：不是很可能发生 
5= 中等：有一定的可能发生 
7= 高：很可能发生 
9= 极高：一定发生 
 
6. 运输过程
复杂多变 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
 
7. 被运输货物
种类复杂 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9  □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
备注： 例子： 
后果的严重性： 
如果危害事件（6）运输过程复杂多变对于可用的基础设施能
力降低的影响较小，那么请选择 1。 
出现此后果的可能性： 
如果危害事件（6）运输过程复杂多变对于可用的基础设施能
力降低的影响较小，但发生的可能性高，那么请选择 7。 
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危害事件作用于运输过程中的核心元素所导致的后果严重程度和出现此后果的可能性分析 
危害事件 运输过程的核心元素 后果的严重性 
（可忽略 ——灾难） 
 出现此后果的可能性 
（不可能——极高） 
 
危害事件发生并且影响运输过程核心元素
的后果是什么？ 
 
0= 可忽略：对此核心活动的影响不重要 
1= 较小：对此核心活动带来轻微影响 
3= 中等： 对此核心活动带来中等的影响 
5= 较大：对此核心活动带来较大的影响 
7= 严重：导致运输过程失败 
9= 灾难：对运输过程带来灾难性的影响 
 
危害事件发生并且产生此影响运输过程核
心元素的后果的可能性是什么？ 
 
0= 不可能：从未发生 
1= 极少发生：很难发生 
3= 低：不是很可能发生 
5= 中等：有一定的可能发生 
7= 高：很可能发生 
9= 极高：一定发生 
 
8. 库存管理
缺乏/不当 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
 
9. 容器管理缺
乏/不当 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9  □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
备注： 例子： 
后果的严重性： 
如果危害事件（8）库存管理缺乏/不当对于可用的基础设施能
力降低的影响较小，那么请选择 1。 
出现此后果的可能性： 
如果危害事件（8）库存管理缺乏/不当对于可用的基础设施能
力降低的影响较小，但发生的可能性高，那么请选择 7。 
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危害事件作用于运输过程中的核心元素所导致的后果严重程度和出现此后果的可能性分析 
危害事件 运输过程的核心元素 后果的严重性 
（可忽略 ——灾难） 
 出现此后果的可能性 
（不可能——极高） 
 
危害事件发生并且影响运输过程核心元素的
后果是什么？ 
 
0= 可忽略：对此核心活动的影响不重要 
1= 较小：对此核心活动带来轻微影响 
3= 中等： 对此核心活动带来中等的影响 
5= 较大：对此核心活动带来较大的影响 
7= 严重：导致运输过程失败 
9= 灾难：对运输过程带来灾难性的影响 
 
危害事件发生并且产生此影响运输过程核心
元素的后果的可能性是什么？ 
 
0= 不可能：从未发生 
1= 极少发生：很难发生 
3= 低：不是很可能发生 
5= 中等：有一定的可能发生 
7= 高：很可能发生 
9= 极高：一定发生 
 
10. 合格的工
作人员缺乏 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
 
11. 技术革新
的挑战 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9  □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
备注： 例子： 
后果的严重性： 
如果危害事件（10）合格的工作人员缺乏对于可用的基础设施
能力降低的影响较小，那么请选择 1。 
出现此后果的可能性： 
如果危害事件（10）合格的工作人员缺乏对于可用的基础设施
能力降低的影响较小，但发生的可能性高，那么请选择 7。 
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危害事件作用于运输过程中的核心元素所导致的后果严重程度和出现此后果的可能性分析 
危害事件 运输过程的核心元素 后果的严重性 
（可忽略 ——灾难） 
 出现此后果的可能性 
（不可能——极高） 
 
危害事件发生并且影响运输过程核心元素的
后果是什么？ 
 
0= 可忽略：对此核心活动的影响不重要 
1= 较小：对此核心活动带来轻微影响 
3= 中等： 对此核心活动带来中等的影响 
5= 较大：对此核心活动带来较大的影响 
7= 严重：导致运输过程失败 
9= 灾难：对运输过程带来灾难性的影响 
 
危害事件发生并且产生此影响运输过程核心
元素的后果的可能性是什么？ 
 
0= 不可能：从未发生 
1= 极少发生：很难发生 
3= 低：不是很可能发生 
5= 中等：有一定的可能发生 
7= 高：很可能发生 
9= 极高：一定发生 
 
12. 供应链信
息共享水平
低 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
 
13. 供应链信
息共享延误
／不准确 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9  □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
备注： 例子： 
后果的严重性： 
如果危害事件（12）供应链信息共享水平低对于可用的基础设
施能力降低的影响较小，那么请选择 1。 
出现此后果的可能性： 
如果危害事件（12）供应链信息共享水平低对于可用的基础设
施能力降低的影响较小，但发生的可能性高，那么请选择 7。 
 
 
 
 
  
268 
 
 
 
 
再次感谢您在此次调查中提供的帮助。 
您的回答将会被保密。
危害事件作用于运输过程中的核心元素所导致的后果严重程度和出现此后果的可能性分析 
危害事件 运输过程的核心元素 后果的严重性 
（可忽略 ——灾难） 
 出现此后果的可能性 
（不可能——极高） 
 
危害事件发生并且影响运输过程核心元素的
后果是什么？ 
 
0= 可忽略：对此核心活动的影响不重要 
1= 较小：对此核心活动带来轻微影响 
3= 中等： 对此核心活动带来中等的影响 
5= 较大：对此核心活动带来较大的影响 
7= 严重：导致运输过程失败 
9= 灾难：对运输过程带来灾难性的影响 
 
危害事件发生并且产生此影响运输过程核心
元素的后果的可能性是什么？ 
 
0= 不可能：从未发生 
1= 极少发生：很难发生 
3= 低：不是很可能发生 
5= 中等：有一定的可能发生 
7= 高：很可能发生 
9= 极高：一定发生 
 
 
14. 运输服务
提供商财务
问题 
可用的基础设施能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
可用的运输工具运输能力降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象质量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输对象数量损坏 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输时间增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享时效性降低 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
信息共享准确性下降 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
运输成本增加 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 □ 0    □ 1    □ 3    □ 5    □ 7   □ 9 
备注： 例子： 
后果的严重性： 
如果危害事件（14）运输服务提供商财务问题对于可用的基础
设施能力降低的影响较小，那么请选择 1。 
出现此后果的可能性： 
如果危害事件（14）运输服务提供商财务问题对于可用的基础
设施能力降低的影响较小，但发生的可能性高，那么请选择
7。 
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